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'Studio 9' Discusses Political Situation in Europe

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["Studio 9" program with Sir Rodric Braithwaite, UK ambassador to the USSR; Gerd Koenig, GDR ambassador to the USSR; Orjan Berner, Swedish ambassador to the USSR; Professor Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, adviser to the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman; and Professor Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Europe and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences; presented by Valentin Zorin—Braithwaite and Berner speak in English with superimposed Russian translation]

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello comrades. As usual, we will devote our conversation in "Studio 9" today to one important issue, in order not to get sidetracked, not to get confused by a variety of topics and to concentrate upon one topic and to discuss it instead from various angles and in more detail. Currently we are witnessing events which will surely subsequently enter history textbooks. I have in mind the completely new political situation in Europe that is now emerging. The structure, the political structure of Europe which emerged after the war and which was discussed at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences is apparently, generally speaking, reaching the end. A completely new situation is taking shape. Of course, I do not have in mind here the problem of borders that took shape following World War II. The inviolability of these borders—the principle of inviolability of these borders—was enshrined and confirmed by the Helsinki Conference Final Act. However, within these borders of postwar Europe events of enormous importance are now taking place. They are creating a completely new situation in Europe.

In as much as this situation represents one of the essential parts of the whole of the present-day world politics, we will discuss this situation during today's "Studio 9" conversation. For you to be able to have various viewpoints, ideas reached through differing approaches, we have today invited to the studio representatives of states which are in NATO and those that represent neutral European states and East European countries, as well as prominent representatives of ours.

To start with, I wish to present to you the participants of our conversation today: Sir Rodric Braithwaite, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Great Britain to the Soviet Union; Comrade Gerd Koenig, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the GDR to our country; Mr. Oerjan Berner, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Sweden to our country; and prominent Soviet specialists: Professor Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, adviser to the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman; and professor Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Europe and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences.

I think it will be correct for us to begin our conversation today with a question I wish to ask each participant. The cause, or causes of the emergence of the present, new situation in Europe—in what do they consist, in your view? Sir Rodric, we begin with you.

[Braithwaite] I will speak English if you do not mind. Why is it that the new situation has emerged? You started by saying that in 1945 agreements were signed. I think—and this is something everyone recognizes—that they have now become obsolete. World War II has become a thing of the past. However, we must begin by saying that as far as many people are concerned, the memory of the consequences of World War II has not become a thing of the past. We cannot ignore the history of those days.

There are some aspects of the 1945 accords which will, without a doubt, not be subject to change. Taking into account the fact that it was 45 years ago—and it is a very long period of time—it is unrealistic to reckon that the political situation would have remained unchanged. One of the main reasons for change is what has taken place in every part of Europe from the political viewpoint. I think we will obviously dwell on this somewhat later. I also take account of the important events that have taken place in the Soviet Union since 1985 and of the serious changes which have taken place in East Europe.

[Zorin] Thank you. Comrade Koenig, your view?

[Koenig] As far as some proposals are concerned, it is surely difficult to have one's say, but it seems to me that, in general, it is a result of recognizing that the process of confrontation which recently existed had no chance at all. People came to understand it. I think that it is a breakthrough for the new thinking and for perestroyka in the socialist countries, and this created this opportunity of going over to an altogether different form of cooperation. The postwar period is coming to an end.

[Zorin] Vadim Valentinovich, what have you to say?

[Zagladin] It seems to me that the cause, the in-depth cause of what has taken place in Europe lies in the internal or, if you like, the crisis development of our civilization. This has demonstrated itself most vividly in Europe and made it necessary to have changes in the East and West alike, and also in the relations between the two parts of the continent. This includes the realization of the dead-end nature of the path we were on before and of the need for changes, conditioned by economic progress and all the other processes. In a word, it is a natural result both of the world development and all-European development, a result of the striving of Europeans to find some sort of a new path, one that leads away from this crisis and which makes it possible to tackle the problems that arise.

[Zorin] Ambassador, please go ahead.

[Berner] I do not object to anything that has already been said. Perhaps I will add a few words. Undoubtedly, it is

in East Europe and the Soviet Union that there have been the main changes. The basis of these changes consists, to an overwhelming extent, of causes all of their own, such as the economic peculiarities of the systems. Some people call these the social market systems in East Europe and these, to some extent, are undoubtedly in opposition to the free market system, one that has already become established and that has proved itself as the most effective system. At the same time, the countries of East Europe came to lag behind, proving the untenability of their systems.

Undoubtedly, as my British colleague has already mentioned, the initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union were of cardinal importance for the political changes we have been observing during the last 4-5 years. The Soviet Union renounced the doctrine of controlling the events in East Europe. This is one of the main reasons for the events taking place there. It seems to me that, without a doubt, it is the events in the Soviet Union that were of main significance.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, your turn has come.

[Zhurkin] It seems to me that the main cause consists in the fact that the division of Europe was becoming outdated. I have in mind not just the military and political division but also to some extent the economic division and somehow the social division. To speak of the underlying tendencies here, we have, of course, the major transformation which West Europe and the West in general are experiencing, becoming socialized in some aspects, regulating some aspects of its economy, developing social programs, integrating with each other, very effectively. If one is to speak of our, the East side of Europe, here we evidently have a growing realization of the fact that the future, and especially the glorious socialist future, cannot be built in conditions of lack of freedom and in violations of the economic laws. This process of renewal underway in our country, a process that is far from easy indeed, a process that is apparently long-term, is also, it seems to me, a contribution of our part of Europe to the overcoming of this division of our continent.

[Zorin] Thank you. I wish to ask my next question by continuing what you have been talking about. The front pages of today's papers all over the world carry reports about events in East Europe. Of course, we will not skirt round this question today when speaking about the situation in Europe. But before we touch on it, I would first of all like to put questions to our Western participants in our conversation concerning this. What, in your view, has changed in West Europe since the end of the war? [passage omitted: Berner replies: the role of the United States as guarantor of security is undiminished, but its economic role has declined in Europe; there is economic integration in West Europe]

[Zorin] Sir Rodric?

[Braithwaite] The first fact I wish to mention is this: After the end of World War II, the West European countries found a key to solve the economic, social, and public problems. They succeeded in creating an economic and political system which, more or less, guarantees social justice. It seems to me that it is a very important change since the time when Europe was in ruins.

As my Swedish colleague has noted, th European Community has a very great historical importance and significance, which came to be recognized only recently, not only by the Soviet Union but also by the United States—I have here the past 2-3 years in mind. The Community came together. It came into being thanks to two reasons. The first reason was Hitler. Subsequently, Germany gave its word never again to do what it had done in the past. The second reason is Stalin. The desire to be defended and protected economically, too, facilitated the unification of Europe. This whole process is very dynamic and very useful.

On the other hand, when I was in Washington 4 years ago, Americans did not believe that Europe would be unified. I think that people here likewise did not believe it. The process was already underway then, but there was a refusal to acknowledge it. As for the changes in East Europe, it is perhaps over the last 2 years that West Europeans gradually came to acknowledge the fact that Europe does not stop at the Elbe. In autumn 1988, Mrs. Thatcher noted that we should expand our concept of Europe and that we should include in it East Europe, too. It is a new concept—the success of this idea depends, without a doubt, on the changes taking place in East Europe.

[Zorin] Now, I think, it is necessary to say a few words about the events in East Europe. I think our TV viewers expect it of us. Let us, then, attempt to compare the viewpoints of the participants in our conversation today on the causes of the events taking place in Europe. I am confident that many, if not all of them, will have various explanations of what is taking place.

[Zagladin] Here you will at long last attain a difference of views, isn't that so? [participants chuckle]

[Zorin] I will try. Comrade Koenig, let us start with you.

[Koenig] I think that indeed the political and economic system that existed in the socialist countries following World War II has reached its limits. The limits have been reached. It may also be that we have not understood correctly what we have been talking about. We called it Socialism, but, in actual fact, it was not what we all conceived it to be like. I think that the command and administrative system that exists—or did exist—it can now be said, has shown in all the East European countries that one must not work like this.

I think the fact that there has been no renewal within our parties, especially the communist parties, also plays a part here. We restricted the role of the apparatus of state. We failed to make use of the economic opportunities or

potentials at our disposal, since these economic management methods did not create the effect we needed. Nor did we make use in good time of the opportunities afforded by the scientific and technological development. Even as far as the social sphere is concerned, we must say we have come to lag behind. A great deal has been done, as is shown by our country's results. All the same, people were not satisfied with it, if you look at the recent events that have taken place. So all this does play a part and has been playing a part, and we did encounter it, I think, and people did not agree with it. Of course these processes took place in different ways. In your country this perestroyka process began from above, by a decision of your party's Central Committee. In our country it began from below. In essence, it began with popular movement on the streets. It was a serious mistake and it had serious consequences for further development in the GDR.

[Zorin] Sir Rodric, what's the view on this from the banks—of the Thames?

[Braithwaite] I think that there is one central question you have mentioned. It seems to us—this is also the way I understand it—that the strategic question of perestroyka consists in the fact that there can be no prosperity in your country without the emancipation of the intellect. People must strive to the utmost to develop their individuality and initiative, even at the most elementary level, to make it possible to resolve economic and political problems, even if, in this case, we set aside the examination of moral problems.

I think that the crisis in East Europe is explained by the fact that an attempt was made to govern society on a different basis: that of uniformity, of controlling the political structure from above, this control asserting that it has a monopoly for the correct decisions to cope with an enormous number of problems. One can understand that a principle like this could not work. It is no coincidence that in the last 5 years the countries of East Europe came, one after another, to understand it. It is no coincidence that the process of perestroyka began in the Soviet Union. Until the Soviet Union proclaimed its readiness for perestroyka and changes, it was impossible for other East European countries to begin this process themselves. This can be seen by the example of the 1968 events, the 1956 events, and others.

To some extent, what you have been dealing with in the past was a boiling cauldron, as it were, and all the time you have been trying to keep the lid down. This process was bound to start in Moscow. Some time was needed so that the East European peoples could come to believe that they can also see these changes in their countries. But once it was clear that the Soviet state was indeed serious in its intentions, the East European countries, already without any fear of outside pressure, began to implement their own changes.

[Zorin] Mr. Berner, I see you want to add something?

[Berner] In order to somehow add a bit more spice to our conversation, our discussion, I would like to touch on a question that has already been mentioned by Mr. Koenig. We can see the limits of socialism's capabilities.

I was ambassador to Poland for 3 years. I saw that already at that time, the Poles became convinced of the need for changes. They thought that their economic and political system was ineffective. It was not to their liking. The prestige of the Communist Party in Poland was not high. The explosion that followed in Poland—and we all witnessed it—proves it. So that is why I would like to add a bit by way of negative aspects when describing the political system that had become established in these countries.

[Zorin] Vadim Valentinovich, are you ready to join in the discussion?

[Zagladin] I am ready. Well, all in all, much of what has been said is mutually complimentary. This is good. I am in agreement with what Gerd Koenig began with, that the system itself has reached its limit. I would even put it this way: That, in actual fact, a crisis of the model of society that had been set up arose over a certain period of time. Mr. Berner says it is a crisis of Socialism. Here I disagree. Why? Because the society that was set up under the banner of Socialism, with certain of its principles being applied, was distorted. That is to say it failed to implement these principles to the full. A contradiction arose between it and the needs of development, the needs of peoples. There is no doubt that this process did make itself felt earlier on. We in the Soviet Union attempted to begin reforms several times. But it was precisely the absence of democratism and the fact that these reforms emanated from above that constituted an impediment.

The year 1985 was a result of two currents, from above and from below, converging, moreover, unfortunately, we even tied somehow to suppress this pressure from below before 1985. Just recall the case of Academician Sakharov. But in 1985 these two currents converged, which ensured both the scope and the controllability of the process and its direction toward a specific side, despite all the difficulties and complexities experienced by this process.

When I said that it was not socialism itself, but merely the model that had been created with distortions that came to be ruined. I thereby wanted to say that we certainly do not write off socialism or its values. Thanks to these values, when they were being implemented, our country and all countries did do a very great deal. Our country was completely transformed in 70 years but, unfortunately, this was accompanied by these enormous costs, victims, and losses that everyone knows about.

As for our neighboring countries, the countries of East Europe, central Europe, it seems to me that a process that, to some extent, is a dual one, was also taking place there. However, it proceeded differently. Gerd Koenig here already spoke of that. I only want to spread it to the

whole of East Europe. There was a pressure from below; there was an awareness that changes are essential and, in particular, it was after the start of our perestroyka that this process began to develop.

However, it was encountered in various countries of East Europe in various ways. In one case, say, it was supported, and they themselves attempted to do something. In another case, it was supported but they did nothing. In yet another case, they simply essentially disagred with what we had embarked on. Hence this distinct nature of the forms which transformations within East European countries assumed. There was no convergence of two currents here. Here, one current from below was overthrowing the leadership. It is very difficult, but I think that even though a very complex, contradictory and perhaps rather lengthy period is ahead, all the same, I think that the peoples of these countries will find a way, or will embark on a way that will lead them to human, humane values, ones that are, if you like, socialist in their essence.

[Braithwaite] I think that the problem of the socialist system which has now approached its failure consists in the fact that for a long time only one definition of the model of socialism was permitted; and it was a model that was incorrect.

When you speak of social values—and it seems to me that Mr. Gorbachev spoke of that—you have in mind the universal values, the universal values of humanity and mankind, such as social justice and the like. When you speak of this, it is important to grasp how these values are attained in practical life. In other countries—Sweden, for instance, is frequently mentioned in this context—there are ways of implementing these values in the practice of East European countries and they were inadequate at a time when in the Western countries this process resembled in some respcts the development of Socialism, that is to say, the guaranteeing of social values for the peoples of West European countries. There were also such examples in my country. It seems to me one needs to be cautious and argue not about words, but about realities.

[Zagladin] You are right, of course. The response to the questions posed by the development of society was inadequate. In the final analysis it meant we had departed from our ideals and from the ideals of all mankind.

[Zhurkin] It seems to me that it is natural, when we speak of the causes of the undoubtedly colossal changes taking place in East Europe, for us to think always, of course, of the future, and the future not only of East Europe, but of Europe, and even of the whole world. All the same, a number of such tendencies, a number of directions will exist in the future. There will be the socialist model, in its enormous diversity, in various forms. There will also be a social democratic model which has proven itself to be good. It is also possible that some other variants will also exist.

It seems to me that whilst renewing itself, socialism will discard what has become obsolete and will create something new. There will also be some sort of other models of development. There will be a neo-liberal model, or maybe a kind of symbiosis between them.

In this context I think that the central question of history, as it were, of the nineties is now of course this: What place will the Soviet Union, and what place will the East European countries find for themselves in this great Socialist movement? Will this apply to all of them? Maybe some of them will proceed along some other path? It is a reality which it is still difficult to foresee for the time being.

But I would also like to return to what others were saying. It seems to me that Socialism, in its various forms, has, all the same, sufficiently proved it has a right to exist on our planet, that it has a right to development, and we will naturally strive to advance its new, more progressive forms.

[Zorin] Last week the "Studio 9" mailbag—this is symptomatic—contained at least one in two letters devoted to the German problem, to its various aspects—which is perfectly understandable. Our constant viewers, the "Studio Nine" viewers, people who for the most part are both interested in international politics and who can get to the bottom of its problems—well, this body of viewers is of the opinion that it is precisely this problem that is now the key problem as far as the European situation is concerned. Well, Gennadiy Ivanovich Smirnov, a veteran of the Patriotic War, a doctor from Kharkov, writes: What is the present and the future of the German problem like?

Well, I think that it will, of course, be Comrade Koenig who will reply, or will start to reply to this question.

[Koenig] Yes, it is a complex question. I agree with the letter's author if he says that the German question is closely connected with the questions of European development, and that it perhaps plays a substantial part here. To begin with, I should state that we have returned to this question, the German question, because we, at any rate—and I think not just us—were of the view that the German question has already been solved. [sentence as heard] This we did proceeding from the fact that after the war there emerged at that time, in the process of the development of Germany, two states, the GDR and the FRG. So we considered this question solved. However, the processes that take place within one nation are much more complex. That is why I think that it is correct to say that there are two states of one German nation. Nor must it be forgotten that we have one history, one culture, one language, of course. There are ties between relatives and the remaining people who have stayed, which must not be forgotten. That is why it seems to me that this question is indeed on the agenda and we must tackle it.

As far as my personal view is concerned, I wish to say that I have no doubt that there will be a unified state. I

will not say when, because journalists always immediately ask when will this happen and how. Of course we can talk about it, because it is a complex question and, in my view, it proceeds stage by stage.

What else did I want to say to begin with? I wanted to say that one must not view this question merely as an overcoming of the division of Germany to resolve the German question. No, it is much more complex. As a result of World War II, all four great powers proceeded from the fact that it was essential to overcome fascism and militarization and to create a peace-loving state and,—the main thing,—that war would never emanate again from Germany. This, in my view, is the main thing we now forget about. We speak of various things: reunification, unification; we are interested in how this is proceeding, but we have already rather forgotten that the main thing is to continue the disarmament process and to think about actually preserving peace and stability in Europe.

[Zorin] What does the ambassador of Great Britain say on this?

[Braithwaite] Of course, I can only agree with what my German colleague has said. I think that it is even possible to amplify what he said. I already mentioned at the beginning the postwar agreements which did have historical consequences of their own. Up to this very day they are of great importance for many people. Our position has always been that the Germans have the right to self-determination, just as any other nation. At the moment, in my view, it is important that the German nation the GDR ambassador was speaking about ought to implement this right to self-determination in such a way as to prevent the appearance of fear among its neighbors, to rule out a repetition of the sad historical experience we had in the past. I do not believe that it is within the realm of the possible. That is my view.

How to achieve unification in practice is, of course, a matter for the German themselves to resolve. Of course, this must be done in such a way that it does not negatively impinge on their neighbors' interests. We have already spoken of political stability in West Europe. If this process develops democratically, without encroaching on the interests of the two German states, it will represent a factor making for stability. In the final analysis we will have a single state formation of the Germans.

[Zorin] Well, in connection with what you, Sir Rodric, said, I recall a joke I heard in America. Asked how we view the unification of Germany, one witty colleague of mine said: We view this question in the same way in which a devout Catholic asks the Lord to take him to Heaven, adding that it should be done as late as possible.

[Braithwaite] You know, it seems to me I have already heard this joke. But I do not agree with it very much. It seems to me that in the final analysis, it was precisely the fact that Germany was divided, split, that has constituted one of the main factors of instability in Europe over the past period. We must somehow overcome the consequences of this division. It seems to me that a positive aspect of the present situation consists in the fact that at present we can resolve this problem democratically. Then we will indeed part with all the consequences of World War II.

[Zhurkin] It seems to me too, Valentin Sergeyevich, that the question does not revolve around the time factor, or that it does not revolve around only the time factor. The question revolves around this: that stability in Europe is not violated. I am very pleased that Sir Rodric said at long last this word "stability." This is because it does not pertain to German-German relations alone. All in all, in East Europe, too, very dynamic situations are underway and these will evidently inevitably engender elements of instability. It is an objective historical reality and we cannot escape from it. Incidentally, nor can you say that the process of integration in West Europe engenders stability and nothing else besides. Instabilities, perhaps not so major, can also be engendered in the economic life, in the relations between West Europe and the United States, between West and East Europe. So stability is the central question.

The question of how to preserve stability is now, it seems to me, the paramount question. At the same time, some sort of European consensus is being worked out to the effect that stability will be ensured so that the German question is solved within the framework of the all-European process. [passage omitted: Berner agrees with Braithwaite, unification will make for greater stability; interests of others must be taken into account; there must be no review of borders]

[Zorin] Excuse me, please, but let me be frank. One gets the impression that we are discussing this problem a bit academically. This is understandable. But I am thinking of the millions of people watching us on TV now. What I am thinking is that as far as the Soviet people are concerned, it is not simply an abstract political problem. It is a problem that exists on top of the Soviet people's very difficult and bitter experience, an experience which even today is still not a thing of the past. Even today it is a bitter present for many families. Vadim Valentinovich, please let us have your viewpoint, not just in an abstract and political manner, but also taking this aspect of the matter into account.

[Zagladin] Well, in the first place I cannot say that this discussion is abstract. I disagree with this. In my view, all the main aspects of the problem have been raised. But, perhaps, answering directly what has been put to me, I would say the following: The fact that the process leading to the re-establishment of a single Germany has begun and the ideas now put forward by Comrade Modrow—a treaty-based community which can be arrived at via confederative relations—and all the other things are already a fact. The process is underway. The question now is not how and how soon it will proceed; the question revolves round its consequences and, in my view, everyone here has spoken of that in various forms.

Here is what I wish to say. As far as I am concerned personally, as a Soviet person whose family also experienced the consequences of the past war, one thing is perfectly clear to me: I am against any reunification that fails to contain within itself and that fails to be accompanied by firm security guarantees not just for our people, but also for all Germany's neighbors and all Europeans.

Firm guarantees—this means that they do not take the form of words, uttered at a press conference or at a lecture at this or that university. I have in mind legally enshrined guarantees, reinforced by obligations of other countries, too. That is why it seems to me that the main problem here is that of security, stability and, of course, of borders. Why do I mention this? Everyone appears to agree that the Helsinki Act does exist and that everything is enshrined within it. But, after all, up to this very day we have seen how Federal Chancellor Kohl has been evasive when replying to these questions. But firm legal guarantees on the inviolability of European borders are what is needed. Without that no reunification is acceptable to me as far as I personally am concerned. I am speaking on my own behalf and am expressing my own point of view, but it seems to me that this is the position that any European shares in his heart of hearts and this also goes for all honest GDR and FRG citizens alike.

[Zorin] Sir Rodric?

[Braithwaite] Do excuse me, I do not wish to trespass on your time too much. I simply wanted to continue our specific conversation. We must reject abstract notions. First of all, as far as the issue of people's views and moods is concerned, in West European countries it is perfectly clear why the attitudes of Soviet people to this question is what it is. After all, it is the Soviet people who suffered most during the time of World War II. There are also moods which, likewise, have arisen as a consequence of World War II and this can be observed in my own country. It is present in my own country, too, as I have already said. It is the division of Germany, something that affected people's attitudes very seriously.

When we speak of the all-European process we must think of how to make use of this experience upon a broader level, to spread it to East Europe and to attain a situation in which Germany's eastern neighbors regard the idea of a possible confrontation with any of their neighbors as being as impossible as it is already regarded by Germany's western neighbors. To me it seems simply impossible that the European Community will expand to take in East Europe just like that. After all, the qustion would then arise where the border of this Community should be—in the Urals, say, or somewhere closer? We should not be debating this now. It is an abstract notion. European Community countries will hold a summit and will undoubtedly approach it in the context of the meeting of the leaders of both German states. The European Community will become one of the guarantors which are needed by all the countries in West and East Europe.

[passage omitted: Zorin asks everyone to describe briefly how they picture Europe's future development. Berner replies first: It is not easy to reform a centralized system and there are no guarantees that promises and hopes will not be broken. There may be big political problems ahead. Berner says the level of military confrontation in Europe is lessening. He praises the USSR's unilateral initiatives. This process of lowering confrontation should also be taken place in Northern Europe. If the processes of glasnost and perestroyka continue we can expect very poositive changes.]

[Zhurkin] It seems to me that one could even continue the list of possible crisis situations and unpleasant events that may yet come Europe's way. In this list I would also include a possible flare-up of some sort of conservative tendencies emanating from either side of East Europe, let us say. We spoke of relations between the two German states. Imagine, if those processes which would place the issue of a single German state on the agenda tomorrow should begin to develop very quickly, dynamically and spontaneously on the streets of the GDR, then all our very sensible structures and agreements that have been achieved will, as it were, be reduced to dust. One must not forget about nuclear arms in Europe and about a thousand and one other things.

Nevertheless and despite all that, if one is to appraise the situation as a whole, I am an even greater optimist than you, Ambassador. This is because it seems to me that a historic opportunity is really now opening up in Europe. What we in the Soviet Union used to call two systems and you in the West also frequently used to call it two systems—a historic opportunity has opened up before these two systems for interaction and for—and I am not afraid to use this word—for a historic compromise.

Of course, as far as many things are concerned, they will continue to retain their identities for all that. In this sense the nineties can genuinely be a period when, through very complex and agonizing processes, through difficulties—difficulties are always staring us in the face; there are difficulties in our country, in the Soviet Union, and in the countries of East Europe, and in Europe as a whole—all the same, Europe genuinely has a chance to make the nineties and maybe even the beginning of he next century a century of Europe, a new Europe, a transforming Europe. [sentence as heard]

[Zorin] Comrade Koenig?

[Koenig] I wish to give a brief answer, but it is difficult for me now since there are some questions which generally must be answered. I want only to say that it is erroneous to conceive of things in Europe and, in particular, in central Europe and between the two German states in such a way that the GDR people only need to require something for it to be a fait accompli tomorrow. This is because even if some bodies adopt such a decision, it will not happen all the same, because the differences between these states are so great that it is impossible, both in the interests of the people of the

FRG, and in the GDR, and in the neighboring countries. [sentence as heard] This means that we must take a very sensible approach to these things. As Vadim Valentinovich stated with regard to this, we must observe things, that is the main issue, to preserve stability in Europe which, I think, is in the interests of all European peoples, and that is the main thing.

As for the steps that must be taken—but one must not talk about them here—a sensible approach must be adopted here. I want, as it were, to state my wishes about further developments in Europe: that they are peaceful, stable, cooperating, and open.

[Zorin] I think everyone wants that. Sir Rodric?

[Braithwaite] Well, I think that this is, of course, a period of very great historic changes in Europe and very great historic opportunities. If we just recall that Europe used to be a destabilizing factor for peace in the past, it is, without a doubt, a period of enormous opportunities. I agree with Mr. Zhurkin that, yes, there is a risk, a certain risk in this situation. We cannot foretell the future, but we do have an agenda of what we must do, in disarmament, the economy, so forth, and many other fields, too. We do have a program, and that is the main thing.

Second, we are now ready on both sides to tacke all the questions on the agenda, not in a spirit of confrontation but in a spirit of cooperation. We must not forget how different these approaches were in recent past. We can see how representatives of the West approach the changes in East Europe, stating they are ready to cooperate. East European leaders state the same thing. That is why on the one hand I do share some fears, but on the other hand I share the hopes.

[Zorin] Vadim Valentinovich, the task to conclude our conversation falls to you.

[Zagladin] I will try. The first thing I wish to say is this: Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin stated at the start of our conversation that he wanted to hear varying and contradictory views. Varying, yes, but I cannot see that these views have been in any great way contradictory. This is because a pan-European consensus on questions of principle is evidently already a reality. This points to the road ahead if you like. Europe has already embarked on the path of overcoming its division, the path of deepening cooperation. The need for this is very great because we all experience—all Europeans experience in an identical way—a mass of problems which we can tackle only together. The need is there, and the basis for this exists too: the common history, common civilization, common cultures, as it were.

True, one can object here that this Community has always existed but, nevertheless, there were also conflict, wars, and everything else. This is correct. But now these factors have a different effect because the situation has changed. In the first place the general situation in the world has changed so much that the realization of mankind's unity as a species, the realization that it has interests in common—something that is felt more in Europe than maybe anywhere else—this realization has increasingly prevailed.

Second, tension declined in the world. The threat of war has been pushed back. Detente—maybe this word is no longer suitable now—we are entering some sort of new period and no name has yet been found for it. Someone suggested that we went over from the cold war to what is, for the time being, a cold peace. That may well be the case, but, at any rate, the process of changes is proceeding.

Finally, in the third place, the internal trends of developments in both parts of Europe and in East Europe in particular are such—maybe the words historical compromise used by Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin are appropriate here—but, at any rate, it is clear that new prerequisites are coming into being facilitating mutual understanding, the coming closer of our cultures, greater contact between our peoples, interaction among our peoples.

Of course—it is correct what has been said—everyone, generally speaking, retains their own identities. We adhere to our socialist values. We understand them to be something that is very close to values common to all mankind. Let everyone use his own methods. We, in our renewed Socialism, will try to tackle the tasks posed by the civilization of all mankind. Other countries will be doing it differently. It is here that we will be competing: not in who gains the upper hand over whom, not in who—I do not know—becomes stronger or more influential, but in how we will tackle these universal tasks. It will be a competition that presupposes, as the most essential part of it, interaction and precisely what I have been talking about, joint development. [passage omitted: Zorin makes concluding remarks and thanks everyone]

Reportage on Gerasimov's 8 Feb Briefing

Ryzhkov Visit to S.E. Asia

LD0802180390 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov will pay official visits to Thailand, Australia and Singapore between February 11-17 this year, a Soviet Foreign Minister spokesman announced at a briefing here today.

Upcoming Kohl, Genscher Visit

LD0802180590 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—West German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will pay a brief visit to the Soviet Union on February 10, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov announced at a briefing here today.

Ties With Chile

LD0802185190 Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—The current democratic changes in Chile create conditions to normalise relations between the Soviet Union and that country, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

Gerasimov noted that the message of congratulations sent on behalf of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to Patricio Aylwin on December 18 on the occasion of his election [as] president of Chile, expressed confidence that the restoration of good relations would accord with the interests of the Soviet and Chilean peoples.

The spokesman stressed that the Soviet Union noted with satisfaction Aylwin's recent statements as well as statements by Chilean Foreign Minister Enrique Silva.

"We confirm that the USSR will be ready to restore diplomatic relations with Chile," Gerasimov said.

U.S. Attack on Cuban-Crewed Ship

LD0802185490 Moscow TASS in English 1838 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—The Soviet Union expresses regret and concern over the U.S. Coast Guard's armed attack on a merchant ship manned by a Cuban crew but flying the Panamanian flag, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

"The Soviet Union stands for the observance by all states of the generally recognised principle of freedom of navigation and opposes illegitimate use of force with regard to any vessels," Gerasimov said.

Cooperation With ICO

LD0802191590 Moscow TASS in English 1847 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—The Soviet Union aims to promote constructive interaction with the Islamic Conference Organisation [ICO] on a broad range of issues, and is prepared to look jointly for a solution of conflict situations, inter-ethnic and other problems, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today in connection with the ICO's 20th anniversary.

The settlement of the conflicts between Arabs and Israel, between Iran and Iraq and inside Lebanon is of special significance for Soviet-ICO cooperation, Gerasimov said.

These complicated problems can be resolved only on the basis of a balance of interests and compliance with the principles of equal rights and equal security of the parties involved and with the observance of international law, he said.

"The same approach is required in settling the Afghan conflict," Gerasimov added.

Eritrean Withdrawal

LD0802204490 Moscow in English to Africa 1700 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Speaking at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists, the head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Gennadiy Gerasimov, said that Soviet military specialists have been withdrawn from Eritrea and other northern regions of Ethiopia, which are zones of military actions. The Soviet Union, Gennadiy Gerasimov noted, is coming out for putting a stop to the blood-letting internal conflict in Ethiopia, for its peaceful political settlement by searching mutually acceptable forms of national reconciliation.

The position of the USSR is known both to the Ethiopian Government and to the People's Front for the Liberation of Eritrea, with whose leadership the Soviet side had direct contacts. Satisfaction is called forth by the fact that as a result of two rounds of governmental talks in Atlanta and Nairobi the representatives of the government of Ethiopia and the People's Front for the Liberation of Eritrea, having demonstrated mutual readiness to compromise, have agreed on procedural questions although it was not an easy thing to do.

Now the way is open for talks on the essence of Eritrean settlement. Both sides are now specifying their platforms. The Soviet Union is ready to assist in successfully conducting these talks and in finding mutually acceptable solutions. It is very important to put an end to the bloodshed in north of Ethiopia for which people are suffering, the Soviet representative of the Foreign Ministry noted.

We can also note as positive the fact that from the beginning of the dialogue of Addis Ababa and the People's Front for the Liberation of Eritrea, there are no serious military confrontations to speak of between these two sides on the territory of Ethiopia. We would like to again note that Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation in the military sphere is directed at helping Ethiopia in building its armed forces with the aim of rebuffing aggression from outside. Therefore, the Soviet military specialists were withdrawn from Eritrea and other northern regions of Ethiopia, which are zones of military action, Gennadiy Gerasimov, the head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, noted.

Shevardnadze-Baker Arms Talks

LD0802211990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Talks were held in Moscow today between the USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. At a

briefing this evening the head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Comrade Gerasimov, informed journalists of the results of the first day of the Soviet-American talks:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] In the opinion of both sides, the results of the talks between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush in Malta revealed real possibilities for achieving in the near future major accords on nuclear, conventional, and chemical armaments. Both sides believe that priority should be given to completing the preparatory work and signing this year a Soviet-American treaty on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms. On this issue, the American delegation brought concrete proposals concerning the problems on which no mutually acceptable solution has yet been found. Those proposals were examined after dinner at the expert level, and that examination will continue tonight. The proposals are, to a large extent, technical in character and it will take time to go into them fully. In Malta the leaders of our countries agreed that the treaty must be ready this year; and therefore it is necessary to try to get agreement on the questions still outstanding in time for the meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union and United States in June. We then examined the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. We made a number of points concerning the personnel of the Armed Forces and the limitation of combat aircraft in Europe. We start from the premise that successful completion of the Vienna talks would also be promoted by positive steps on the part of the American administration in terms of willingness to discuss the problems of naval forces. But the Americans are refusing point-blank even to discuss this problem. We feel that we should at least start talking about it at the expert level in order to work out who really needs what armed naval forces in the present situation, today.

On the problem of stopping nuclear tests, the sides agreed that the task facing them—namely that of preparing protocols to the treaties, the so-called threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 and signing those protocols in the course of the forthcoming summit meeting in June—is an entirely realistic one. The participants in the talks urged speeding up work on the conclusion of an international convention on the total banning and destruction of chemical weapons. There was also an exchange of views on the situation in the regions. [end recording]

Further on Shevardnadze-Baker Talks

LD0802222690 Moscow TASS in English 2159 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—The Gorbachev-Bush talks off Malta highlighted practical possibilities for addressing major accords on nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons soon, Baker and Shevardnadze stressed during their meeting in Moscow.

They agreed that this year's high priority task is to complete preparations for, and sign the Soviet-U.S. treaty on a fifty per cent cuts in strategic offensive weapons, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The American delegation, headed by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, brought to Moscow specific proposals on issues for which mutually acceptable solutions have not yet been identified. These are mainly technical proposals, the Soviet spokesman said, but it is necessary to seek coordination on all issues in time for the Soviet-American summit in June so as to devote more time to legally finalise the treaty afterwards.

As regards cutting conventional arms in Europe, the Soviet delegation headed by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, voiced some proposals relating to cuts in troops and combat air forces in Europe.

"We proceed from an assumption that a successful conclusion of Vienna talks would be facilitated by the U.S. Adminstration's positive steps in addressing the issue of naval forces," Gerasimov stressed. "However, the U.S. side is refusing outright even to discuss this issue".

Nevertheless, the Soviet side believes that "it is necessary to at least begin discussing the issue at the expert level in order to make clear who really needs what naval forces in the present situation".

As regards curbing nuclear tests, the Soviet spokesman said, the sides agreed that it is quite feasible to prepare protocols to the so-called threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 and have these treaties signed during the June summit.

Differences on this issue consist in the following: The Soviet Union insists on banning nuclear tests as soon as possible, while the United States are considering "a pause after the U.S. Senate ratifies the threshold treaties".

The participants favoured expediting work to conclude an international convention on a complete chemical weapons ban and elimination, Gerasimov noted.

Pointing to another forthcoming meeting between Baker and Shevardnadze at the international open skies conference in Ottawa, Canada, the Soviet spokesman noted that both the Soviet Union and the United States expressed their interest in making the conference's work productive.

Baker and Shevardnadze also discussed regional issues, Gerasimov continued to say. In reviewing the situation in Central America, "much was said about ensuring free elections in Nicaragua".

The U.S. secretary of state was told that no matter what arguments were brought in to defend the U.S. intervention in Panama, that action cannot be justified and U.S. troops must leave Panama immediately.

Despite differences on aspects of the Afghan problem, Gerasimov said, the two countries intend to promote the

achievement of political solutions with the dialogue between the warring parties and national reconciliation as the basis.

The U.S. side had its own plan for the settlement, which, in the view of the Soviet side, "did not take into account the situation in Kabul and the solidity of Najibullah's government".

"However, on the whole the sides agreed that they should look for components of new approaches" and that "practical settlement is possible in Afghanistan only through dialogue, national reconciliation and involvement of all Afghan parties in this dialogue, and only on the basis of intra-Afghan dialogue."

Gerasimov said that Baker and Shevardnadze discussed problems of Middle East and Cambodia, the situation on the Korean peninsula and African issues.

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results of interaction relating to the settlement in the south of Africa where Namibia was cited as "an example of successful and fruitful cooperation of the two great powers."

In closing the Soviet spokesman said that the United States presently agree, "although with three reservations," to "the Soviet proposal for holding at the end of this year a summit meeting of the member countries of the conference for cooperation and security in Europe, called Helsinki-2."

U.S. Ties, Soviet Jewish Emigration

LD0802214990 Moscow TASS in English 2110 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—"The results of the Mikhail Gorbachev-George Bush Mediterranean meeting have spelled out real possibilities for reaching major accords on nuclear, conventional and chemical armaments in the near future," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing today.

In the course of the Soviet-American negotiations, which began in Moscow today, the two sides therefore regarded the completion of preparatory work to sign a USSR-USA agreement on a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive armaments this year is a priority objective.

"The American proposals are largely of a technical character and one needs time to see into them," he said. Major efforts will be required to coordinate outstanding questions in time for the Soviet-American summit in June, Gerasimov said. The period after the summit meeting will be devoted to legal finalising the agreement.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman reaffirmed that the summit meeting in Washington, planned earlier for June, will be held, notwithstanding the 28th Soviet Communist Party Congress planned for June-July this year.

Speaking about emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, Gerasimov said that the problem had been discussed at the current Soviet-American negotiations. "Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States support Israel in its policy or its declarations that Jewish citizens from the USSR will be settled on occupied territories," he said.

The Soviet Union recognises the right of citizens to leave any country, including the USSR, recorded in appropriate international documents, "but settling people on the occupied territories is quite another matter," Gerasimov stressed. "To settle Israeli citizens and emigrants from other countries on the occupied Arab territories is an obvious violation of the 49th Article of the Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention," he added.

"It is quite possible that a general viewpoint on that matter, denouncing Israel's attempts to settle emigrants on occupied territories, will be expressed as a result of Soviet-American negotiations," Gerasimov said.

"The United States informed the Soviet side that this year it had somewhat increased the quota of emigrants from the USSR—to approximately 60-70 thousand," Gerasimov said.

Touching upon a possibility of a tripartite meeting of the Soviet, American and West German foreign ministers during Helmut Kohl's and Hans-Dietrich Genscher's forthcoming visit to Moscow, Gerasimov said that such a meeting was possible, though it is not mentioned in the preliminary programme of the West German delegation's visit to Moscow.

Davos Forum Discusses Germanies, Europe

LD0802155990 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Davos February 8 TASS—By TASS correspondent Boris Shabayev:

The world economic forum which ended here on Wednesday, concentrated on changes in Eastern Europe and their influence on the situation in Europe and throughout the world. The forum was attended by politicians, members of the business community, scientists and journalists from dozens of countries.

Forum participants paid special attention to the prospects and possible forms of German unification.

Among speakers were the leaders of central and Eastern European countries, including Wojciech Jaruzelski, Hans Modrow, Andrey Lukanov, Marian Calfa, Peter Medgyessy and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Soviet delegation was led by Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin.

Despite some differences in opinions, forum participants were unanimous on one thing: It is necessary to support the democratisation and liberalisation of the

economies of East European countries, preserving stability in Europe and respect for the right of each nation to self-determination.

This is the key to the successful construction of a European home in the interests of all humanity, they stressed.

Grammatchikov Comments on German Unification

LD0802105990 Moscow International Service in Czech 1600 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Georgiy Grammatchikov commentary]

[Excerpts] As we already reported, Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet minister of foreign affairs, stated at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that the German issue has evoked dangerous hopes for revision of the borders. Alongside the idea of unity and unification, a shadow of revanchism is creeping across Europe. Here is a commentary by Georgiy Grammatchikov.

[Passage omitted] The revision of borders, or simply territorial claims at state level would mean the end of European stability, which was reached with much difficulty. All, including the German people, would be the losers. As far as unification as such is concerned, then we have neither an opportunity nor a moral right to resist this process, and moreover, this would be a short-sighted stance. Hampering the natural endeavor of Germans from the GDR and the FRG to expand their mutual contacts, to cooperate, and later to establish a united state, would mean giving rise to a dangerous hotbed of tension in the center of Europe. The point is that the unification process should not proceed in a painful way for Europe, and all interested countries should adopt a cautious and extremely sensible approach in this process. There should be a clear understanding that a principally new state, which has nothing in common with the Reich or with its borders, inherited certain commitments, both in the FRG and GDR, in the arms reduction sphere and in providing security on the continent. It is well known that it was precisely the division of Germany which was at one time a cause for the rise of two military blocs. German unification will perhaps be an impetus for their gradual scrapping. In any case, planting a mine of revanchism in a future all-European home under the banner of German unification must not be permitted.

'No Grounds' To Ban Driftnet Fishing Completely

PM0902110390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Candidate of Biological Sciences B.K. Zilanov and Candidate of Juridical Sciences A.N. Vylegzhanin: "Specialist Commentary"]

[Excerpts] At the editorial office's request, Candidate of Biological Sciences B.K. Zilanov and Candidate of Juridical Sciences A.N. Vylegzhanin commented on the problem of driftnet fishing, which has recently produced a widespread international reaction. [passage omitted]

A negative view of driftnet fishing on the high seas is given in a number of international documents, including the Guam Resolution of the South Pacific Conference, the Tarawa Declaration of the heads of government of the South Pacific Forum countries, and the resolution adopted in December 1989 by the UN General Assembly Second Committee. [passage omitted]

In the aforesaid Tarawa Declaration driftnet fishing, which is practiced in the south Pacific, is described as "incompatible with the demands of international law." We feel that such a large-scale method, practiced in areas of the high seas outside the boundaries of economic and fisheries zones, which undermines biological relationships between marine organisms and which has other negative effects on ecological biocomplexes, does not accord with existing international-law requirements on the protection of the environment and the maintenance and rational utilization of the biological resources of the world's oceans. In particular, it is a violation of the 1982 UN Convention on Maritime Law.

There is also another extreme. These are the proposals from a number of U.S. ecological organizations on the complete prohibition of driftnet fishing as a form of fishing. Small driftnet catches for specific purposes—including scientific experiments—have long been conducted off the coasts of a number of countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States (off Alaska). Since this takes place within a specific economic zone in which the coastal state has sovereign rights as regards natural resources and jurisdiction with respect to the protection and maintenance of the marine environment, there are favorable legal conditions for organizing proper state regulation of such fishing. Consequently there are no grounds for banning it in international law.

United States & Canada

Secretary of State Baker Holds Talks in Moscow

Shevardnadze on 7 Feb Session

LD0802110390 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—Official Soviet-U.S. talks began early today at the Foreign Ministry mansion, in Moscow. The delegations are led by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and visiting U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

Shavardnadze, who arrived at the talks several minutes before his American counterpart, held a brief talk with Soviet and foreign journalists. Asked by TASS for his impressions of the February 7 tete-a-tete with the U.S. secretary of state, Shevardnadze replied that it was "a good, substantive and fundamental conversation," which lasted 3 ½ hours.

"We discussed in advance many problems involved with arms reductions," he continued. There was also a substantive discussion of Soviet internal problems. For his part, Shevardnadze said, the secretary of state set out his views on events in the Western hemisphere. The situation in Europe was also discussed.

Speaking about the development of Soviet-U.S. relations in the light of this week's plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Shevardnadze noted that changes in the Soviet Union promote "new elements of trust, mutual respect and understanding in our relations."

Speaking about the possible impact of the Soviet domestic policy on Soviet foreign policy, the minister said that "Soviet activity on the international arena should not be allowed to diminish."

Speaking about specific aspects of the negotiations agenda, Shevardnadze pointed to interesting elements in the U.S. position on combat aircraft within the framework of talks about conventional forces in Vienna. He stressed that this position is being elaborated and studied.

Baker, who joined the talks with journalists, said that the morning round of talks would mainly focus on an entire range of disarmament issues, including strategic, chemical and conventional arms.

Speaking about the date for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, the secretary of state noted that Soviet and U.S. leaders had agreed to meet in June this year. But the date has yet to be set.

Talks Called 'Businesslike'

LD0802143490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow 8 Feb (TASS)—TASS diplomatic correspondent reports:

The morning round of Soviet-U.S. talks ended at about 1300 today at the residence of the USSR Foreign Ministry in Moscow. The delegations of the sides are headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, who has arrived here on an official visit. Evidently, two more rounds are to be held today. This morning's meeting went on for about three hours.

Commenting on the beginning and progress of the discussion in a conversation with a TASS correspondent, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, a member of the Soviet delegation, first USSR deputy foreign minister, said that "in the main the talks started on a good businesslike note." On 7 February, the day of the U.S. state secretary's arrival in Moscow, the heads of the foreign political departments of the two countries met for the first time and had a one-on-one conversation, he said. Their conversation went on for three-and-a-half hours, and actually laid the foundation for the official talks that began today with more members of the delegation present.

The start of today's talks was notable, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said, for the fact that the sides immediately got down to the more difficult items on the agenda. The morning was devoted to a discussion on the whole complex of questions on arms limitation and disarmament, he said. We began with problems of strategic and space armaments, covering such aspects as nuclear proliferation, and then turned to conventional armaments, chemical weapons, and space.

The USSR deputy foreign minister noted that both sides came up with new ideas on a number of questions on this problem which, he said, "makes the talks particularly businesslike and constructive."

Speaking specifically about these "new ideas," Aleksandr Bessmertnykh stressed that "the key problems remaining on the negotiation table, the resolving of which will determine the future of a strategic offensive weapons treaty," were determined as early as the meeting between the leaders of the two countries off the coast of Malta. One "of these knotty problems" he called the whole problem of air-launched cruise missiles. In his view, the ideas voiced today by both sides "could advance the untying of this knot." Aleksandr Bessmertnykh pointed out that "there are movements of a similar kind in certain other aspects, particularly on conventional and chemical weapons. The ministers, he said, have instructed the working groups, traditionally set up on both sides, to meet again and discuss all the necessary details. The groups have already begun work.

The very names of the groups demonstrate the breadth and importance of the nature of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue under way in Moscow. They include a group on disarmament with relevant subgroups; a group on regional problems; a group on transnational matters, including, in particular, ecology and terrorism; and a group on bilateral and economic trade ties between the USSR and the U.S.

Replying to a question as to the degree to which the present talks come within the framework of preparations for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said that "they are directly bound up with them." He recalled that the leaders of the USSR and the United States agreed during the summit near Malta that the foreign ministers should meet in the immediate future and begin preparations for a summit to be held in June. "This, strictly speaking, also defines the framework of the discussion taking place in Moscow now," he said. "The present meeting is the first and it will evidently be followed by at least two more meetings between the ministers."

At the same time, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh noted that the matters being discussed at the talks are not limited merely to the topics of the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit.

Shevardnadze Stresses 'Trust'

LD0802181590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] The talks between Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker continued in Moscow today. The present meeting between the heads of our two countries' diplomatic departments is one of the preparatory stages for the summit meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush planned for June of this year.

Speaking to journalists prior to the talks, Comrade Shevardnadze stressed that more elements of trust, mutual understanding, and mutual respect are appearing in Soviet-American relations. It is expected that the talks will include a discussion of the entire package of issues on which the two great powers have recently been working and interacting—disarmament, regional, trade-economic, humanitarian, and transnational issues.

Particular attention will be devoted to resolving the remaining disagreements on the road to concluding an agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms so that the main provisions are ready for the summit meeting.

Just about this time, a press conference is beginning in the main Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is being held by Gerasimov, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate, and is devoted virtually entirely to the results of the first day of talks between Comrade Shevardnadze and James Baker. Later on, we plan to give you more precise information on what has been discussed by the leaders of our countries' foreign policy departments.

Regional Problems Discussed

LD0802182290 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—"Speaking of the general impression of the talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, one should say that these are very serious negotiations, which are being held in a good business-like atmosphere," Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told TASS today, commenting on the first day of Soviet-American discussions in Moscow.

Shevardnadze emphasised that "the discussion of the disarmament problem is proceeding fairly well."

"Naturally, new elements, demanding additional thorough study, are emerging," he added. "That is why experts will have to work hard on all these issues tonight and tomorrow."

Speaking of European affairs, Shevardnadze stressed the importance of the fact that the sides favoured the convocation of an all-European summit conference.

"The German issue is a separate issue upon which we have not yet touched," he remarked.

"As to regional problems, we have substantially discussed their entire spectrum and gave corresponding extra assignments to working groups of the two sides," Shevardnadze said.

The minister expressed hope that the results of the talks could be summed up on Friday afternoon.

Disarmament Issues Reviewed

LD0902073490 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who arrived in the Soviet Union on Wednesday on an official visit, today will continue his talks with Soviet officials.

The talks began on Thursday in the Foreign Ministry mansion.

During the first half of the day, Baker will meet Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, after which the talks will resume.

First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who is participating in the talks, told TASS that "on the whole, the talks began in a good, business-like manner."

The sides discussed a whole range of issues connected with strategic and space armaments, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, reductions in conventional armaments and a ban on chemical weapons.

They put forth new approaches to these issues, which added a "particularly businesslike and constructive character" to the talks, the deputy minister said.

Speaking about the content of the talks, Bessmertnykh focused on the reduction of air-launched cruise missiles. He said "the future of a treaty on strategic offensive armaments depends on the solution of this problem."

Proposals made by the Soviet and U.S. delegations, he added, could promote this solution.

Similar headway was also made on some other issues, including conventional and chemical weapons.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Baker agreed to establish working groups on disarmament, regional problems, bilateral relations and humanitarian issues. The groups will discuss all the necessary details. According to the proposal of the American delegation, the sides set up a group on transnational problems.

Commenting on the results of the first day of talks in a TASS interview on Thursday evening, Shevardnadze said the talks were proceeding in a "serious, good, businesslike atmosphere." He described the discussion of disarmament issues as "not bad."

"Of course, there are new elements that need to be throughly analysed."

The Soviet minister said that he and Baker "had a very substantial discussion about nearly all of the regional issues," after which they gave additional instructions to their delegations and working groups.

Shevardnadze described as "very important" the fact that both negotiating sides called for the convocation of an all-European summit conference.

Second Shevardnadze Session

LD0902073790 Moscow TASS in English 0727 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—The second one-to-one meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker began in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's mansion in downtown Moscow this morning.

Before the meeting, Shevardnadze and Baker answered questions from the press.

"Think we may speak of progress at the talks," Shevardnadze told journalists. [as received] "Today we will continue the talks and will be able to inform you in greater detail at the end of the day."

Gorbachev Receives Baker

LD0902100190 Moscow TASS in English 0951 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—A meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has just started at the Kremlin. Baker is in the Soviet Union on a four-day official visit.

Asked by journalists about changes in the Soviet Union during the past week and the European reaction to them, Gorbachev said that the West is mistaken if it believes that changs in the Soviet Union have only occurred in the past few days. They have been under way since 1985.

In reply to a question on the most difficult moments of the past few days, Gorbachev said that nothing special has taken place.

"What we needed to do was done at the plenary meeting and our actions were determined by our possibilities at the current stage," he said. It is now necessary to take firmer hold and move forward.

Speaking about U.S. President Bush's proposals on conventional arms in Europe, Gorbachev said that they are under serious consideration, and he is prepared to talk with Baker about this issue.

9 Feb Talks Reviewed

LD0902095990 Moscow TASS in English 0938 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—Talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who is on a 4-day official visit in the USSR, were continued here today.

On Thursday the ministers, meeting in narrow compact, discussed in detail problems of security and disarmament. They regard as a priority task the completion of preparations to sign this year a Soviet-American treaty on a 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. This requires a mutually-acceptable solution of all unsettled issues before the meeting of Soviet and American leaders this June. The Soviet and American delegations have started to discuss concrete proposals intended to settle unresolved problems.

The ministers reviewed the progress of talks on conventional arms in Europe. They expressed new ideas about the reduction of military personnels and restrictions of air forces in Europe. The exchange of views revealed additional areas where the positions of the two sides have become closer. Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker noted also the importance of Soviet initiatives to hold an all-European summit meeting this year.

The sides reaffirmed their adherence to the idea of concluding an international convention on banning chemical weapons. They exchanged drafts of a bilateral agreement on the reduction of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and got down to their practical discussion.

In connection with the forthcoming Ottawa international "Open Sky" Conference, the ministers confirmed that the USSR and the United States were interested in its resultativeness [as received].

Regional situations were discussed productively and in detail. Eduard Shevardnadze told James Baker, when the situation in Central America was discussed, that there was no justification from the American armed intervention in Panama, no matter how the action was motivated.

Continuing the Wyoming and Malta dialogue on the solution of the Afghanistan conflict, the ministers exchanged views on possible ways to promote an inter-Afghan dialogue in order to achieve a just political settlement of the issue.

The sides discussed the problem of a Middle East settlement. The Soviet side noted the productivity of the multiple approach, combining active bilateral and multilateral efforts. It was noted in this context that the USSR was ready to contribute actively to all forms of efforts to further the peace process in the region. Having reviewed the situation in the Asian-Pacific region, Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker went on record for further interaction in order to settle the Cambodian issue and improve the situation on the Korean peninsula. They expressed satisfaction with the results of their interaction in the effort to settle the South-West Africa problem.

President Bush Cited on Security Policy, Plenum

PM0802194990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "G. Bush Speech"]

[Text] San Francisco 8 Feb—"The cold war is receding and the prospects for lasting peace are now more hopeful than ever," President G. Bush stated in a speech to the California Commonwealth Club devoted to U.S. military strategy in a changing world.

Thanks to the onset of freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, he noted, we can now predict a new future for the countries of the European continent—the appearance of a genuinely whole Europe. We have also achieved progress at the strategic offensive arms reduction talks and hope for a considerable reduction in the number of strategic weapons on both sides. It is these important reductions that Secretary of State Baker is currently discussing in Moscow," the President noted.

"I am fully determined to strive for parallelism with the Soviet Union in building a new world," G. Bush stressed. "In the language of international relations, parallelism means standing down soldiers, dismantling tanks, destroying missiles, and banning chemical weapons and removing them from the face of the earth."

At the same time Bush stated that, despite the great hopes that exist for the future, America's security must be guaranteed during the transition from today's to tomorrow's world." "Of course we will continue to reduce the probability of nuclear war. And I will therefore be vigorous in conducting talks with the Soviet Union on strategic offensive arms. But arms control strategy and strategic modernization plans are not in competition with each other," Bush believes. The head of the White House urged the further development of U.S. strategic military programs, primarily the "strategic defense initiative." He also spoke about this the same day at the Lawrence Livermore radiation laboratory, where fundamental SDI research is carried out, claiming that "strategic defense strengthens America's ability to preserve peace in the nineties and beyond." The President also advocated that an American military presence be retained in Europe indefinitely, asserting that "all the West Europeans want us to stay."

After the President's speech, members of the California Commonwealth Club asked about his reaction to the results of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that has ended in Moscow. Bush's remarks on this topic, the CBS television network noted, "expressed hope and caution." The head of the White House stated that M.S. Gorbachev "is displaying definite restraint in tackling the Soviet Union's exceptionally complex internal problems, and it seems to me that this demonstrates his commitment to peaceful change." However he added that nevertheless "an attempt should not be made from San Francisco to sort out the nuances of the Central Committee meeting."

Commenting on G. Bush's speech as a whole, the CBS White House correspondent noted that "from a symbolic viewpoint these are not happy times for the president: He is advocating the 'Star Wars' program and the retention of strong nuclear forces while Gorbachev is advocating democracy." "The winds of change blowing right across Europe from Moscow have given rise in U.S. political life to strong sentiments in favor of more substantial cuts in the military budget," a correspondent for another television network, ABC, pointed out.

U.S. Official Cited on Upcoming Trade Talks

LD0802124890 Moscow TASS in English 1231 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 8 TASS—The first round of the Soviet-U.S. trade talks will begin on February 12 in Washington, presidential representative to the talks Carla Hills said on Wednesday.

The talks will focus on an agreement to help the Soviet Union obtain most favoured nation status in trade with the United States, Hills noted.

During the Malta summit last year, Gorbachev and Bush expressed their intention to compile such an agreement by the June summit, 1990, Hills said. Working in a close contact with Congress, representatives of federal agencies and the U.S. private sector, the sides will successfully prepare the agreement by June, she added.

Hills expressed hope that the forthcoming trade negotiations contribute to Soviet economic reform. The successful signing of the agreement will also make it possible for the U.S. business community to expand its trade and commercial activities in the Soviet Union, she stressed.

The U.S. delegation will be headed by deputy presidential representative to the talks Julius Katz. The Soviet

delegation will be led by deputy minister of foreign economic relations Yuriy Chumakov.

Commentator Kozyakov Reviews Bilateral Issues

Discusses 'Arms Race'

LD0902013490 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Now our commentator Vladislav Kozyakov speaks about some of the responses in the United States on the Communist Party plenum just ended here in Moscow:

We here in the Soviet Union, he says, are quite satisfied with the news that American hails the decisions of our party plenum quite justly noting their historical importance for the development of perestroyka and democracy. [passage omitted]

And Secretary of State Baker, who arrived in Moscow right after the plenum ended, had this to say: This is a time of great change in the Soviet Union.

And this seemed to be recognition of the fact that just recently there were doubts in the Western countries about the continuation of perestroyka in the USSR and that these doubts no longer exist. Perestroyka, as they say in Russian, is spreading in depth and in width. And this is a favorable fact for the situation in the world today. This factor undoubtedly will be furthered also by the Soviet-American talks now being held in Moscow on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weaponry and also other agreements on disarmament.

Baker's spokeswoman here in Moscow said that Secretary Baker had raised a number of new positions in all areas of arms control in an effort to speed agreements.

Well, both sides apparently expressed hopes for the success of these talks. It is very strange, however, that these days, which are noted by great changes in the USSR and in Eastern Europe too, the American Administration is talking Congress and the American public into increasing expenditures on strategic weaponry—the very same military program of bombers, rockets, and Star Wars which were invented in the years of the cold war and confrontation. It seems that in the days of tensions these programs were justified by the tension. And in the period of favorable changes on the international scene increasing expenditures are justified by the changes which actually are decreasing the tensions. So where is the logic in all this?

And it is not only we Soviet people that are surprised at this.

Surprise is also expressed by members of Congress in the United States. Senator James Sasser, the chairman of the Budget Committee, questioned why the administration wants to raise spending on SDI and other strategic weapons programs. Why don't we wait and see, he said, what kind of world we're going to be living in in a very short period of time rather than going ahead and committing ourselves to these programs?

A good question. Why doesn't America wait and postpone its new round in the arms race? Particularly now when perestroyka and democracy in the Soviet Union are opening up unprecedented opportunities to reduce armaments and in this way increase hopes for mutual control, which has excellent facilities today, and to strengthen security on the basis of trust, openness, and cooperation.

Comments on Baker's Visit

LD0802094390 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 7 Feb 90

[V. Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] Upon his arrival in Moscow on Wednesday, the American secretary of state, James Baker, began talks with his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze. During the visit the secretary of state is expected to be received by Mikhail Gorbachev. Radio Moscow's Vladislav Kozyakov considers the background to the talks. This is what he writes:

Moscow has expressed hope for the success of the talks being held in a favorable atmosphere. When Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush met in Malta they shared the view that Soviet-American relations were entering a new era. They instructed their foreign department chiefs to pave the way for a new summit in the United States in June. One favorable factor for the negotiations is the Communist Party Plenum that has reaffirmed the course toward the consolidation of perestroyka in the USSR.

We can see that perestroyka and new thinking have been having their effect on both Soviet-American ties and the international situation as a whole. Addressing the plenum on Monday, General Secretary Gorbachev pointed out that the restructured foreign policy met the country's domestic requirements, benefitted civilized relations in the world, and brought humanity nearer to a peaceful period in its development.

Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that there was nothing more important today than to advance disarmament, promote a dialogue and mutual understanding, and assist the construction of a common European home. Recent events put the European security issue to the fore both in wake of what's been taking place in Eastern and Western Europe and over the possibility of the reunification of the two Germanys. This country believes that a future reunited Germany must be a peaceful and democratic state. There must be firm guarantees that war will never start from German soil.

In his speech at the plenum on Tuesday, the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, touched upon the German unity issue. The ideas of unity and reunification he said go side by side with revenge-seeking trends in Europe. The new state of the German issue has inspired dangerous hopes for the revision of frontiers.

Europe, said Eduard Shevardnadze, can build a common home, suitable for all European nations, if it overcomes the current crisis without upheavals.

Still more urgent to the background of the changes in Europe, continues Vladislav Kozyakov, is Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to hold a European summit conference in Helsinki already this year. The offer has been welcomed by all 12 EEC states and many other countries. A statement made by Mr. Baker on the eve of his departure for Europe appears to be promising. He voiced his country's support for the Soviet proposal.

There is every indication that the current Moscow meeting will take a step toward preparing the summit in June. The question is how significant and decisive it will be on all the problems discussed, especially on the treaty to halve strategic offensive arms, because (?it's) the core of security. Much depends on what Mr. Baker has brought to Moscow. At the last ministerial meeting in Wyoming in September, the Soviet side tabled important proposals concerning such key issues as sea-based cruise missiles and space weapons. Washington gave much credit to the Soviet initiatives at the time. It called them a compromise helping to solve a difficult problem, and promised to study them and give a reply later on. Apparently time to answer now. [as heard] So, progress at the negotiations depends on the substance of the reply and on the initiatives taken by the American side itself.

A short while ago the United States proposed setting new lower levels for Soviet and American troops in Central Europe. But what can be expected from America in the field of strategic arms reduction? There have been bitter debates going on in the United States over such arms. President Bush in the course of his inspection trip to military bases and other facilities in the Western states has been stressing the need for modernizing strategic forces. He argued that increased budgetary allocations (?perfect) America's restructured defense in the wake of the changes in the world. However, many congressmen have been advocating a different approach.

The chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin, has described the administration's position as a reflection of old thinking rather than new realities. In his words the military budget proposed by the administration does not match the political realities at home or abroad. The further trend of U.S. policy toward strategic arsenals will most likely depend on the administration's position at the negotiations on a 50 percent reduction in the nuclear triad and Mr. Baker's visit will shed light on this.

China

Experts Open Joint Arms Talks in Beijing 8 Feb

LD0902131190 Moscow TASS in English 1128 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] Beijing February 9 TASS—A regular meeting of the Soviet-Chinese group of diplomatic and military experts began here on February 8.

During the second round of the talks they will continue to discuss the leading principles for mutual cuts in the armed forces in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border and confidence-building mesures in the military field.

The Soviet side of the group is headed by Genrikh Kireyev, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Department for Socialist Countries in Asia, and the Chinese side—by Liu Guangzhi, deputy head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Department for the USSR and East European Countries.

U.S. House's Disregard for Veto Angers Ministry

PM0802100990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Yu. Savenkov dispatch under the "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment" rubric: "China: Protest Against Sanctions"]

[Excerpts] Beijing—Little more than a week has elapsed since the day when Jin Guihua, spokesman of the PRC Foreign Ministry, sharply protested at a press briefing against the decision by the U.S. Congress House of Representatives to disregard President Bush's veto on a resolution extending the stay of Chinese students studying at U.S. higher educational establishments, effectively giving them emigre status and depriving China of specialists. [passage omitted].

The story of numerous resolutions passed by the U.S. Congress, which, Chinese officials have stated on several occasions, is interfering in China's internal affairs and violating the spirit and letter of joint intergovernmental declarations, has been going on for several years now. In particular, resolutions against China's birth control policy, supporting Tibetan separatists, and expressing sympathy for Taiwanese independence are well known. U.S. congressmen have accused the Chinese authorities several times of "violating human rights." The problem of all kinds of sanctions was exacerbated following the dramatic events in Beijing last year in the late spring and early summer.

China has frequently cast doubt on the U.S. congressmen's logic, accusing them of basing their policy on rumor and ignorance. Recently Li Tieying, chairman [title as published] of the State Education Commission, speaking to students, assured them that no one who returned would be victimized for their involvement in the demonstrations against the Chinese Government or for "impulsive words and deeds last spring and summer." At the same time he acknowledged that the Chinese Government has hitherto mainly devoted its attention to mere formalities when sending people to study abroad (in the last 10 years 80,000 students have gone to study in 70 countries, 30,0000 of whom returned after completing their academic course) and showed insufficient concern for the working and living conditions of specialists who return. Centers are now being created to resolve their problems. They will be given

research subsidies. Priority is given to those who are young and talented and have no other means of obtaining funds.

So the resolution on economic sanctions approved by the Congress has been sent to the White House for the President to sign. What will be his decision?

Academician Recounts Past Sino-Soviet Relations

90UI0336A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 5, 3-9 Feb 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with Professor L. Delyusin, head of the China Department at the Oriental Studies Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences, by correspondent D. Makarov, under the rubric "Point of View of a Scholar": "The USSR and the PRC: Leaving the Past in the Past"]

[Text] **In recent years there have been substantial, positive achievements in Sino-Soviet relations. Trade and economic cooperation and cultural and sports ties have been developing.**

The visit of M.S. Gorbachev to China in May 1989 was a reminder of the past. Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, plans a visit to our country this year.

However there have been times when our relations did not develop in the best manner. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov talks with L. Delyusin, professor and head of the China Department at the Oriental Studies Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences:

[Makarov] How did our relations with China develop after the formation of the PRC 1949?

[Delyusin] The end of the forties and the beginning of the fifties was one of the most interesting periods in the history of China, and it coincided with the flourishing of our relations. China had just announced the victory of the revolution and had begun agrarian reform when a renovation of industry and a reorganization of the Chinese Red Army was undertaken with the aid of Soviet specialists. All the Soviet people in China were greeted with delight. It was a striking example of what we now call "people's diplomacy." Only much later did I learn that relations between the upper echelons of power were not quite as successful.

[Makarov] How did this express itself?

[Delyusin] When Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow in 1949 after the victory of the revolution in China, Stalin met him not as the leader of Asia's largest state which had just completed a socialist revolution, but rather as a vassal whom he could keep waiting in the entryway. Mao Zedong had not expected such a reception from "the father of the peoples" and was stunned and angered, especially when Stalin avoided discussions on matters of any importance for a long time. (Mao Zedong later recalled this with bitterness.) And when discussions finally began, great pressure was put on the Chinese delegation to grant all sorts of concessions. As a result, a number of the trade and economic agreements concluded with China at that time were not equitable in nature. China's leaders were very aware of that inequality, but they were forced to conclude such agreements inasmuch as there were no other sources of aid. Only later did we learn how much their pride had been hurt.

[Makarov] Could China have received such aid from any other source?

[Delyusin] No. As a historian I must say that Soviet aid was crucial to China at that time. This is acknowledged by others as well as the Chinese themselves. When you talk with American experts on China you find that they too recognize that the Soviet Union was the only state in the world at that time able to render aid to China on so great a scale. With all its deficiencies, the Soviet aid helped to create the foundations for Chinese industry.

[Makarov] Summarizing the Stalin-Mao Zedong period of Sino-Soviet relations, what kind of conclusions can be made?

[Delyusin] Everything went well in that period externally. Chinese goods could be bought in Soviet stores, and Chinese students studied side by side with Soviet students in Soviet higher educational institutions. The opera "The Great Friendship" played on the Leningrad stage and children learned the song "Moscow-Peking" in school. But those were only external appearances. Resentment at the injustice and humiliation to which Stalin subjected the Chinese leaders accumulated, although it was carefully hidden.

[Makarov] How did our relations with China evolve after N.S. Khrushchev came to power?

[Delyusin] From the very first Khrushchev did much to eliminate the injustices permitted under Stalin, to consolidate the friendship with China, and to build Sino-Soviet relations on a basis of equality. When we talk about the Khrushchev period today many recall first and foremost his transgressions, but few know that his intentions were of the very best. The Chinese themselves have said that after Khrushchev's trip to the PRC in 1954 and his meeting with Mao Zedong a new era began in Sino-Soviet relations.

Khrushchev did much to consolidate relations with the PRC, but some of his proposals were distinguished by their lack of adequate consideration and did not suit the Chinese. And later there came a time when he began to overestimate the degree of friendly relations.

He advanced the thesis of the "common interests" of the two great powers, equal in everything—the USSR and the PRC. But in fact common interests generally meant Soviet interests, and these were formulated in Moscow. The illusion was created that China was one more Soviet republic, and as a result it was possible simply to send Soviet specialists to China with travel authority instead

of inquiring with the Chinese about entry visas for them. "Joint statements" were made without the consent of the Chinese. All this could be called familiarity on an intergovernmental level.

[Makarov] How did China react to Stalin's denounciation of personality?

[Delyusin] It "wounded" them especially deeply because they had always spoken about the "special" relations between Stalin and Mao Zedong. As a result, even after the 20th Congress, portraits of the "father of the people" continued to hang in China and his works were studied and quoted. To some degree this was done to underscore the PRC's independence relative to Moscow, and within the world communist movement in particular. By defending the cult of personality, Mao was also defending himself.

[Makarov] When did the leaders' differences become common knowledge?

[Delyusin] At the beginning of the policy of "the great leap forward" and the creation of people's communes in 1958. Criticism of the Soviet experience started up at that time in China, and some Chinese leaders gloated and said that while the USSR was dawdling at the stage of socialism they would break away and arrive at communism sooner. They circulated the slogan "a few years of hard work and 10,000 years of happiness." And then they began to criticize the Soviet specialists in the PRC, sometimes openly, for being "technically backward and reactionary."

However, the criticism of the Soviet specialists was not of a mass character and was not distinguished by cruelty. Sometimes this was not even criticism but rather misunderstanding and the consequence of a language barrier. But news that the Chinese were "speaking out" reached Moscow. And on the basis of these few instances, Khrushchev unexpectedly made the decision to call back the Soviet specialists. The decision was one of the "volitional" sort, and because he made it without having consulted anyone it was completely unexpected.

The mass media of the USSR and the PRC began to criticize each other's real and imaginary mistakes at first gradually, and then more openly, and then vehemently. The period of the "great friendship" was over and the "great animosity" began.

[Makarov] In October 1964 Khrushchev was removed and his place was taken by Brezhnev. How did this reflect upon our relations with the PRC?

[Delyusin] The accession of a new leadership to power in any country is always an opportunity to correct past mistakes and renounce any "legacy" or parts of it. Although the Soviet leadership took certain steps with the goal of normalizing relations, no improvements occurred at that time.

[Makarov] What can you say about the dispute that developed in the USSR and PRC press at the beginning of the sixties?

[Delyusin] It is difficult to be objective in the midst of mutual reproaches. Nonetheless, objectivity was needed. And all the more by such countries as ours. However, both we and the Chinese unfortunately used arguments in the dispute that were not entirely honest. Among other things the Chinese accused us of a revision of Marxism and compromise with international imperialism. In turn we tried to prove that China was slipping down the path of capitalism. It was a deeply mistaken idea which was supported by some of our high officials. It seemed to them that if they could convince the whole world that the CPC was taking on a new life and becoming a petty bourgeois party, it would bring us some kind of ideological dividends. And in fact the PRC, despite all its serious theoretical mistakes and vacillations (and who did not commit them?), was seeking to build socialism in the country. Although its understanding of the way to build socialism was far from scientific.

In the meantime we also tolerated, to say it directly, an "incorrect" attitude toward facts and documents that did not at all facilitate a reconciliation of our positions. The book "A Special Region of China" by P.P. Vladimirov, published in 1973, may serve as a "classic" example.

Vladimirov was in China off and on from 1938 to 1951 in many different positions, including that of messenger for the Communist International to the CPC Central Committee. The book "A Special Region" was written in the form of journals of events which Vladimirov supposedly experienced. In fact, under the conditions of constant security or being shadowed (call it what you want) that the Chinese imposed upon him, it would have been extremely difficult for Vladimirov to write any such "journals" in which he criticized the leadership of the CPC.

"A Special Region of China" is a compilation put together on the basis of various sources. This is easy to see because in a number of instances the authors used English material in some places and Chinese in others, and as a result the transcriptions of the same names and geographic locations are English at times and Chinese at other times.

[Makarov] But this entire dispute that went on with China in the middle of the sixties was between the two parties.

[Delyusin] Considering that the CPSU and the CPC were the governing parties in their countries, the dispute could not help but be reflected in international relations.

The issue of the correlation of party policy and state policy is extremely important and requires close study. In this instance, ideological differences between the CPSU and the CPC ended by bringing our countries to

the edge of a complete severance of all relations, including diplomatic, and even to the brink of war.

[Makarov] You are referring to the events on Damanskiy Island in 1969.

[Delyusin] The border clashes began much earlier, sometime at the beginning of the sixties, but the events on Damanskiy were a sort of culmination of the entire conflict between the USSR and the PRC.

In the atmosphere of anti-Soviet sentiments it is indicative that the former leaders of the PRC, particularly Minister of Defense Lin Piao, experienced certain difficulties in the course of the "Cultural Revolution" and tried to resolve them by generating a frenzy of nationalism—an approach often used by foundering politicians.

[Makarov] I remember how, as a student at MGU [Moscow State University] in 1969, I walked with my friends to a protest demonstration at the Chinese Embassy in connection with the events on the Chinese border. The dean was at the head of our "delegation."

[Delyusin] There were similar demonstrations in front of our embassy in Beijing and in front of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. I personally am not an adherent of such "measures" organized from above. Especially when they involve throwing ink bottles at the embassy and shouting insults through megaphones, as they did then.

[Makarov] How did the conflict on Damanskiy influence the further development of events?

[Delyusin] When the squabble turned into a firefight, which also included the use of rocket artillery, both sides suddenly came to their senses: A conflict about boundaries and ideology could grow into something worse. And diplomatic steps were then taken to normalize the situation. In 1969 there was a meeting between A.N. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai, premier of the PRC State Council, and afterwards relations between our countries became more peaceful to a certain degree.

[Makarov] And nonetheless, the fear of a great war with China did not disappear for a long time.

[Delyusin] That was the consequence of our propaganda, which depicted China as an enemy scarcely less dangerous than the United States. In China too the official propaganda went on from one day to the next about the "threat from the north," and in Beijing and other cities they built bomb shelters. And at that time no one could have given a 100 percent guarantee that there would be no war with China. But anyone who followed events in the PRC then (and that was at the very height of the "Cultural Revolution"), or who knew about the condition of the Chinese Army with its half-literate soldiers armed with outdated rifles or who had an idea of the level of devastation of industry and agriculture, had to come to the conclusion that the Chinese could hardly resolve to begin a military conflict more serious than a border clash. Those minor provocations which the Chinese committed on the border at that time were carried out in the name of domestic policy and not foreign policy. However, our leadership as represented by Brezhnev overestimated the danger and began to transfer troops and military equipment to the Far East in great quantities. In part this was explained by the "magic of large numbers," and indeed the population of the PRC was already approaching 1 billion. Our leadership was probably frightened to some degree by the Chinese rhetoric, and to some degree by its own. However it happened, the mass transfer of troops to the east cost a great deal of money.

[Makarov] However, it is worth remembering that China already had the atomic bomb, and the geopolitical doctrine of Mao foresaw the opportunity for China to "warm its hands" at the atomic bonfire.

[Delyusin] The bomb cannot win a war all by itself. It was not the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that won the war with Japan, but rather the combined efforts of the Soviet and American armies that shattered the Japanese forces. An army well equipped with conventional weapons is needed in addition to the bomb, and China did not have such an army at that time.

[Makarov] Then why did they expend so much effort and money creating it?

[Delyusin] Mao basically needed it for prestige. We, he said, are prepared to go without trousers so long as we have the atomic bomb. The philosophy of today's leaders of the country is diametrically different. Good trousers for all Chinese and the satisfaction of their needs is more important than military playthings. China's main object right now is the complete modernization of its economy. Peace is an indispensable condition for the achievement of the goals it has set itself. In this lies one more difference between the philosophy of Mao and, let us say, Deng Xiaoping. Mao believed that war was inevitable. It is ruinous and pointless for China to chase after the United States and the USSR in the modernization of weapons.

[Makarov] The creation of "people's communes," the policy of "the great leap forward," and the "Cultural Revolution" were all mistakes of a primarily theoretical nature which, when they were put into practice, caused harm to the entire Chinese people. Are other such mistakes possible in the future?

[Delyusin] You have asked a question that is timely for all systems of socialism. A personality raised to a cult, be it Mao, Stalin, or someone else, is always "doomed" to mistakes. Standing at the height of power, he commits an obvious absurdity. There is no one to correct him. He is above all criticism. Therefore only a comprehensive democratization of society may be able to guard against a repetition of such "expensive" mistakes.

In order to avoid mistakes in the future, the concept of an initial stage in the development of socialism is being carefully worked out in China. Socialism, as they believe in China, is only just beginning.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Alekseyev on Sihanouk's DK 'Dissociation'

BK0902071190 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Station observer Oleg Alekseyev commentary]

[Text] Recently, at his residence in Beijing, Samdech Sihanouk announced that the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK] will be called the National Government of Cambodia. He also decided to again use the traditional national symbol. The Democratic Kampuchea [DK] flag will henceforth be replaced by the the blue and red striped flag depicting the Angkor Wat temple in the center. The ancient national anthem will also be restored. We wonder what is behind these moves.

For one who clearly knows the history of present-day Cambodia, the DK name is directly connected with the bloody oppression practiced by the Khmer Rouge. The flag imposed by the Khmer Rouge on the so-called CGDK—headed by Sihanouk for years—is now rejected by the samdech.

On 24 January, Sihanouk officially announced his resignation from the CGDK leadership. However, he still considers himself a head of state as displayed in a letter he issued in Beijing which he signed as president of Cambodia. Moreover, the samdech declared that he would shortly return to Cambodia to rebuild his country—that is, to govern the reborn nation.

How should people view Sihanouk's move of ceasing to use the political appellation and facade of the Khmer Rouge? Is this a resolute decision by Sihanouk to distance himself from the culprits of the genocide in Cambodia? If so, it is an immensely reasonable turnabout. Another question is: Should Sihanouk take part in the settlement of the Cambodian problem in accordance with the plan initiated not long ago by Australian Foreign Minister Evans, who proposed that a UN administration be established to carry out a number of supervisory tasks in Cambodia during the transition? The answer lies in the fact that general elections will be held in Cambodia under UN supervision and through the outcome of these elections a new government will be formed.

As already known, Comrade Hun Sen, chairman of the State of Cambodia's Council of Ministers, recently stated that his government did not recognize the Khmer Rouge group. However, he indicated that for the sake of a settlement he would hold talks with the CGDK led by Sihanouk, with or without the presence of the Khmer Rouge, and that the composition of the CGDK would be left to the judgment of the leader of that government.

Nevertheless, Sihanouk's dissociation from the Khmer Rouge clearly shows that the prince is making amends by stepping down from the CGDK leadership and ridding himself of the political alliance with these Khmer Rouge. We hope that the move helps pave the way for an agreement to restore peace in Cambodia.

Near East & South Asia

Iranian Killed During 'Firefight' on Border

PM0802175590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Senior Lieutenant D. Shkurko under the rubric "Incidents": "Firefight on the Border"]

[Text] We are informed by the USSR KGB Border Guards Main Directorate that on the night of 6-7 February, attempts by a group of between four and 14 violators to infiltrate Soviet territory on the Soviet-Iranian sector of the state border were foiled.

The violators used firearms. During the action taken to repulse the attempted crossing of the border, one of them was fatally wounded. Most of the violators managed to escape into Iranian territory.

Shooting of Iranian Defended

PM0802190790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Special correspondent Ruslan Ignatyev telephone report: "Tension Continues"]

[Text] Baku—Operational summary, 8 February: The situation in the city remains tense. The administrative apparatus, repair services, and enterprises providing vital services continue, on the whole, to operate in the republic. According to figures from the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], the daily losses caused by the strikes run into millions of rubles.

Colonel A. Atamas, an officer with an operations group, reported that trains have been exchanged between Armenia and Azerbaijan for the first time following a long interval.... They ran between Norashen and Idzhevan railroad stations.

Here is what V. Gasanov, chief engineer at the Azerbaijan Power and Electrification Administration, said: "Owing to the accident involving the No. 1 power unit at the Mingechaur GRES [state regional electric power station], electricity supplies to industrial enterprises have fallen considerably. On the morning of 8 February only four of the seven power units were working. Restoration work is under way. Six GRES power units will be brought on stream 18 February."

...On the night of 7 February a border detail was attacked on the Soviet-Iranian border in a border subunit sector in Dzhalilabadskiy Rayon. The violators fired first. Similar incidents have been recorded in other sectors. The situation currently prevailing on the state border

was described by Major General V. Lilin, deputy chief of the USSR KGB Transcaucasus Border District:

"We have reinforced and strengthened border protection. Nonetheless, the border continues to be violated in Dzhalilabadskiy and Pushkinskiy Rayons both from Soviet and Iranian territory. Up to 200 Iranians and approximately the same number of Soviet citizens illegally cross the border in those areas every day. It is worrying that such crossings usually take place at night, and the people involved carry arms....

"Now to get down to details. On the night of 6-7 February an ordinary three-man detail was on routine duty in a sector in Dzhalilabadskiy Rayon (Baykhanlyyskiy Rural Soviet). Near the border control strip the border guards spotted six unidentified persons coming over from the Iranian side. On that moonlit night their figures were clearly distinguishable. The detail fired an illumination flare to let the violators know that this is the border and that they should go no further. The violators, however, did not stop but continued moving straight toward the border guards. Suddenly they opened fire on the detail, which in response fired warning shots into the air and then shot at the violators. One violator was severely wounded and captured. Another two were then captured. The rest escaped. The wounded man was immediately sent to the rayon hospital at Dzhalilabad, but the doctors were unable to save him. The identity of the captured men is being ascertained.

"An hour before this incident a border detail was fired on at a neighboring subunit—also from the Iranian side. Fortunately, nobody was hurt. The bandits escaped. The same night a group of persons unknown fired pistols when crossing the border.... Four people were detained.

"I want to emphasize," the major general continued, "that so far the border guards have behaved correctly, realizing that the use of weapons in this situation will only complicate matters. But now, when violators are carrying and using weapons, the border guards will open fire in response—irrespective of who is doing the shooting; let's not forget that events are developing on the state border....

"One other problem is the return home of Iranians and Soviet citizens who have crossed the border illegally. Under an agreement with the neighboring side, we have set up so-called filtration centers. Two of these are located in the area of Nakhichevan, while others are located in Dzhalilabadskiy, Pushkinskiy, and Astarinskiy Rayons. Every day up to 500 people pass through them in both directions. But the stream is not subsiding. There are still thousands of Iranians on our territory. Moreover, we detain, as I have already said, up to 200 violators every day.

"Our leadership is regularly appearing on local radio and television and meeting with the population. We are carrying out explanatory work among the residents. Currently the USSR and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministries have prepared an agreement to set up simplified crossing points. This has been agreed with all interested organizations and submitted to the Iranian side for their examination. As soon as Iran accepts our conditions the document will be signed and come into force. This means that the residents of border regions will be entitled to cross the border using their ordinary passports. Local organs of power will issue special additional passport pages [vkladyshi-propuska]."

Commentary on Iranian Efforts To Defuse Tension

NC0602163190 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Sergey Salgirov commentary]

[Text] The situation in the regions along the Soviet-Iranian border is gradually returning to normal. As the Soviet Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry reported, the Soviet Union has submitted proposals to Iranian representatives related to the bilateral accord reached earlier on detailed rules and regulations for the travel across the border by residents of the border regions. The relaxation of formalities for travel permits will facilitate visits to relatives and personal travel.

In addition, Soviet and Iranian border guards have held a meeting during which they reached agreement on the reciprocal exchange of those who had violated the borders. The calamitous events in the Transcaucasus affected not only the Soviet Union but also our southern neighbor, Iran. After all, the railway lines, highways, and sea links in the border regions carry a considerable proportion of the trade between the two countries as well as Iran's trade with European countries.

The escalation of tension caused halts in the operations of this transport network, which was later totally paralyzed by the repercussions of the nationalistic conflict. The hydroelectric power stations on the Aras River ground to a halt, causing power outages in residential areas on both sides of the Aras River. It is not surprising that perceptive personalities and social circles in Iran made efforts to defuse the tension. It has been reported that Mr. Karim Shafe'i, an Iranian Majles deputy, used a megaphone to address the Soviet Azerbaijanis who had gathered on the opposite side of the river and who wanted the border with Iran to be opened.

He said that the congregation of such a large number of people is a meaningless act. Soviet Muslims must contact their officials to travel to Iran and must do so through proper channels. Mr. Shafe'i called on his Soviet coreligionist brothers to observe the regulations regarding the Soviet and Iranian borders. Unfortunately, the fundamentalists hampered the implementation of the beneficial initiatives of the Iranian side and attempted to capitalize on the Transcaucasian events to achieve their own anti-Soviet political objectives.

However, there were certain individuals among the Shiite clergy who stressed the need to normalize the situation and condemned extremism. In any case, such

persons are not found only in Iran. Ayatollah Mehdi Ruhani, the religious leader of the Iranians residing in Western Europe, addressed his coreligionist Azerbaijani brothers in an interview with Radio Europe-1 and called on them to assist Gorbachev in his numerous reforms for freedom.

There is no doubt that foreign personalities were genuinely apprehensive about the consequences of the casualties and hardships suffered by the Muslims in the deteriorating conditions in the Transcaucasus and the state of emergency declared there. It is for this reason that they strove to calm inflamed sentiments. They realized that restraint and wisdom would be the most effective long-term means to ameliorate the conditions.

The adoption of measures to safeguard people's lives and property within the framework of the emergency declaration paved the way for stabilizing the situation. However, these measures cannot resolve the situation by themselves. An enormous task lies ahead in facilitating amicable dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia, meeting the sociopolitical aspirations of the local people, and restructuring all aspects of life in the Transcaucasian regions.

Iran Ready To Supply Natural Gas to USSR

LD0802113790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1015 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Tehran, 8 Feb. (TASS)—Iran is ready to deliver natural gas to its northern neighbor, Mohammad Esma'il Kordchian, general director of the Iranian National Gas Company, has said. The export of Iranian gas to the Soviet Union will begin in the early days of April at a volume of 8 million cubic meters daily and at prices that are accepted on the international market. In the words of M.E. Kordchian, the final stage of talks between Iranian and Soviet officials on this question will begin next week.

Iranian natural gas, he stressed, will be delivered to the USSR mainly from the Kangan deposit, along the Trans-Iranian trunk gas pipeline. Last month this deposit was switched in to the country's general network of gas pipelines, and in the first stage it will produce 34 million cubic meters of gas daily.

Batyev Comments on Iran's Stand on Afghanistan

NC0902124790 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Interview by Yuriy Andreyev from the "On the Waves of Radio Moscow" feature]

[Text] Esteemed listeners, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is in Moscow for talks with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Afghanistan is one of the topics of these talks, which are being followed with great attention by the world and namely by Iran. Our analyst Aleksandr Batyev says about this:

[Begin Batyev recording in Russian, fading into Persian translation] Only a few can deny that the Afghanistan problem can be solved only through political means. However, approaches on how to achieve this goal, specifically the approaches of the Soviet Union and of the United States, differ. It is hoped that more understanding will be displayed during the Moscow talks. At any rate, the activity or inactivity of both countries will have great impact on the process of a political solution to the Afghanistan problem which should lead to the formation of a new government in that country. What kind of government will this be? Tehran cannot be indifferent to this question. [end recording]

Our correspondent asked: What are Tehran's views on the stands adopted by the Soviet Union and the United States?

[Begin Batyev recording in Russian, fading into Persian translation] I think that the proposals propounded by the Soviet Union and Kabul meet Tehran's interests more. These proposals are that the Afghanistan Government be formed with the participation of all competent Afghan forces. The United States is currently propounding the resignation of President Najibullah's government and supports the allegations by the so-called interim government formed by the seven-party opposition alliance in Peshawar. But as pointed out even by THE WASHINGTON POST, the field commanders of the mujahidin in Afghanistan are not willing to bring a government to power which they believe is under the control of Pakistan and, in turn, under Washington's control.

Apparently Tehran also is suspicious of such a government. After all, the failure of the repeated efforts to include representatives of the Nine-Party Alliance supported by Tehran in the interim government of the Seven-Party Alliance was not accidental. Meanwhile, only a few second-rate positions in this government had been handed to the Nine-Party Alliance. Actually there are objective reasons for this. The Nine-Party Alliance enjoys a much lesser credibility than the Seven-Party Alliance in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Tehran does not want to leave the forces that are under its aegis defenseless. Under such conditions, the participation of the current Afghanistan leadership in Kabul together with the Nine-Party Alliance representatives in Afghanistan's future government will form the necessary force to neutralize the [word indistinct] wishes of the Peshawar-based Seven-Party Alliance. [end recording]

Our correspondent asked: In short, do you think that given favorable conditions, Iran can support Kabul's current initiatives for national reconciliation which are supported by the Soviet Union?

[Begin Batyev recording in Russian, fading into Persian] Yes. By pursuing the ideas of national reconciliation Kabul is, at the same time, striving toward the formation of an international conference on Afghanistan with the participation of all interested sides so that Afghanistan's situation as a neutal, nonaligned, and non-military

country will be ensured. Kabul proposes that not only the Soviet Union and the United States, but neighboring countries like Iran, actively participate in the efforts to solve the Afghanistan problem. It is impossible that this proposal will not be favored by Iran.

Ba..gladesh, Pakistani 'Propaganda' Assailed

NC0502191190 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Aleksandr Batyev commentary]

[Excerpt] The Baku military commandant has announced that a four-phase timetable for relaxing the curfew restrictions in the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan has been drawn up. The Interior Ministry forces are to be withdrawn after the situation in the city is normalized. This announcement by the Baku military commandant is further proof of the complicated but steadily stabilizing trend in Azerbaijan. The easing of tension in the region has resulted in events in the Transcaucasian regions being reduced to second class or third class coverage on the pages of foreign publications. Despite this, most Islamic countries, including Pakistan and Bangladesh, continue to give immense attention to such reports. It is being said in these countries that such attention to events in Soviet Azerbaijan is evidence of Islamic solidarity, as if to say that Soviet Muslims in Azerbaijan are being subjected to harassment and persecution.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman denied these allegations and said that the reasons for the incidents in the Transcaucasian regions are the result of historically rooted economic, social, and nationalistic factors and have no religious bias at all. It would not be inappropriate to mention in connection with the recent events in Baku that a new office of the spiritual administration of the Muslims has been set up in Baku. In the Soviet Union, the mosques are placed at the disposal of Muslims, who also have the right to construct new ones. All this is taking place in accordance with the new policy toward the Muslims which was initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev.

In light of the above, impartial observers must acknowledge that allegations of persecution and harassment of Soviet Muslims are not true. Nevertheless, most newspapers in Pakistan and Bangladesh claim that the Armed Forces' intervention in Azerbaijan was aimed at crushing the Muslims and condemn this. In my opinion, such observations are nothing but old and inappropriate propaganda stunts.

Such remarks about the intervention of Soviet troops and their help in repressing the Soviet Muslims in Azerbaijan could result in equating this event with the entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The many years of the Soviet troops' presence in Afghanistan have been interpreted as armed Soviet intervention. The authors of this propoganda expect that reports on the Soviet Interior Ministry forces' operations in Baku will automatically leave a similar negative impression in the minds of readers.

However, I believe that the readers of these newspapers are blessed with enough sound judgment to understand that Azerbaijan is not Afghanistan. It is a Soviet republic and has never been a separate country. Therefore, on this basis the Supreme Soviet Presidium has the constitutional right to declare an emergency in Baku. Every country, including Pakistan and Bangladesh, has such rights and can declare an emergency situation in any part of the country when the lives or safety of its citizens are threatened. [passage omitted]

Arab Envoy Concerned Over Israeli Immigration

LD0802201790 Moscow TASS in English 1931 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—Monsif al-May, head of the Moscow Arab League Mission, was received by First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov today.

"At its recent meeting in Tunis, the Arab League's Committee in Support of the Palestinian Uprising expressed concern over the Israeli authorities' plans to use immigrants to Israel to press Palestinians out of their lands," Al-May said.

Vorontsov touched in detail upon the Soviet Union's steps to influence Israel's stand and noted that the Soviet side expected constructive interacation with Arab states and the international community as a whole to prevent immigrants from being settled on Palestinian lands and to see to it that Israel observes international law.

Problem of Jewish Emigration to Israel Examined

LD0802123190 Kuwait KUNA in English 0916 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 8 (KUNA)—Prominent Soviet figures have joined the world in expressing anxiety over the flow of Jewish immigrants to Israel and the intention of the Israeli Government to settle the new immigrants in the occupied Arab territories.

Deputy chairman of the Middle East and North Africa Department in the Soviet NOVOSTY NEWS AGENCY said the immigration became a source of anxiety for all Soviets concerned and called for a peaceful and just settlement of the Middle East crises.

Aleksandr Smirnov, in a survey conducted by KUNA in this respect, added that "whether we like it nor not, Jewish immigration will cause immense damage to the struggle of the Palestinian people, especially in light of the Shamir government's intentions to settle the Jews in the occupied territories."

Smirnov called for extensive efforts by moderate Arab states and the Soviet Union to push the American

Administration to remove obstacles facing Jewish immigration to the U.S., accusing Washington and Israel of collusion in this respect.

He brought to the attention the importance of getting, through American, Soviet and West European joint efforts, Israeli guarantees not to settle the Jews in the occupied territories.

Explaining the clear trend to immigrate, Smirnov said the recent historical and critical stage the Soviet Union is passing through has given birth to irresponsible elements calling themselves as "nationalist Russians."

Some Jews are seeking to achieve personal gains by portraying the exodus as fleeing from massacres to make the United States given them the status of refugees under which they will receive 15,000 U.S. dollars, Smirnov said.

He expressed hope that the Soviet Government would set an embargo on young Jewish immigration ranging between 20-35 years to Israel in spite of this delicate issue.

Smirnov called for launching an intensive media campaign to speak to the Jewish mind and enlighten it about the dangers of settling Jews in the occupied Arab territories.

For his part an international law academic in Moscow's Friendship University, Professor Egor Plitchinco called for holding tripartite negotiations among the Soviet Union, Israel and the Palestinian state to reach a settlement for Jewish immigration.

He added that settling the Soviet Jews in the occupied Arab territories will create tension in Soviet-Arab relations.

He assessed the Zionist settlement policies as "illegal and violate the Geneva Convention of 1949" and cast doubts about the settlers' rights of possession and work.

The Soviet professor expressed confidence that the question of settling any Jew immigrant in the occupied Arab territories is an interference in the Palestinian state's powers, noting that this question cannot be solved without consultations and agreements with the Palestine Liberation Organization, sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In this respect a Jewish Soviet writer, Victor Magidson, rejected initiation of direct airflights between Tel Aviv and Moscow and called on the United States and Western governments to stop considering Jewish immigration as a national issue but rather from the stand point of every individual's right to emigrate.

The Soviet writer stressed that the issue of settling Jews in the occupied territories is an "immoral question," noting that the Israeli Government seeks to use the settlers as a buffer zone between Israel and the Arab states.

Magidson affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state on their lands, noting that Palestine is a land for both the "Jews and Palestinians."

Commentator on Jewish Emigration to Israel

LD0802154690 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] About the issue of emigration from the Soviet Union, our commentator Aleksey Zlatorunskiy says:

The committee for supporting the uprising, which was formed by the Arab League in 1988 and includes the foreign ministers of Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, the PLO and the Arab League secretary general, has held a meeting in Tunis.

The probable consequences of Israel's intention to settle the Jewish emigrants, including the Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union, in the occupied Arab territories were among the principal issues discussed in the meeting.

The committee adopted a resolution to send widely representative delegations to the Soviet Union, the United States, and the EEC to exert pressure on Israel to stop the persecution of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to make Tel Aviv abandon the idea of settling the emigrants in the occupied Arab territories.

The committee's resolution was adopted under the shadow of an active campaign by the Arab media organs. The essence of this campaign is the need to adopt radical measures to stop the colonization of the occupied Arab territories. In this context severe criticism is addressed not only to Israel and the United States, but also to the Soviet Union, which is becoming a source of the vital forces of the extremist policy of Tel Aviv.

The commentator says that he understands the Arab worries. In fact, who among the friends of the Arabs could remain silent toward this grave danger, the danger of annexing the occupied territories to the Zionist entity?

It is probable that two different things get mixed up under the influence of emotions and the propaganda campaign. They are the issue of emigration and the issue of colonization. It is forgotten that the issue of emigration, whose freedom is specified by the international laws, is not necessarily conducive to the second issue, the issue of colonization.

Yitzhak Shamir tried to combine the issue of emigration and the issue of colonization in order to revive an anti-Soviet wave and defame the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries. By the way, many Arabs understood that very well. If we look at Yitzhak Shamir's logic, we can see that the Israeli expansion is not based on Zionist policies, but it is based on the hundreds of thousands of Jewish emigrants, who came—by the way—from the Arab countries. It is clear to everyone that Morocco, from which approximately

400,000 Jews left, and also Iraq and the other Arab countries from which the Jews left, all of them at that time acted in a humanitarian manner according to international law.

No, the issue is not emigration. In 1989 12,500 Jews left the Soviet Union. How many of them settled in Israel? We remind those who do not know the truth that only one-tenth of the Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union settled in Israel. Therefore the issue is confined to the policies of the Israel leadership, which relies on the support—including the financial support—of the United States and the international Zionist organizations. The issue is confined to the Israeli unwillingness to respond to the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, especially their right to establish their own state. The Soviet Union has always supported the Palestinian right to establish their independent state.

The commentator said: I am confident that Moscow will receive warmly the delegation of the Arab League Committee in Support of the Uprising. Undoubtedly the delegation will find understanding and support because the policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is an honorable and frank policy which is not affected by temporary considerations, and it is an amicable policy toward the Arab countries.

Emigration To Continue Despite Arab Pressure

TA0802180690 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1600 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The Arab countries and the Islamic world continue to complain to the international community over the large immigration from the USSR to Israel. The Islamic Conference Organization discussed the issue in Jeddah and issued an urgent call to pressure Israel not to settle immigrants in the territories. At the same time, it called on the USSR to limit the numbers of immigrants permitted to leave. I would like to believe that Mr. Shamir's remarks about the need for a big Israel to absorb the immigrants from the USSR was a slip of the tongue and that he did not have the intention of causing such a large storm. It is a fact that the USSR's relations with the Arab countries became heated, since the Arabs are angry and have issued a variety of calls, requests, and warnings to Moscow. But were they willing to discuss the issue objectively they would quickly learn that there is no danger that the territories will be settled with Soviet immigrants. In 1989, some 13,000 Soviet immigrants arrived in Israel, with less than 0.5 percent settling in the territories. Soviet Jews are mostly from large cities and naturally prefer to settle in Jerusalem, the Dan District, or in Haifa. Since most are not ideologically motivated they have no reason to show any initiative in the Israeli-Arab conflict. That is one aspect of the problem. The other is that the USSR is undergoing a period of democratic change in all aspects of life. The principle of freedom of movement is one of the cornerstones of a democratic and modern society, and this includes Soviet Jewry. The gates to emigration will therefore not be shut. For us this is a question of principle.

There is perhaps yet another aspect to the Arab side of the storm. If each new Israeli citizen is viewed as an enemy, then of course any immigration to Israel is a danger. But if that is the case, what is the point of all the attempts to advance the Middle East peace process? If we really want peace it can be made only with Israel, since without it there will be no peace. If there is a desire for peace and a readiness to make peace, then let there be peace. What difference does it make to the Arabs how many people live in Israel? They oppose the intention to populate the territories with new Soviet immigrants. That is natural, but if they oppose all immigration, that is unacceptable.

The USSR will continue to operate in two directions simultaneously based on the principles of our policy: We will support the struggle for the fulfillment of the national rights of the Palestinian people for a just political settlement in the Middle East, and we will fulfill all our human rights commitments, including freedom of movement and immigration.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Six Soviets Killed in Helicopter Crash

AB0802201990 Paris AFP in English 1903 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Addis Ababa, Feb 8 (AFP)—Six Soviet citizens, one of them an Army major-general, were among 17 people killed in a helicopter crash in eastern Ethiopia on Wednesday [7 February], reports here said Thursday.

Two Ethiopian generals, two colonels, a regional police commander and the regional chief of internal security were also among the casualties.

The six Soviets were Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Simonov, described as a military advisor to the Ethiopian Army, four crew and a translator, Andrey Semyolov.

Eleven Ethiopians lost their lives in the crash, which occurred when the Army helicopter piloted by one of the Soviets slammed into Gudo Bela Mountain in the Alemaya region of east Harer at 11 a.m. local time on Wednesday, the ETHIOPIAN NEWS AGENCY (ENA) said.

ENA gave the names of 12 of those killed in the crash, including that of the Soviet general, but the rest were simply identified as "the four Soviet crew and a translator". Nothing was said about their mission. [passage omitted]

Potovskiy Says De Klerk Has Crossed Rubicon

MB0702232290 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Igor Potovskiy commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] Today, when the euphoria called forth by President de Klerk's speech is gradually dissipating, the words of the South African politologist, Dr. Andre Odendaal, are coming to one's mind. Not so long ago in an interview to Radio Moscow, he said that it should be understood that the more there are changes in South Africa, the more remains unchanged.

The changes promulgated by the president are really considerable: the legalization of banned organizations, the decision to unconditionally release Nelson Mandela, and the direct invitation to talks with democratic forces. But despite the numerous statements to the effect that there are no more grounds in the country for oppression, that the government had created the necessary climate for a political dialogue, today there is still no real basis for negotiations.

The government has fulfilled the ANC [African National Congress] conditions in many ways, but not completely. It is evident that the ANC is not satisfied. Difficulties have appeared concerning the date of the release of Nelson Mandela. Information agencies say that on the whole, two political giants of South Africa, Nelson Mandela and Frederik de Klerk, are waging a war of nerves, gradually approaching the table of negotiation.

Analysts consider that a whole year will pass because talks cannot be expected in the near future. Many suppositions are today voiced concerning the country's prospects. It is only in one thing that there is certainty more than before. It is in the positions of the sides and in the character of their differences. The problem is in the fact that even in the present very deep changes in the South African political situation, the positions of sides remain practically unchanged, in principle and in practice.

The ANC and the government have opposite viewpoints on the future of the country. In the economic sphere, the ANC considers nationalization to be inevitable. De Klerk considers that to be madness. His economic program, put forward in the parliamentary speech, is built on opposite principles. On the whole the program is very close to the policy of denationalization conducted by the prime minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher.

The ANC is insisting on the unacceptable-for-the- government constitutional principle, one-man, one-vote. Frederik de Klerk asserts to the principle of the protection of the rights of the minority, that is of groups of population, unacceptable for the ANC.

No matter how paradoxical this may sound, President de Klerk's speech in the Parliament confirmed the invariability of the policy of the National Party. The president did not make the main thing, a choice. As before, he is balancing between the rightists and the leftists. All the measures that were proclaimed were undertaken for the sake of one objective: not to allow a revolution.

Even when serious researchers, including in the West, found the demands of the ANC a necessary minimum, the president did not fulfill them. The state of emergency was not lifted because the conservative part of the white population would not have accepted that. The president does not intend to lose the support of the majority of the white electorate. He does not intend to create the grounds for the deepening of the conflict inside the white community.

The complexity of the situation of Frederik de Klerk consists in the fact that he has crossed his Rubicon. In August 1985, his predecessor, Pieter Botha, stated that he had crossed the Rubicon. The country was promised reform, but the sharply increased expectations and hopes did not justify themselves and in the final count brought Botha to the bankruptcy of his political career. Frederik de Klerk did not mention the Rubicon, but the expectations he gave birth to are considerably more serious, just like the possible consequences, if they are not justified.

Asoyan Warns of 'Great Illusions' Within RSA

MB0802213890 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] A spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry has said that a historical chance is opening for South Africa to put an end to injustice and violence, and this chance should not be lost by no means.

Deputy chief of the African section of the ministry, Boris Asoyan, stressed that the recent speech by President de Klerk reflects the growing realization by the ruling circles of Pretoria of the necessity of a dialogue with the democratic opposition. This, Boris Asoyan says, would have been impossible without the powerful pressure by the antiapartheid movement in South Africa and in the rest of the world.

However, he said, there should not be any great illusions about the readiness of Pretoria for a fast, full, and complete abolition of apartheid. As long as Nelson Mandela remains behind bars and troops are stationed in African townships, Boris Asoyan said, one cannot expect a fast transition from hostility to trust. Every new step to negotiations will be stubbornly resisted by the opponents to change.

U.S. Aid Said To Make UNITA 'Inflexible'

MB0802221390 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 8 Feb 90

[(Vladimir Shirov) commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] African leaders are continuing to press for peace in Angola.

The presidents of Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, and Zaire met on Wednesday [7 Feb] in the small town of Nsele, near Kinshasa, to study this question once again.

(Vladimir Shirov) comments:

(?That) mini-summit, this get-together, was held after several unsuccessful attempts to assemble all the members of the mediatory group of eight African countries.

The latest such initiative envisaged a meeting in Luanda on 10 January, when it was called off because its chairman, the president of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, did not turn up, (?but who) explained his actions by measures of business.

There was no confidence to the very last moment that yesterday's meeting would take place either, as, on the day before it was scheduled, it was announced that Angola's president, Eduardo dos Santos, (?who) had been invited, was unable to attend. Nonetheless, the mini-summit came through.

The communique issued by the mini-summit provides little information on the essence of the talks. It states briefly that the presidents looked into the situation in Angola, which is giving rise to anxiety, and stated the intention to continue bending every effort to promote discontinuation of hostile action in the country.

Those intentions command respect. The only question is: How soon will they lead to practical results?

Meantime, news agency reports speak of on-going fighting between government troops and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] detachments in southeast Angola and in the region of Mavinga.

Spokesmen for the government say the city has been taken, but UNITA is denying such reports.

Meanwhile, President dos Santos has stressed that he has no intention of crushing UNITA militarily and that his earlier claim of a peace settlement still remains in force.

Incidentally, this month it will be a year since the amnesty was announced for UNITA members who surrender voluntarily. The government intends to prolong the amnesty, so the dialogue on ways of solving the domestic conflict could continue.

At the same time, UNITA, with Jonas Savimbi in the lead, is quite inflexible as regards to several of the Angolan Government's peace proposals and insists on having a say in Angola's affairs as an independent political force. Its persistence is, no doubt, due to on-going support on the part of the United States. According to certain evaluations, Washington annually extends UNITA support to the tune of some $50 million. So, we can understand the Angolan leadership, which believes that the normalization process is terminated in the country due, to a great extent, to the United States, whose actions go counter to the peace platform worked out by the government of the Republic.

True, there have been calls, specifically from South Africa, that the Soviet Union bring its influence to bear on developments in Angola. But, the striking thing about this is that those calls came at a time when UNITA found itself under strong pressure due to the offensive of the Angolan Government troops.

However the case might be, the settlement of the regional conflict, in the final count, will depend mainly on the sides involved.

Perhaps some of the African countries will be able to help, including those whose leaders met yesterday, near Kinshasa.

Prospects for Stability in Horn Assessed

EA0702214690 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Our commentator Aleksandr Mikhaylov says that whenever the news agencies report on East Africa, I like to see whether the reports are on indications of the coming of stability to the region. Unfortunately, however, the latest reports are creating worries.

On Saturday a plane from the Sudan National Army bombed the town of Moyo in Uganda. A senior committee of officers is carrying on an investigation. Without wanting to predict the results that this committee of officers will achieve, I would like to say that this accident took place by mistake. Like the two previous ones, this Sudanese officer seems to have made a mistake. Instead of bombing the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, he bombed the land of a neighboring country with whom Sudan has friendly relations.

This mistake was caused by the low standard of the planes' navigational equipment and the lack of proper demarcation along the border between the two countries. Nevertheless, will the relatives of those five who died there understand such an explanation? Can the six Ugandan peasants injured there listen to this explanation? The answer is clear. Whatever country may be interested in the war in Sudan, the people of Uganda are not concerned with it. They have full rights to ask their central government to guarantee their peace and security from external aggression. The central government, led by President Yoweri Museveni, is striving very hard to prevent the war in Sudan from spilling over into Uganda. However, the tension on the border of the two countries is increasing, despite the desires of the leaderships of Uganda and Sudan.

During the whole of last week accusations and counter accusations between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF] never cooled. These accusations are based on ways of delivering the food relief donated to the people living in the war-torn regions. The guerrillas want the international organizations to distribute the food.

The government is adamant that it has the ability to deliver the food to the people through the safe corridors which the guerrillas are to vacate. The result of this is a threat to the food aid meant for instant delivery to the people. The reasons put forward by both sides can be understood, but the following questions crops up: Can the debates going on between the two opposing sides satisfy the starving people? Can a person understand that

he can starve to death for one reason or another, while the food donated by the international organizations is in the stores? The answer, said our commentator, is clear. The conflicts and wars going in the Horn of Africa have now reached a point at which the confronting sides are losing control over them. Therefore, they are a real danger to the several millions living in Sudan and Ethiopia, and are harming the other governments in East Africa. There is no better time than now to put out this raging fire.

East Europe

Czechoslovak Troop Withdrawal Talks Hit Impasse

Differing Opinions on Deadline

LD0802185290 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] And now let's focus on foreign affairs issues concerning Czechoslovakia. A difference of opinions on the deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops is appearing in the talks. A telephone dispatch by Peter Voldan, our Moscow correspondent, provides more details:

[Voldan] As Lubos Dobrovskiy, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told newsmen a little while ago, the working groups, comprising members of the Czechoslovak and Soviet delegations at the Soviet troop withdrawal talks, were in session today. According to Lubos Dobrovskiy, positive results were achieved in the first group, which dealt with the wording of the text of the agreement on the troop withdrawal. A text acceptable to both sides is taking shape.

The problems are in the second group, which discusses technical and transport questions connected with the departure of Soviet units. On the basis of disagreements between the experts on the deadline for withdrawal of the Soviet troops, when the Soviet side reemphasized its willingness to pull out its troops but was attempting to prove that the deadlines submitted by the Czechoslovak delegation were too soon, it was noted that acceptance of the other side's position would exceed the mandate of the two delegations. It has been decided that the delegations contact their governments and that, on the basis of these consultations, they attempt to reach conclusions at tomorrow's talks that could be taken by the Czechoslovak delegation to Prague.

According to the spokesman of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it seems certain that this round of talks will end tomorrow and not, as was stressed, with a lack of success. The point is that the talks on withdrawing a major part of the troops in the first stage before the elections in Czechoslovakia are proceeding in a highly promising manner. An interim and important agreement on the numbers of troops, equipment, and dates has been reached. The circumstances prompting the Soviet side's proposals to shift the final deadline for the withdrawal to as late as 1991 are of an important political nature, noted Lubos Dobrovskiy.

We will inform you about tomorrow's continuation of the Czechoslovak-Soviet talks.

Negotiations Break Down

LD0902102690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] The CTK news agency has reported the halting of the talks with the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of Soviet troops form Czechoslovakia. The sides could not agree on the timetable for the withdrawal. Czechoslovakia insists on a withdrawal before the end of the year, with half of the Soviet troops having to return home before the general elections in Czechoslovakia in June. The Soviet Union, while agreeing in principle to the troop withdrawal, maintains that the time scale is too tight for such a complex operation.

Hungary Wants Soviet Troops Garrisoned

LD0802093190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0900 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] The defense minister has called on the commanders of the Soviet Southern Army Group that from February to April they should not carry out any maneuvers or artillery practice which would require the troops to leave their local garrisons.

This information was given to Hungarian radio by Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Csikos, deputy head of the Defense Ministry's Press Main Department. He said that Ferenc Karpati, defense minister, this morning summoned to the ministry the commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group and asked for a briefing about what kind of maneuvers are being planned for the coming months on Hungary's territory.

The commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group said that for this period they are not planning any more significant maneuvers at all. They will only be carrying out leading artillery [vezetesi loeveszeti] tasks to be performed in the course of training, at the level of subunits.

Colonel Says Maneuvers Slated Near Veszprem

LD0802101790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0500 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Denes Csengey, member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum Presidium, speaking yesterday at the national summit meeting repeatedly asked if there will be any Soviet military maneuvres at the time of the elections in Transdanubia. According to a report in NEPSZABADSAG, Premier Miklos Nemeth explicitly denied this, saying that in the earlier training plan there were indeed plans for Soviet military maneuvres in Hungary, but these had been renounced by the competent Soviet officials on the basis of a mutual agreement.

However, NEPSZAVA carries completely different information. Our newsreader [name indistinct] will now acquaint you with this:

[Newsreader] Staff members of NEPSZAVA have investigated reports on planned Soviet military maneuvers based on the communique of the National [word indistinct] Service, and alluding to Soviet Captain (Klebov), who stated in MAGYAR HIRLAP: The Southern Army Group will not hold military maneuvers in either February or March.

The staff members of NEPSZAVA telephoned Hungarian Democratic Forum staff members in Veszprem, who quoted an official statement from page 8 of the 26 January issue of the local paper, in which the Territorial Command of the Soviet Army informs the population that it will be holding artillery and military maneuvers in the vicinity of Veszprem from 1 February to 30 May.

The journalists then telephoned an officer of the Southern Army Group, Colonel (Kristof Korespov), who told NEVSZAVA the following: It is possible that, after all, there will be military maneuvers in the vicinity of Veszprem, but this is the concern of the Territorial Command. Following further questioning, he stated that at the given time, over a three-month period, Soviet troops from throughout the country will move to the Veszprem region and, working in relays, will carry out military maneuvres until 30 May. By way of reassurance, the colonel added: This will not be a big amalgamated military maneuver; it is merely lots of little ones.

Hungarian Price Hikes Breed 'Social Tension'

PM0702160590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Single Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Rising Prices"]

[Text] In the past few days shoppers in Hungary have witnessed the latest price increases on a whole series of consumer goods, primarily foods.

The price of detergents and confectionery has gone up. A plant which manufactures refrigerators has raised the prices of its goods by almost 25 percent. There has been an appreciable increase in the price of vegetable oil, which completely disappeared from stores just before the New Year. Economists believe that the latest price increases are not the last and that Hungarian citizens are going to find themselves facing phenomena such as inflation and the rising cost of essential goods more than once in the future.

Despite the fact that rising prices are now a common phenomenon for many in Hungary, this process is causing growing social tension in the country. The price of meat has risen by almost 32 percent and dairy products by more than 40 percent so far this year. Just a few days ago, there was a 35 percent increase in rents and the cost of tickets for many forms of city transport went up.

Specialists are pointing out that growth in consumer prices cannot serve as a reliable means of resolving Hungary's present economic situation, which is continuing to worsen.

German Unity Debate Seen Prompting Kohl Visit

PM0802172790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Ye. Bovkun report: "H. Kohl's Lightning Visit"]

[Text] Bonn—The surprise visit to Moscow by FRG Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher is being given an unambiguous interpretation in Bonn. It is believed that the leaders of the ruling coalition will be familiarizing the Soviet leadership in detail with their new plans on the further development of German-German relations, taking into account first and foremost such an important aspect of European policy as security.

At the end of February, H. Kohl intends to discuss this problem with his U.S. colleagues at Camp David, and he must be interested to know how Moscow will react to the FRG Government's attempts to accelerate the solution of the German question—the unification of Germany.

Many contradictions have already been noted in Bonn's position. On the one hand, Kohl's well-known 10-point plan is still "valid," and a concept for FRG-GDR economic cooperation, including the creation of a bilateral monetary union, is being actively studied. On the other hand, Bonn has been more than restrained toward the current GDR Government's counterproposals: The ruling coalition is awaiting the results of the March elections in the neighboring German state, so as to get a firm idea of whom it will be dealing with. Bonn's conservatives are very worried in particular by the possible success of the social democrats in the GDR.

Nor are the two states' relations at interparty level free from contradictions. There is much debate as to how the "kindred" parties can cooperate with one another on the eve of and during the elections (there will be parliamentary elections in Bonn in December), whether the Bonn parties leaders have the right to attend pre-election events in the GDR and, conversely, whether that would be regarded in the neighboring countries as interference in a neighbor's internal affairs.

But the question now worrying everyone most of all is surely that of the future political status of the united Germany: neutrality, limited neutrality, FRG and GDR membership of opposing military-political blocs under a common state administration, a confederation with the presence of German troops alone on the two states' territory.... There are many options, each with its drawbacks. Bonn is therefore urgently seeking one which could satisfy the security interests of both East and West.

They know the Soviet viewpoint well here, as they do the position of their immediate allies—the United States,

Britain, and France. Combining their interests is not easy, but it is extremely necessary.

Levin Comments on German Unification Issue

LD0202154290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0340 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] Today, 2 February, Hans Modrow, chairman of the GDR Government, will meet with Lothar Spaeth, minister-president of Baden-Gutenberg. As the DPA agency reports, in his discussion with Hans Modrow, Lothar Spaeth, a leader of the Christian Democratic Union, the ruling party in the FRG, intends to discuss more specifically the talks held in Moscow with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and in particular to pinpoint the USSR's position with regard to German unity, a very topical issue which is concerning many people. Viktor Levin will now comment:

[Levin] I can very well imagine the interest which Lothar Spaeth is displaying in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement on the unity of Germany, but all in all, these statements are fairly widely known. They are of a fundamental nature in my view—fundamental because they very precisely define the Soviet Union's approach and state that we do not have objections in principle to the unity of Germany.

The question may arise as to why our country has only now come out with this statement. Well, you will agree that only a few months ago it would have been difficult even to imagine that the development of events in the GDR, and indeed in the FRG, would take such a turn, and that the issue of German unity would come onto the practical agenda. It is now already obvious that it has entered onto the agenda, and our country has given a clear response.

It follows from this that we respect the German people's aspiration for unification and understand their rights. However, it would be wrong to place a full stop here, for there are no rights without obligations, just as there are no obligations without rights. We are living in a single interdependent world, and any phenomenon, any process in any country has an effect in other countries, all the more so when what is involved are processes in the very center of Europe, and a process that is essentially of an international nature, from today's point of view, even in a purely formal way. This is because what is involved is the destiny of two states. Yes, a single nation lives in these states, but there are two states, and the issue of how, and by what means they approach this unity is of key significance. It is obvious that the German people cannot avoid taking into account both their own responsibility, which is derived from European history, and their interdependence with the common European processes.

For this reason, when voices were sometimes heard in the FRG, especially initially, saying that it is necessary to go one's own way and not to pay attention to anyone, the politicians who thought in a realistic way immediately said that the Germans do not have the right to go it alone; they must coordinate their actions with other countries. What is involved is that the unity of Germany should be achieved in such a way that it is not to the detriment of other states' interests. This path is completely realistic, particularly within the framework of the all-European process. At one time we had an unclear picture of what the all-European home is; now its shape is becoming increasingly clear, and I think that within the framework of this all-European home a solution to the German problem can be optimum in nature when it is to everyone's benefit and to the detriment of no one.

Pro-Unification Demonstrations Staged 5 Feb

Protests in Leipzig, Dresden

LD0602225590 Moscow TASS in English 2248 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Berlin February 7 TASS—Over 100,000 people participated in traditional mass demonstrations held on Monday in various cities of the republic. Several dozen thousands of people who gathered in Leipzig, Dresden and Halle, again demanded the earliest-possible unification of the two German states.

They also spoke of strengthening peace, supported a call by the Evangelical Church for the establishment and strengthening of partner relations between parties and democratic groups as well as between demonstrators and police.

Some marchers in Leipzig voiced slogans against the Party of Democratic Socialism. The ADN news agency reports that demonstrators in Leipzig included members of the "republican" party from West Germany, who again committed extremist actions.

These actions showed that the GDR People's Chamber was right, deciding to ban this right-wing radical party.

Demonstrators in Dresden gave much attention to a serious situation in public health. Over 1,000 medical workers from Dresden Province left for West Germany in the past 13 months.

Doctors and other medical personnel proclaimed the slogan "for healthy public health", demanding urgent measures to change the situation.

Ingmar Wagner, member of the Danish Communist Party Central Committee, sent an invitation to Erich Honecker to settle in Denmark and to undergo treatment there. Wagner also agreed to accommodate the former GDR leader at his home.

But the implementation of this invitation is hardly possible, since the investigation into Honecker's case continues, although he was released from custody for health reasons.

He now lives at the house of Evangelical Church priest U. Homer in the town of Lohbental near Berlin.

Further Details on Rallies

PM0702174590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Single Edition p 1

[TASS report under the rubric "From Abroad": "Mass Demonstrations"]

[Text] Berlin, 6 Feb—More than 100,000 people took part in what are now traditional mass demonstrations, held yesterday in various cities in the republic. In Leipzig, Dresden, and Halle, tens of thousands gathered to again demand the earliest possible unification of the two German states. They also talked about strengthening peace and supported the Evangelical church appeal to establish and strengthen a partner relationship between parties and democratic groups, and also between demonstrators and the police.

In Leipzig, slogans directed against the Party of Democratic Socialism were also heard. According to ADN, among the demonstrators in Leipzig were members of the Republicans Party from the FRG, who again resorted to extremist actions. This is further evidence in favor of the People's Chamber decision to ban the activity of this radical right-wing party.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND today published an ADN report from Bonn which emphasized that since 1961 more than a million people have left the GDR. The report noted that half of this number are young people under 30 years of age.

The German unity theme has been supported by the National Democratic Party of Germany [NPD]. A statement published today says that the NPD is in favor of moving toward German unity. The party believes that one of the most important conditions for this is to form an economic and currency union of the two German states as soon as possible and also to see that the GDR joins the European community.

It has become known that three of the GDR's opposition parties—the "Democratic Breakthrough," German Social Union, and Christian Social Union—have formed an election coalition. This election "Union for Germany" arose as a result of talks held in West Berlin, in which FRG Chancellor H. Kohl, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (FRG), took part.

GDR Gets 'National Reponsibility' Government

PM0102142190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov dispatch: "At Intermediate Stage"]

[text] Berlin, 29 Jan—Elections to the GDR Volkskammer will not take place 6 May, as previously intended, but 18 March. Until then, a government of national responsibility in which all the opposition parties and groupings participating in the "roundtable" will each have one minister without a portfolio operating in the country.

These were the results of the conference between H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, and representatives of the "roundtable" parties and groupings. Talks went on all day yesterday and finished late last night. The final statement adopted as a result of the discussion was read as if it were a matter of an ultimatum to a besieged fortress. Its main points boiled down to saying that the reconstructed government must be nonpartisan in nature and its members, including the chairman of the Council of Ministers, must "suspend" their party membership. A demand was also made to hold obligatory consultations with the "roundtable" and take its proposals and recommendations into consideration when preparing laws and government resolutions.

Thus the elections to the Volkskammer are being brought forward. This is the interim result to date of the political struggle taking place in the GDR. Forces with the most diverse orientations are taking part in it.

The largest party in the country is still the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS], which has around 1 million members. It has lost over half its members since the political and economic crisis started in the GDR. The party is taking the path of renewal, resolutely cleansing itself of those who compromised it in the past through abuse of power and corruption. It is restructuring its organizational structure, forms, and methods of work. All the other parties, old and new, have stated that they do not intend to enter into a coalition with the SED-PDS after the elections. And the SED-PDS leadership declares that, if need be, it will assume the role of opposition after the elections.

However, the other old parties in the GDR have recently redefined their positions and the organizational formation of new political parties and movements has been proceeding at a fast rate. In many cases, they have been given direct material and financial support by "sister" political parties in the FRG, which are unceremoniously interfering in their neighbor's internal affairs.

The Social Democratic Party organized in the GDR is quickly gathering strength.

The most important question over which forces are now polarizing in the country is the question of the future of the GDR, the future of the German nation, and the possibility of uniting both German states. On the one hand there are those who, like the SED-PDS, believe that the GDR should be preserved and further developed as a socialist alternative to the capitalist FRG. On the other hand there are those who are convinced that it is necessary and inevitable to unite the two German states, and the only question is how quickly and under what conditions this can be realized.

The political situation in the GDR is continuing to grow more complicated. There is no doubt that the remaining weeks before 18 March will be filled with heated disputes and difficult political battles. It is not just a question of the new GDR Government's national responsibility, but also of both German states' responsibility for stability on our continent.

Volkskammer Session, Neo-Nazi Party Ban Noted

PM0702161590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Lapskiy dispatch: "Questions, Questions...."]

[Text] The session of the GDR Volkskammer has ratified the composition of the new government, which includes eight representatives of the opposition parties and movements represented at the "roundtable." The new ministers will not receive portfolios—that was decided previously—but they will take part prior to the 18 March election in resolving questions, of which, these days have shown, there are more than enough.

Government head H. Modrow spoke at the session. The situation in the country urgently requires that the parliamentary elections be held ahead of schedule, he said. The new government's main aim is to strengthen stability in the country before the election and take further steps to implement reform.

It was decided by an overwhelming majority to discuss the German question at the next session. The conversation also turned to the activity of right-wing radical neo-Nazi organizations in the GDR. It was decided to proclaim the activity of "Republicans" on the country's territory inadmissible and to ban it. This ban also extends to organizations with similar programs irrespective of their name.

A "roundtable" sitting took place at virtually the same time as the session. It also discussed important questions, including the following: How will the economy go in the future? How are we to ease the social hardships that are inevitable when implementing reform? Under what conditions can we agree to create a currency union with the FRG? How are we to stabilize the economy if there are still trends impairing it?

The government is proceeding on the premise that this year the level of production will fall in comparison with last year. The country's foreign debt has already reached $18.5 billion. C. Luft proposed holding a referendum on the question of currency union with the FRG. She set out the main principles of economic reform. She is convinced that the GDR will need FRG aid amounting to $10-15 billion. Manfred Flegel, minister of trade and supply, announced that FRG citizens visiting the GDR are buying up large quantities of meat, groceries, wine, and champagne; this is extremely tangible in some areas of the GDR.

A dispute was provoked by the question of whether politicians from other countries, notably the FRG, should be invited to the upcoming election events held by GDR parties. It was resolved by a majority of votes to reject their involvement. Let me remind you that lately leading Bonn politicians have delivered speeches at events and meetings held by various GDR parties and movements.

Discredited GDR Security Doctrine Outlined

PM3101094590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 90 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov dispatch: "The 'Security Doctrine' and Its Consequences. The Results of the Suppression of 'Dissidence'"]

[Text] Berlin—The tumultuous whirlpool of political life in the GDR has focused the public's attention on the question of the role played by the country's state security organs in the recent past. In this context, Egon Krenz, who was specifically in charge of these organs on the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee Politburo until the "fall revolution," and Wolfgang Herger, who was chief of the relevant SED Central Committee department, were invited to attend a regular sitting of the "roundtable" at which 16 old and new parties and a number of social movements and groups were represented.

Judging by the keen interest shown in the invitation to E. Krenz and W. Herger by local opposition circles and Western journalists, it was assumed that they would cast light on the "intrigues" of close association between the SED and the now abolished Ministry of State Security. But anyone who expected sensations, which could be used to compromise the SED-PDS [Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism] which is now undergoing renewal, was obviously disappointed. No "involvement" at all came to light.

Without denying their personal guilt for the political crisis in the country, the two former senior SED Central Committee officials said that close daily collaboration existed only between E. Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee who was simultaneously chairman of the National Defense Council, and Minister of State Security E. Mielke. They were the only ones to discuss matters concerning specific operations.

In essence, the ministry was transformed from an organ protecting the GDR people's interests into an organ for the implementation of an incorrect and dangerous "security doctrine" as perceived by the former SED leader. He had his own views on the matter. They were displayed especially clearly after 1985, when the Soviet Union took the path of perestroyka.

As unsolved problems and domestic tension kept mounting in the GDR, accompanied by growing criticism from below, E. Honecker increasingly insisted on a course of stifling "dissidence." There were widespread

repressive measures against those who dared to criticize. Neither SED members nor party and state officials were spared. But tension in the country only mounted.

The banking on the suppression of "dissidence" resulted in making the state security organs a "state within a state" during the eighties. Their numerical strength doubled to reach 85,000 men. Some 21,000 of them were engaged on operations. The country was kept "isolated and under observation" [pod kolpakom]. There was widespread shadowing. The state security had quite a few nonstaff agents for this purpose—109,000. More than 1,000 staffers eavesdropped on telephone conversations, with over 2,000 opening and inspecting correspondence. The state security organs had a sizeable combat arsenal. They had at their disposal—either issued to personnel or in warehouses—124,000 pistols, 76,000 automatic rifles, about 450 light machine guns, more than 760 heavy machine guns, and over 340 antiaircraft machine guns.

It is not hard to imagine what the consequences of the "security doctrine" adopted by E. Honecker would have been had the ministry apparatus, including a regiment of internal troops, turned its weapons on the thousands attending peaceful demonstrations in Leipzig and demanding the GDR's renewal. Everyone is now aware of the example provided by what happened in Romania. Fortunately, E. Krenz, who was sent by the SED leader to impose "order" in Leipzig, shouldered the responsibility and banned the use of force. The "fall revolution" occurred without bloodshed.

The participants in the "roundtable," including many who were classed as "dissidents" in the past, demand that the total liquidation of state security organs be completed. The whipping up of tension around this issue led to an act of vandalism—the destruction of the former ministry building and then of the National Security Directorate by an excited crowd. Moreover, it was reported that there had been "foreign citizens" among the pogromists.... Journalists commented: The "fall revolution," which had been progressing beneath the slogan of "No Violence" until then, lost its "virginal purity" after that pogrom.

But the problem of state security organs, which is now being tackled by the "roundtable," also has another aspect. As a result of it, the GDR has become almost the only state in the world without its own intelligence and counterintelligence service which is necessary to protect its vital interests. It is defenseless in the face of actions by neofascists who are taking advantage of the security vacuum that has developed for their own organization. And this is happening at a time when, in response to the people's wishes, the GDR has opened its Western borders.

The notorious "security doctrine" could have brought the GDR to bloodshed. Having turned into a sinister specter of the past, it undermines the country's security in the present.

'Unofficial Movements' Open Meeting in Vilnius

LD0402172890 Moscow TASS in English 1706 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Vilnius February 4 TASS—A meeting of representatives of unofficial movements from Moscow, Leningrad, a number of Soviet republics, the Czechoslovak Civic Forum, Polish Solidarity, the Movement of Free Democrats, Young Democrats and the Democratic Forum of Hungary opened here today.

Participants in the forum noted that the current processes of democratisation can be likened to the October 1917 revolution in Russia in their scale and significance.

They shared experience of creating information agencies and discussed prospects for non-traditional information media. The forum also discussed problems of the independent working class movement in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Much attention was given to the problems of the younger generation and the army. One of the forum's organizers Petras Vaitekunas, member of the Lithuanian Sajudis Movement for Perestroyka, said the issue was one of concern not only for Lithuanian but for some other republics as well.

The gathering discussed the situation in the Lithuanian Communist Party, as well as the role of trade unions in democratic processes.

Rogachev Receives Romanian Ambassador 5 Feb

PM0602165490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] On 5 February USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev received V. Sandru, Romanian ambassador to the USSR, at his request, and had a friendly conversation with him.

Mostovoy Meets Romanian Petrochemical Minister

PM2901160190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 26 January P.I. Mostovoy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Soviet side of the Soviet-Romanian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, received G. Caranfil, Romanian minister of the chemical and petrochemical industry.

Questions of cooperation between the two countries, including cooperation in the sphere of the chemical and petrochemical industry, were examined.

Romanian Provisional Council Decision Reviewed

PM0502152990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Volodin: "Provisional Council Before a Parliament"]

[Text] Bucharest—After six hours of heated debate, the "roundtable" participants decided to transform the National Salvation Front [NSF] Council into a Provisional Council of National Unity, which will undertake to govern the country until the free elections scheduled for 20 May.

Thus a "small parliament," as the session's participants described the Provisional Council, was set up. According to the communique signed by representatives of all Romania's political forces, the Provisional Council of National Unity will incorporate representatives from the broad strata of the Romanian public and national minorities who took an active part in the revolution, along with judet emissaries who formed the NSF Council leadership. In addition there will also be three representatives from each political party or public organization. They in turn form, so to speak, two numerically equal chambers of the "small parliament."

I must point out that the participants in this session agreed to hold it at last Sunday's meeting, when many people came to the negotiating table straight from demonstrations. It is well known that Sunday's debates ended in failure, but the participants in the talks agreed, on the initiative of the NSF Council, to meet a week after the publication in the press of a new draft election law, which makes provision for the creation of a parliament in Romania vested with all legislative power, so as not to bar the way to dialogue. Incidentally, it cannot be disregarded that the "small parliament" also has legislative powers, while copying in principle the bicameral system outlined in the draft law.

Therefore, the Provisional Council's decisions will be considered adopted and assume legal force if a majority of the council's members vote in favor of them. The session also discussed the possibility of granting members of the Provisional Council for National Unity the right to veto council decisions. However, the "roundtable" final document does not contain this clause.

As for the NSF, according to an agreement between the NSF Council and representatives of political parties that included the "Anticommunist Antifascist Free League of Workers," it has been transformed into a political organization with a unified structure and a platform that guarantees all its members, including those from the former front council, legal participation in free elections on an equal footing with other parties.

Therefore, consensus has been attained between the NSF and all other political forces. Leaders of the "historical" parties acknowledged that the results of the "roundtable" exceeded their wildest expectations. In this connection representatives of political organizations and parties, noting the positive movement away from street to parliamentary democracy, urged their supporters to avoid demonstrations, which may undermine the unity that has been achieved and could result in confrontation, for the entire subsequent period. Speaking at the close of the session, I. Iliescu described the creation of the Provisional Council of National Unity as an example of dialogue.

Romanian NSF Registers, Publishes Platform

LD0602222690 Moscow TASS in English 2126 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Bucharest February 6 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikolay Morozov:

On Tuesday the city court registered, as a legal person, the National Salvation Front (NSF), a democratic political entity representing broad social sections, which was born by the December 1989 revolution. The front will now participate in the free elections of May 20, 1990, along with other political groups.

Later in the day the National Salvation Front published a platform noting that the front aims to change Romanian society on the basis of democracy, freedom and dignity.

The front's programme is based on the idea of unification of the country's creative forces to establish a pluralistic and democratic political system, a modern efficient economy and revival of national culture.

The document stresses that the front is fully determined to fight for the complete destruction of the totalitarian political, economic and social system which paved the road to the dictatorial regime.

The front will help Romanian society to spurn down the ideology inherent in this system as well as other extremist, anti-democratic and anti-humane concepts.

The National Salvation Front will work to restore structures of a civil society, which were distorted by bureaucratic and authoritarian methods of administration and to provide conditions for every social group to have a chance to express its interests and to influence the decision-making process.

The front seeks to establish a liberal, decentralised and multistructure system in the Romanian economy, which will be based on market mechanisms.

Its aim is to restore farms by giving land to farmers for permanent ownership or for leasing and to give them state's aid.

The NSF is against great differences in property status between various sections of population. It deems necessary to introduce several economic measures, including a taxation system.

However, taxes should not undermine free enterprise, competitiveness and efficiency.

The front favours broader international contacts in culture. But it is against any attempts to use culture and art for the manipulation of society for political ends.

The NSF deems it necessary to create legal prerequisites to guarantee the real freedom of the press, radio and television.

It favours a foreign policy of openness, good-neighbourly relations, peace and friendship with all nations, a policy based on the principles of international law and on observance of commitments and international treaties.

The document says in conclusion that the National Salvation Front believes that the implementation of the programme would mean an important step towards the implementation of aspirations and ideals which inspired the Romanian people during the December revolution.

Romania Introduces 'Limited' Private Enterprise

PM0702160390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Single Edition p 6

[TASS report: "'Green Light' for Private Enterprise"]

[Text] Private enterprise on a limited scale has now been authorized in Romania.

The published National Salvation Front Council law-decree on the organization and implementation of economic activity on the basis of free initiative provides for the possibility of setting up small enterprises with a maximum of 20 employees, as well as labor and family associations. Individuals may also engage in labor activity. The aim of this innovation is to better satisfy popular demand for goods and services, make effective use of local raw materials and semi-manufactures, and enhance the use of manpower.

Only persons living in Romania may set up enterprises and associations on the basis of free initiative, the decree stipulates. A person may only work at one such enterprise. New working people are accepted on the basis of a labor contract which observes the provisions of the labor code. Wages are decided on the basis of a free agreement between the parties concerned. Employees of state or cooperative enterprises may work at other enterprises and associations after completing the working day at their main work place.

The employees of enterprises formed on the basis of free initiative enjoy the same social rights as state enterprise personnel.

The funds needed to set up such an enterprise are to be supplied from people's own resources or from bank loans. Financial resources may also be obtained from abroad, but only with the authorization of the Foreign Trade Ministry and on the terms of the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade. Enterprises formed on the basis of free initiative may export goods and services. They may keep foreign currency in open accounts in the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade. Half of the hard currency revenue generated by exports will be issued to the enterprise in leus at the current exchange rate and the remainder placed at its disposal.

Ban on Politics in Polish Armed Forces Urged

PM0902101790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Single Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Proposal to the Polish Government"]

[Text] Warsaw, 7 Feb—Army Gen. F. Siwicki, Poland's minister of national defense, has proposed that the country's government introduce a legislative initiative banning military cadre personnel from belonging to political parties and engaging in political activity while serving in the Armed Forces. He made this proposal during a meeting with T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Republic of Poland Council of Ministers.

TASS Reports Krakow Anti-Soviet Demonstration

LD0802174790 Moscow TASS in English 0814 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Warsaw February 8 TASS—Street riots, provoked by the so-called Anti-Communist Front (A-Front), were reported in Krakow on Wednesday.

After a gathering near the monument to Adam Mickiewicz in the central market place, about 150 youngsters walked towards the Soviet Consulate General, chanting "Soviets, go home" and "Away with Yalta." They were stopped by militia.

During a short rally, demonstration organizers asked the youngsters to break up. However a group of young demonstrators began to throw bottles with petrol, cans with paint, metal pieces and stones at militiamen. Thanks to resolute measures taken by militia, the riots near the consulate were stopped within a few minutes.

But the youngsters moved to the central railway station and post office and continued to throw bottles and stones at militiamen, who resorted to water cannons.

Specialists Working on Convertible Currency

LD0202180790 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Under an agreement between the Soviet Union and Poland, specialists of the two countries are working on how to experimentally introduce a new form of price formation and payment in convertible currency. This was stated by Deputy Premier Stefan Sitaryan in the parliamentary committee for international affairs. He said that in the first stage the reform will cover only 10 to 15 per cent of mutual trade. In the future all members of COMECON will switch to the new system. An agreement to this effect was reached at the organization's session last month.

PRAVDA Views Realignment on Polish Left

PM3001163590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Jan 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Dispatch by special correspondents A. Starukhin and M. Tretyakov: "New Party Created"]

[Text] Warsaw, 29 Jan—The constituent congress of the party of Polish left-wing forces has completed its work in Warsaw.

The party of Polish left-wing forces came into being in a dramatic atmosphere. A stumbling block in the debate lasting many hours was the question of whether the new political force should be the heir to the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] or whether it has to break with the communist legacy and dissociate itself from it.

A group of delegates from the social democratic bloc headed by T. Fiszbach advocated the creation of its own party—the Social Democratic Union of the Republic of Poland. This group is small in size, no more than 100 people. Whereas a decisive majority—approximately 1,500 people—seeks to preserve unity on the left.

So, the possibility of a split in the Polish "left," which was spoken of with such alarm before and during the work of the congress, became a reality. In the delegates' opinion, this did not disrupt the work of the congress. But the voice of J. Rychlewski from Warsaw sounded a dissonant note in the overall flow of the delegates' speeches advocating a social democratic party.

"I am not a supporter of social democracy. No one wants to think about what will happen when the economic program of T. Mazowiecki's government has been fulfilled. The prospect is millions of unemployed and an acute crisis in housing construction—that is, increased social tension. The right-wingers are on the offensive! Therefore we need a militant party with teeth to protect the working people's interests. Unless we define our stand regarding the now clearly apparent government plan to go over to capitalism, we will never restore our prestige. The new party must be underpinned by realities. There is no going back to the past. At the same time I do not wish to dissociate myself from what the PZPR did and what was created in the people's Poland. I merely condemn the mistakes made by the party. In my view, we need a party distinguished by unity of action, even if it has different orientations within it."

Opposite views in many respects were expressed at the congress. It happened that several hours were spent discussing certain questions of an apparently formal nature. But no one interrupted the speakers or imposed his own opinion on the hall. In general, total democracy reigned and culture was present.

Everyone could propose something of his own. And Warsaw delegate W. Wisniewski, deputy chairman of the commission to prepare for the forum, drew our attention to precisely this aspect of the free "atmosphere of equal rights" which evolved at the congress. He is, incidentally, also a leader of the Polish National Trade Union Accord. He said something else too:

"I would point out that the very atmosphere of the congress is imbued with very strong social democratic tendencies. We personally advocate that the new party should express the trade unions' interests more fully. For this we plan to create a trade union faction within its framework. For the chief thing for the party today is not its size but its influence on voters. How many of its own representatives it will be able to get onto elected organs, what its financial position will be... We will acquire weight and then we will be able to fully influence the state's economic policy and really protect the working people's interests. See what awaits us. According to our estimates, over the next year the standard of living of people employed in the socialized sector will fall 40-50 percent. Even now practically all enterprises are refusing to take people on for work. How many unemployed are 'taking shape'! No one knows precisely—400,000, 1 million, or perhaps even more...."

The new party has to resolve very many problems. Both its future prestige and its authority among the people depend on how capable it will be of changing the life of society for the better. So it was probably no coincidence that alarm was apparent in what delegate S. Mleczko, a Sejm deputy, said in conversation with us, when he stated with regret that the tone was again being set at the congress by intellectuals, while hardly more than 100 workers were present there in all. What if all this, he said, again turns into a talking-shop and cursing match between people totally divorced from physical production.

Many views were aired during a discussion of the future party's draft statutes. It was proposed that the first point in this document concerning the party's name be discussed last. This was another symptom of the fact that unity was not to be observed among the delegates on the question of the political nature of the newly formed party. Even though it had been very confidently claimed here long before the congress began its work that the new party would have a social democratic thrust, nonetheless much time was spent discussing the question of building an alternative—that is, socialist—party.

The delegates were practically unanimous on one thing when they agreed with the proposal of A. Kwasniewski, who characterized the draft statutes—to drop such principles as democratic centralism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and proletarian internationalism. The statutes, he said, open up broad opportunities for internal party democracy—that is, for creating political platforms, factions, and so forth. In drawing up the draft document, we utilized the experience of West Europe's social democratic parties, which has stood the test of time. The statutes clearly stipulate the party's structure and organizational makeup.

A sharp debate flared over the party's program declaration. The document adopted emphasizes that Poland

itself is the most important asset, and the party serves it above all, underpinned by the trust and support of the country's citizens. The people's will expressed in democratic and equal elections with proportional representation of all sections of society on elected organs should be considered the only criterion of power. Poland's well-being is seen in progress, in openness to the world, and in participation in all mankind's achievements. We want Poland to be a motherland of free, equal citizens living in solidarity, and a state of social justice, the declaration states.

The international section speaks of the need to protect the Polish state's interests, whose foundation is the right to exist within the present secure borders. The party confirms: Our aim is the solidarity and friendship of equitable peoples, and we support the idea of a common European home in which all neighbors will live under conditions of guaranteed security. We consider most important the development of propitious and good-neighborly relations with our allies. We particularly value the alliance with the Socialist International.

A decision was adopted to hand over the PZPR's property to a commission formed for this purpose, which will determine its future fate once and for all. T. Fiszbach's group, which formed the social democratic union, renounced its claims to this property.

The congress completed its work. It elected the leading organs of the new party—Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, as it was named: the Main Council, the Polish National Auditing Commission, and the Polish National Party Court. A. Kwasniewski was elected chairman of the Main Council, and L. Miller general secretary of the party.

The "i's" have been dotted. One more page in Poland's history has been closed. The word "people's" has been removed from the state's name, and the PZPR—the party of Polish communists—has ceased to exist. A new party—a social democratic one—has emerged, while another party, far smaller but with practically the same thrust, was formed by "budding" alongside it at the congress.

What will be the future fate of the Polish left-wing forces in the present complex internal political situation, and how far will they be able to express and protect the working people's interests? Time will tell us that, as well as the extent to which the Polish working class accepts the ideas of the new social democratic party and whether it links its fate quite firmly with it.

The party is faced with great and difficult work aimed at not just winning the people's trust but also determining Poland's destiny.

West Europe

Medvedev Heads Delegation on Visit to London

Discusses East-West Relations

PM0802142190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS reports under general headline: "Official Visit"]

[Excerpts] A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by USSR People's Deputy V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, departed Moscow 7 February on an official visit to London.

It comprises USSR People's Deputies N.B. Bikkenin, V.I. Goldanskiy, K.D. Lubenchenko, N.V. Molotkov, R.A. Ubaydullayeva, and N.P. Shmelev. [passage omitted]

From the airport, the delegation made its way to the "Elizabeth II" Conference Center, where it was welcomed by members of the British Interparliamentary Union Group and the British Parliament's British-Soviet group. A "roundtable" debate was held on the role of the new political thinking in East-West relations today and in the future. The meeting participants were addressed by V.A. Medvedev, who specifically declared:

It was five years ago, here in London, within the framework of a visit by a Soviet parliamentary delegation and a dialogue with British parliamentarians, that the actual term "new political thinking" first came to life and became part of international vocabulary. This thesis was put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, leader of the group of Soviet parliamentarians.

Of course, that was only the starting point of a concept which in subsequent years has evolved into an entire system of views on the processes of world development... I would like to emphasize that the actual evolution of this concept began at a time when the heat of "cold war" passions was at its peak, and that the new political thinking resulted from a rejection of short-term considerations, from profound reflections and appraisals of our present realities, and from attempts to look into the future. It is inseparably linked with the quest for the new dominant factor of mutual relations between the two social systems, of East and West, figuratively speaking, at the present stage of historical development. It is the fruit of the retreat from such views that our society unfortunately lived for many decades.

We arrived at the new philosophy of mutual relations between East and West via a realization of the need for the radical revision of views on the path of our own internal development, in other words via perestroyka. This enabled us to understand the priority importance of universal human values for the future of this process. In fact, this is the essence of the new political thinking. It is the antithesis of the still extant strong-arm approaches

which are still geared to strong-arm methods, confrontation, and one system's "victory" over the other.

Our new vision of the world stems from a completely new vision of our own selves, of socialism, and of man, from the very essence of the truly revolutionary transformations taking place in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the conception of mankind as a single whole is dictated by its economic, military, ecological, and information realities. They objectively demand cooperation, joint development, and collaboration.

In other words, the new thinking is a result of a conscious choice by today's Soviet leadership, an objective appraisal of the new realities, and the modern world's growing interdependence and integrity.

This world is more diverse than ever before. More than 150 states live as neighbors, clash, and coexist in it. Each one of them has its own history, traditions, and interests.

The actual composition of the contemporary world, its typical processes and trends, and the rich experience of international relations give rise to the sole opportunity to build relations on the basis of recognition of the universality of the principle of freedom of choice.

Indeed, for all the importance of integrating and uniting elements, we are witnessing a growing diversity in the ways and forms of social movement in various countries. It would probably be senseless, if not impossible, to attempt to boil them all down to a common denominator. Each country and people has an inalienable right to choose its own path. Attempts to violate this right and impose a will alien to a country are the right way to create pockets of tension and undermine the extremely fragile equilibrium that is now being achieved through the world community's immense efforts.

Recently the problem of the choice of a path has often been discussed in connection with the rapid and turbulent changes in a number of East European countries. The development of events in that region is naturally attracting attention at present. All the more so as it has been dynamic and sometimes dramatic.

However, in our view, it would be wrong to see the processes in East Europe in the old way—in the light of East-West confrontation, as playing into the hands of one side and weakening another, as representing, for instance, the "final collapse" of socialism and the triumph of the capitalist system. That approach would be a leftover of former thinking.

I say this because the Western interpretation of these events is sometimes similar to a mirror image of our previous scholastic methodology. Indeed, we ourselves viewed the Great Depression of the late twenties and early thirties, or the collapse of the colonial system in the fifties, as heralding the end of capitalism. But it resulted in a process of adaptation to new realities, and renewal took place—although, of course, these processes cannot be called easy or straightforward.

But in general, if we think in broad historical terms of the development of capitalism over the past two centuries, it is not hard to see how difficult its adaptation to the new realities and how tortuous—not least following revolutionary explosions—its transformation into its current state have been.

So why deny socialism a future? After all, in historical terms it is still young. It will be undertaking profound transformations, during which the face of the system will change radically.

Returning specifically to the processes currently taking place in East Europe, I would like to say that we should not confuse the fall of certain specific models of the socialist system with the socialist idea itself. I think that, despite the very resolute rejection of deformed models, fundamental socialist ideas such as the idea of social justice will remain; they are part of the genetic memory of generations, they cannot be erased.

A correct and balanced approach to the events and changes in East Europe is of fundamental importance for all states participating in the Helsinki process. Hence the urgent need for the changes in East Europe to take place in the context of international political and strategic stability. The common interest of East and West in this area is greater than the points which divide them. It would be dangerous for anyone to think that a favorable situation was being created which could be exploited for their own interests.

From that standpoint we are wary about the attempts by certain forces in the FRG to artificially expedite the resolution of the German problem by becoming directly involved in political processes in the GDR without considering the existing geopolitical and strategic realities, or the interests of the two states and the peoples of all Europe.

Interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples—however well-intentioned and whatever the slogans that motivate it—is bound up with a desire to impose one's own ideology and political institutions on others. Such actions are even less desirable since mankind has already taken its first and still unaccustomed steps toward a new peaceful phase in its history.

V.A. Medvedev dwelt in detail on the problems associated with ensuring states' security, having emphasized that progress is noticeable primarily in this sphere. At the end of the 20th century, he said, it is universally accepted that this security is less and less associated with military might, and is more and more the result of political efforts. Hence the doctrine of defense sufficiency with which you are familiar, which was proclaimed by the Soviet Union and its allies, and in accordance with which they are reconfigurating their armed forces. Hence, the unilateral steps to reduce our Armed Forces. Hence, the determination to achieve accords reducing the level of military confrontation.

The treaty on intermediate-range and short-range missiles became a sort of testing ground for such accords. Now there are real prospects also for major agreements on strategic nuclear arms, chemical weapons, and a radical reduction of troops in Europe.

Touching on the Soviet program for progress toward a nuclear-free world, Medvedev emphasized that its intention is to create a situation whereby there will simply be no need for nuclear deterrence. We do not call for the overnight elimination of nuclear weapons with conventional arms retained, he said. We envision the practical implementation of the concept of eliminating nuclear weapons in changing conditions, when not a single—and I emphasize, not a single—country will have even the slightest serious offensive potential in any category of arms.

We envision the implementation of this step in conditions of such international verification as would make it possible to forestall any attempts to violate the accord and to create [sozdat] nuclear weapons or other equally dangerous armed forces and armaments anywhere. In other words, we have in mind a completely different degree of trust between states.

Speaking of the future structure of international relations, the Soviet delegation head especially emphasized the role of openness. It seems that this is the term which today offers the key to a qualitatively new understanding of the need for East-West collaboration. Openness in politics, openness in the economy, openness for information and contacts—this is the necessary triad whose purpose is to determine the nature of this collaboration to a growing degree. Open politics today is the sole ultimate guarantee of success. Convincing proof of this is offered by contacts at summit level which have already become a norm of international intercourse and are gradually extending their scope. Moreover, as shown by practice—and specifically by the regular meetings between M. Thatcher and M.S. Gorbachev, and by the meetings between the Soviet and the U.S. leaders—the effectiveness of such "personal diplomacy" is actually conditioned by the opportunity for a direct exchange of opinions, which makes it possible to better understand each other's positions and to find ways to coordinate these positions.

The expansion of human contacts and the elimination of barriers blocking the exchange of ideas and cultural contacts in the broadest sense of the word depend not so much on objective circumstances but on the sides' determination and good will. By developing ever more rapidly and consolidating the potential of trust, such contacts have a favorable effect on the entire range of our relations.

Parliaments and their collaboration probably have to play a unique role here. After all, they are not only the states' supreme legislative organs of power, but also institutions reflecting the widest possible spectrum of their peoples' moods, hopes, and aspirations. The elitist and bureaucratic practice of international relations is today clearly inadequate for solving the key problems facing the international community. Interparliamentary cooperation, just like the "people's democracy" which is now gathering strength, is becoming an important factor in bringing East and West closer together and in the onward development of their relations.

V.A. Medvedev said in conclusion that it would be a great mistake to continue to extend ideological approaches to our international relations. East and West alike already have considerable experience of ideologized foreign policy. And what have we achieved thereby? Only war brinkmanship. Let us not contain natural evolution in the procrustean bed of new schemes, he said. As we understand it, the paths of the two systems' development will inevitably cross; they interact within the framework of one and the same human civilization. In essence, this conforms with the principles of dialectics, which presuppose not only the struggle between opposites, but also their unity.

We do not believe that competition may result in some mechanical fusion of the two systems, or in one of the systems swallowing, replacing, or squeezing out the other. We can only talk of a competition in which there are neither victors nor vanquished. A competition in which, in the event of success, both systems end up as victors, and in which, in the event of defeat, neither will evade catastrophe.

Meets With Thatcher

PM0802144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report under general heading "On Official Visit"]

[Text] London, 7 Feb—USSR People's Deputy V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, heading a visiting USSR Supreme Soviet delegation, was received by British Prime Minister M. Thatcher today. V.A. Medvedev gave M. Thatcher a personal message from M.S. Gorbachev.

Questions of all-European building were first and foremost among the international problems discussed during the conversation. In the light of the Soviet proposal to hold a summit meeting of CSCE countries in 1990, the sides spoke in favor of speeding up the processes leading toward overcoming the division of Europe along the lines of the Helsinki Accords. Emphasis was placed on the great importance which the Soviet Union and Britain attach to the successful conclusion of the Vienna talks in 1990.

The interlocutors expressed similar appraisals and opinions when examining the situation in central Europe and German-German affairs. It was noted that the German people's exercise of their right to self-determination must proceed in stages, in synchronization with the

CSCE process, and with observance of the legitimate interests of other European peoples and four-power responsibility.

At M. Thatcher's request, the delegation head spoke about the present stage of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, the results of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the activity of USSR legislative organs, and measures aimed at normalizing international relations. The British prime minister declared her understanding for the transformations being implemented in the Soviet Union.

Individual aspects of bilateral relations were also examined in a constructive spirit, primarily in the sphere of political dialogue, interparliamentary relations, and the economy, with mutual interest being expressed in their ongoing development in different forms and at different levels.

USSR Ambassador to Britain L.M. Zamyatin and British Ambassador to the USSR R. Braithwaite took part in the conversation.

Meets With Deputy Prime Minister

LD0802125190 Moscow TASS in English 1242 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] London February 8 TASS—Soviet Communist Party ideology chief Vadim Medvedev, who is leading a Soviet parliamentary delegation now visiting Britain, met Geoffrey Howe, British deputy prime minister and leader of the House of Commons, to discuss ways of expanding bilateral parliamentary exchanges.

The two leaders also discussed European policy issues.

Meets With Foreign Secretary

LD0802191990 Moscow TASS in English 1908 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] London February 8 TASS—A visiting delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Soviet Communist Party ideology chief Vadim Medvedev today met British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. During the talk they exchanged views on developing the process launched at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the German question, and bilateral relations.

The sides noted that these relations are developing and have good prospects although some difficulties do emerge on their path.

The Soviet delegation then talked with British lawmakers about the activity of the British Parliament and the parliamentary procedure.

The Soviet delegation today laid a wreath on the grave of Karl Marx in Highgate cemetery.

Meets Members of Parliament

LD0802173490 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] London February 8 TASS—A visiting delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Soviet Communist Party ideology chief Vadim Medvedev met members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament here today. Medvedev spoke during a debate on the subject "Processes in Europe—Prospects for building a common European home."

In setting out the Soviet understanding of the concept of a common European home, he said:

"Employing construction terminology, which is suitable in this case, it can be said that we suggest building a multi-apartment house with a diversity of interior designs but with walls and common roof made of the sound material of human values and common sense. But this house can be constructed only by joint efforts, relying on mutual trust and getting rid of prejudices and suspicion.

"We proceed from the premise that a simple formula—dynamism within the framework of stability—should be a guide in building a common Europe [as received] home. More recently, the durability of the Berlin wall had been the yardstick of stability. Today, pieces of this wall have become popular souvenirs.

"Given the unequivocally positive nature of the changes taking place, their significance and rapidity undoubtedly harbour the danger of a destabilising effect. The old does not always cease its existence peacefully but is frequently eager to accompany its passing away with a bloody ritual.

"The tempestuous and sometimes dramatic developments in the east of Europe stimulate political thought and aim it at the quest for more rational and viable forms of a European set-up, ones that would guarantee the security of countries and peoples. We welcome the healthy competition of various projects, see in this a field for interaction and mutually complementary efforts. In its turn, the Soviet Union proposes joint work in several directions as part of building a common European home."

"In the military-political sphere this involves military balance proceeding from the concept of sufficiency for the defence needs. It presupposes bringing military potentials down to the minimum needed and lending a non-offensive structure to armed forces.

"In the economic area it means gradually integrating various systems for the purpose of forming sometime in future a truly European market, a European economic space.

"In the ecological sphere—setting generally recognised standards, responsible conduct of all and everyone, harmony with nature rather than its rapacious conquering,

and the search for ecologically clean and safe sources of energy. The ultimate goal is to form a regional ecological security system.

"In the humanitarian area—showing concern about the respect of human rights and asserting the notion of the individual as the supreme value. In the legal area—elaborating uniform legal standards. In the field of information—creating a European information zone, a zone of openness.

"Speaking about Europe's future, one cannot forget that our continent is a component of the worldwide housing complex. Just as the European dialogue and cooperation reach the new world through the United States and Canada, they reach Asia through the Soviet Union, a European-Asian power, and Africa through the Mediterranean.

"I would like to single out the unpassing [as received] importance of relations between the USSR and Britain to the development of the CSCE process. Our countries frequently found themselves on different poles of Europe not only because geographically they are located on its fringes but also from the point of view of politics.

"There are enough reasons for disputes today, too. The idea of a common European home, which at the beginning seemed an utopian flight of imagination, is now acquiring political scope and being implemented. Much credit for this goes to the USSR and Britain.

"Suffice it to say that the thesis 'Europe is our common home' was heard for the first time in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Westminster Palace in December 1984. The case of our countries provides an especially illustrious example of how much can be accomplished within a relatively short time if countries turn to common sense and are guided by the desire to understand correctly each other's intentions and shun political suspicion and ideological impatience.

"Five years ago the principle 'an eye for an eye' dominated our relations. Now we would hardly find an area of international politics or bilateral ties where we have not amassed the experience of positive interaction and where promising prospects are not visualised. Two British candidates for a space flight to the Soviet Mir station have been selected already.

"We firmly believe that today our countries are required not just to cooperate but to join efforts in imparting a still greater purpose and productiveness to the European and universal dialogue," Medvedev said.

During the talk British MPs [members of parliament] showed great interest in the Soviet view of the development of the political situation in Europe. The discussion invariably turned to the developments in the Soviet Union.

Many questions were put on the results of the plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, the outcome of which was described by British MPs as a step towards strengthening political stability in the Soviet Union and developing democracy within the party itself, which is viewed as an exceptionally important element of the general process of democratisation in the USSR.

British MPs said that there was keen interest in developing relations with the Soviet Union. Support was voiced for the idea to grant credits to the USSR.

At the same time, members of the Soviet delegation noted that the magnitude of the tasks before the Soviet Union called primarily for raising the effectiveness of the Soviet economy itself. They underlined the usefulness of developing international economic ties to integrate the Soviet economy into the world economic structure.

Members of the Soviet delegation signed the book of honorary guests of the British Parliament.

Addresses International Affairs Institute

LD0802205390 Moscow TASS in English 2041 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] London February 8 TASS—Head of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation Vadim Medvedev made a speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a competent world policy study center.

About 300 British prominent public figures and politicians, historians, political scientists and publicists, many of them specialising on Soviet studies, met to hear the Soviet leadership's viewpoint on current changes in the USSR.

Medvedev dwelt in detail on conceptual aspects of perestroika and explained its aims and tasks. He analysed the experience of the transformation of society, difficulties, problems and contradictions that appeared in the course of perestroika, and ways to solve them.

Medvedev answered numerous questions.

More on Medvedev Visit

WA0902145990

For reportage on the seven-day visit to the United Kingdom by Vadim Medvedev, Gorbachev adviser and member of the Politburo, including reports on his talks with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, please see the United Kingdom section of the 8 February West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Soviet Delegation Visits Swedish Legislature

LD0702180490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0540 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Stockholm, 7 Feb (TASS)—Familiarization with the experience of one of Europe's oldest legislative assemblies in determining social and economic development of the country, is at the focus of the attention of a delegation from the committees and commissions of the

USSR Supreme Soviet which has arrived in Sweden. It is headed by N.N. Gritsenko, chairman of the Commission on Issues of Labor, Prices, and Social Policy of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Soviet-Austrian Economic Talks Begin in Moscow

LD0802102990 Moscow TASS in English 1610 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—"The radical reform of the Soviet Union's economic mechanism opens up new opportunities for deepening economic interaction between Soviet organisations and Austrian firms," Soviet Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov, head of the Soviet delegation at the 21st session of the mixed Soviet-Austrian delegation on economic and scientific and thechnological cooperation, said today at the opening meeting.

"On the whole," he continued, "the economic relations between the USSR and Austria are developing positively. We were able to stabilise bilateral trade exchange and create prerequisites for its future growth. Soviet organisations and Austrian firms have stepped up efforts to develop such an important modern form of cooperation as joint ventures in the territory of the USSR. Practical steps were made to carry out the Danube Trade Agreement.

"Mutual trade grew last year by more than 15 percent as compared to 1988 and topped 1.3 billion rubles. This growth, however, occurred primarily due to Soviet import, whereas exports from Austria dropped by almost two percent and amounted to 445 million rubles."

Wolfgan Schussel, the Austrian minister for economy, said the Austrian Government and business circles were keenly interested in further expanding relations with the USSR in economy, science and technology. He noted, however, that Soviet licensing regulations and Vneshekonombank's restrictive practices often obstructed the development of bilateral trade.

"We in Austria," Wolfgang Schussel noted, "are following with great interest and attention the Soviet reforms in economy and commercial activity, which are of great importance for all of Europe. We regard them as a great chance to improve business cooperation between Austrian firms and Soviet enterprises."

Central Committee Plenum

Gorbachev Addresses Meeting on Plenum Results

LD0802164390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] A meeting took place today at the CPSU Central Committee with first secretaries of town and rayon party committees and secetaries of primary party organizations who had taken part in the work of the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The meeting was addressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. A lively exchange of views took place on the results of the plenum that has taken place, the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress which was approved at it, the report-back and election campaign, and the procedure for the elections of delegates to the congress. It was noted that the success of perestroyka is unthinkable without the active participation of the CPSU, above all of its primary organizations. It is necessary to do everything to overcome the gap that has begun to appear between the party's leading bodies and its grass-roots links and the broad masses of communists.

Taking part in the meeting were Comrades Slyunkov, Razumovskiy, and Manayenkov.

A detailed report on the meeting will be published in PRAVDA.

Moscow 1st Secretary on Plenum Results

LD0802231190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast presented by Igor Fesunenko; video report by correspondent V. Stepanyuk, identified by screen caption]

[Excerpts] [Fesunenko] Our party's Central Committee plenum, which has just ended, seethed with turbulent emotions. Almost for the first time you and I were able to see the Central Committee not as some remote assembly of wise men, grave wise men, who, heeding good and evil with indifference, attempt from on high to manage our destinies. Over the past three days we saw the members of the Central Committee as living people, struggling, arguing, attempting to find, but then erring, and again trying to find the correct path. [passage omitted]

Let me say that at present the plenum participants have enough concerns. They are still working, meeting communists and the collectives of enterprises and establishments—in short, meeting the people. They are telling people about the plenum:

[Stepanyuk] Today's press conference by Yuriy Antonovich Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City party committee, was devoted to the results of the Central Committee plenum that has just been held. Within the framework of their precongress discussions of the role of the CPSU in the current political system, Moscow's communists have been working out many fundamentally new approaches to perestroyka in the party and also specific proposals for its program documents—in particular on holding direct and secret elections of delegates on the basis of alternative candidates. Incidentally this formula has become part of the Central Committee's platform for the congress:

[Begin Prokofyev recording] I was part of the drafting commission, and all told, worked for probably at least some 20 hours on drafting this new platform. It has been stated in a thoroughly clearcut way that the party does not aspire to a political monopoly and will operate on an equal footing with other political movements. It seems to me that it was precisely this that was expected by communists and our society, because confirmation of the possibility of the existence of a new type of party membership and renunciation of some kind of special role for oneself in society enshrined in the Constitution are precisely the sign of the democratization of our society and the party as a whole.

Heated arguments raged for several hours over the subject of formulating the place and role of Russia's communists. Viewpoints were exchanged. Some were in favor of the creation of a Russian Communist Party and others were against. Eventually they reached the conclusion that a party conference of Russia's communists needs to be held and that those from Russia need to determine their future themselves.

Beside the discussion of the platform, the plenum was characterized by alarm over the state of affairs in the country, a sharply critical assessment of the results of perestroyka over the past five years, and a demand for deeds and not words and for action and not waiting. These things are perhaps what particularly characterized the party Central Committee plenum that has just been held. [end recording]

PRAVDA Editor Frolov on Party Plenum

LD0802233290 Moscow TASS in English 2318 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—"The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, that ended on Wednesday, was of a dimension exceeding the bounds of such events in the party's life." Ivan Frolov, Soviet Communist Party Central Committee secretary and newspaper PRAVDA editor-in-chief, said on Thursday.

He addressed a traditional meeting with representatives of foreign mass media, accredited in the Soviet Union.

"The plenum's significance stems above all from the fact that it adopted the CPSU Central Committee platform for the party's 28th congress, formulating the Soviet communists' strategy and tactics for the next decade," Frolov said.

"The platform is a political and theoretical document which clearly designates the goal—to advance towards a humane and democratic socialism," he said.

As to the party's tactics, the document outlines measures to accelerate the implementation of the political and economic reform. Among such measures, he said, are the proposed introduction of a presidential form of government in the country and the repeal of the USSR Constitution's sixth article on the party's guilding role in the life of society. He also mentioned a possibility of a multi-party system, which is not ruled out by the platform.

"It is most important now to solve pressing problems, namely to stabilise the social sphere and inter-ethnic relations, and to ensure the saturation of the consumer market," Frolov said.

"The party's renewal was the main problem discussed by the plenum. That issue was most heatedly discussed," he said. "The opinions of plenum participants on the party's platform varied not too greatly to prevent the unanimous vote for its adoption," Frolov said.

"The Central Committee will have its next plenum in three or four weeks' time to discuss organisational matters of preparation for the congress and specify its exact date," Frolov said.

The congress of Soviet communists has preliminarily been scheduled for next June or July.

7 February Central Committee Plenum Reportage

Gorbachev's Closing Speech

PM0902114190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

["M.S. Gorbachev's Concluding Speech at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February 1990"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] I will say just a few words, without going into any lengthy debate, because we have to conclude the major discussion held over the past three days in the party Central Committee's plenary sittings auditorium.

I think that the plenum debate on the entire package of questions was commensurate with the scale and novelty of the documents and problems we discussed. The present plenum could be described as follows: It revealed the enormous concern and the tremendous alarm of the Central Committee and the party as a whole in connection with the situation in the country, in connection with the progress of perestroyka processes. The plenum provided a merciless critical analysis of all perestroyka processes and, on this basis, a forecast of what has to be done and how it should be done. This was reflected in the political guidelines underlying the CPSU Central Committee platform.

This is probably the first occasion since we worked on the 19th party conference resolutions that the entire Central Committee has devoted the sweat of its brow, as the saying goes, to a document. This leads me to a very important conclusion: All the activeness, urgency, and moods that were displayed here are, in some form or other, a manifestation of concern about the party, about the future of perestroyka, about having the ruling party provide society with correct political guidelines at this very crucial state of perestroyka.

I believe, comrades, that despite all the diversity of opinions—and it does exist, all the way to the diametrically opposite positions which clashed here (lack of restraint also made itself felt, but all that is forgivable!)—all comrades were unanimous about the need for a progressive document pointing the way forward rather than backward. This, in my view, is the predominant opinion.

I believe that, in certain sectors of work, there is a need to utilize some elements of the old mechanisms while the new ones are still not functioning. Society cannot be abandoned without a helm and without sails, without means capable of driving the process of perestroyka in our vast country. Nonetheless, the prevailing opinion—and this is enshrined in the CPSU Central Committee platform—is that it is necessary to solve pressing problems along the paths of perestroyka, of society's renewal, of the CPSU's renewal. This is the main point.

Another thought—the obverse of the coin, I would say. Now we can sense not only mentally but literally physically that it is necessary to act decisively. The Central Committee, the government, and the Supreme Soviet must act. I am not saying this in order to give them instructions. No, we are only stating our position. The main point is that Communists on all these organs must act on the basis of this evaluation. We cannot waste any more time. It was correctly said about the party Central Committee: Delay is now intolerable; it is essential to take a lead in the tumultuous, ambiguous, and complex processes in order to support and consolidate healthy trends and try to overcome or suppress destructive trends.

Communists in the government must act. I think that comrades correctly reminded those party members who work in the government that we failed to hear their point of view at this plenum when the platform was being discussed. References were made to the fact that such a discussion took place at the Second Congress of People's Deputies. That is no argument. A discussion was also needed here. Especially since the government is now up to its neck in practical work and has plenty to say. It was also important for Central Committee members to check these steps and to orient the entire party toward supporting and backing them. Primarily to express our support for the program approved by the Congress. I do think, however, that the government will find a way to bring Central Committee members and party committee

secretaries up to date so that they may have a clear and complete picture of all specific issues.

It is also necessary to act in the Supreme Soviet, which is expected to produce important decisions on key questions of perestroyka and the improvement of the situation in the country. Communists must act energetically and efficiently in all sectors. Generally speaking, we must consolidate forces by regrouping them and must resolutely advance perestroyka and practical deeds. This is my second point.

The further we penetrate the deeper layers of perestroyka and touch all strata, the more clearly the positions and interests of the opposing sides crystallize. We have felt its presence here. This is a reflection of everything that our society is living through.

The fact that we are exchanging opinions here and summing up after a tough debate at times affects our pride, and sharp words can be heard in this hall. But ultimately we arrive at the main and, I think, progressive conclusion. So it is on the basis of this conclusion that actions must be consolidated.

The debate has taken place. The decision has been adopted. The program has been ratified. The guidelines are available. It is necessary to work rather than keep a score of who said what about whom. Yes, we do have people who specialize in that! We cannot get used to the fact that a normal process of debate is under way, that pluralism of opinions means both dissent and a newly conceived democratic centralism. We are debating openly, even on questions like fundamental issues of perestroyka, when the future of the country and, considering its importance, also the future of the world are being decided. How can it be possible to humor each other, as it were, to try to save face? All this has gone and must never return. We must not make conjectures about how business can be done with one person, but not with another. We must all stand together, feel each other's support, and act! Not start dividing into clans and groupings! That way we will ruin the party and the country.

I also want to mention the debate among Politburo members which developed here. During my meeting with the miners I told the truth when I said that there are no differences today that can hinder the Politburo's efficient work. There is a struggle of opinions, debates are getting sharper—this is understandable. I met coal miners from all over the country: the amount of information they passed on to me! We assemble for sittings and the discussions of documents with certain thoughts, and there is comparison, a sharp discussion. I want to say this, Comrade Malkov, so that nobody has any suspicions about the Politburo's being split or doing a bad job. There is nothing of the sort, and efforts must be made to ensure that nothing of the sort is conceived. We are now undergoing tough trials in the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the entire party—we must rise to the required height.

About this "height." I very much liked what Comrade Alekseyev said. He is not only a jurist, he also has a philosophical approach, and such a combination of these qualities—exacting formulation of ideas coupled with scope of thought—is always very useful. I have already said this, because it was how I described him when we nominated him for the chairmanship of the Constitutional Oversight Committee. This was what made me like Sergey Sergeyevich's idea. We are at such a crucial stage, we are involved in such events that we are still unable to fully assess what we are doing and what its consequences will be. Our drama consists in the fact that we are being pressured by the burden of current problems and the urgency of the socioeconomic situation. We have missed many opportunities, complicated the situation. All this is true, but it must not put us off. We must reach the "height" necessary to oversee this process.

A turn is taking place in the direction of world civilization, of renewal processes in the socialist world. There is plenty that we still have to work out and comprehend, as Comrade Shatalin put it. We are developing correct long-term guidelines, but the important point is not to get confused in tactics, not to quarrel. And, of course, not to make a mess of things.

To always appraise events from such a height is one approach, whereas if we proceed from considering how this will affect me personally, what will happen to me tomorrow... This is what I always say at the Politburo: You know, here is the question we have to face today, let us forget our present offices and what will happen to us tomorrow, because the issue concerns the country, the guidelines for its development.

We have yet to reach that height. There are many people wanting simple solutions which do not exist. We are at a stage where there are and there will be no simple solutions. An ordinary, unversed person may be forgiven when he asks: Provide a clear-cut answer, itemize everything—one, two, three, four. As a matter of fact, all populists speculate on this. A ruling party, especially in a country like ours, cannot take such a path. We must have a broad vision of the world and the country, of its present situation and long-term prospects.

I think that so far we have made no mistakes on main issues. But we have committed mistakes in implementing the necessary measures, we have either delayed them or failed to ensure synchronization processes, especially in economic reform. This has complicated our job, and it has a powerful political effect. But it does not mean that we ought to panic and shout "Help!" One man says: "A prosperous state has been ruined," another says something else along similar lines. True enough, afterward they give assurances that they are in favor of perestroyka, that they are not panic mongers. Panic mongers! That is defeatism.

An important plenum has been held, its results are major. But all this can bear fruit only if we bring all healthy forces of perestroyka into the party on the basis

of the platform, if we resolutely advance our political tenets and the plans underlying the platform.

I would like to express the confidence, and I hope that you will back me, that we are now better aware of our responsibilities and better armed for resolutely advancing our common cause, the cause of perestroyka, the cause of socialist society's renewal.

Gorbachev Speaks on Lithuania

LD0802224290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

[M.S. Gorbachev's speech on Lithuania at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 7 February 1990]

[Text] We must now conclude the matter that we were discussing in December at the extraordinary Central Committee plenum, and which we broke off discussing so as to resume after the trip by members of the Central Committee and by the general secretary of the Central Committee to the Communist Party of Lithuania, to the republic. Permit me to report briefly on the matter.

I say "briefly" because the work that was carried out on the instructions of the Central Committee plenum has been reported in the press. Today we are to conclude our examination of the matter, which arose in connection with a decision of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania.

Then, as you remember, we had a sharp conversation on the matter here, and various judgments and principled assessments were expressed. I wish to recall once more the conclusion that we drew at the Central Committee plenum—to wit, that, from organizational and rule-based standpoints, the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania are not competent [nepravomochny]. They go beyond the bounds of the republic's internal life, affect the interests of the whole of our party, and create a threat to its unity.

Nevertheless, we did not start to draw any final conclusions, and I think we acted rightly. We decided then to send off a group of those attending the plenum so as to discuss a whole complex of issues on the spot and in meetings with Communists and working people. That work was carried out. Comrades Medvedev, Maslyukov, Frolov, Velikhov, Grigoryev, Kolesnikov, Kuptsov, Yagodin, Ulyanov, Karimov, and Oleynik visited the republic together with me.

We visited 15 rayons and towns in the republic and met Communists, veterans, scientific and cultural figures, servicemen, and representatives of more than 40 collectives from enterprises and organizations. An assembly of the republican party aktiv was held. In general, one could say that there was a very major, detailed, and frank dialogue with the whole of Lithuania, since everything that went on in the lecture halls and at the meetings, and even in the streets, was broadcast to the entire republic through the mass information media.

I cannot fail to mention the atmosphere surrounding our meetings and discussions. It contained much that was contradictory. At the same time we sensed a genuine amicability and interest, especially during the unscheduled meetings and when visiting labor collectives. The contact between us was not in the least like the "talks with the president of a neighboring country" to which the "Sajudis" leadership was exhorting the republic's population prior to the visit.

There was a frank and direct discussion of our country's vital problems. We sensed no disrespect toward the other republics or peoples, or to the country as a whole, to the union, although it should be said that at times it was difficult to hear out the critical observations, harsh observations. Overall, it all gave us an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the processes taking place, and more fully, to understand people's attitude.

That supremely broad and open exchange of views indicates that most people in the republic adhere to the standpoint of perestroyka. Various forces in Lithuanian society, however, are putting their own meanings and aims into this concept.

The aspiration of some to pursue perestroyka by means of isolation, right up to the secession of the republic from the union, has boldly revealed itself, although even this part, this wing, so to speak, nevertheless is for links with the union. The conviction of others that the tasks of renewal should be solved by the common efforts of the communists of all the union republics in the composition of a renewed CPSU and the union federal state has revealed itself just as boldly.

It was with consideration of these sometimes diametrically opposed positions that the conclusions of the December plenum of the CPSU Central Committee were also perceived. On the one hand, attempts are being made to interpret them as a demonstration of conservatism on the part of Moscow. On the other hand, a considerable part of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the working people of the republic have perceived in the Central Committee plenum materials the will of the CPSU for renewal, and for dialogue with all who are for progressive transformation.

Unfortunately, it must be stated that at present separatist moods are prevalent in the republic. A significant part of Lithuanian society is residing in a state of unique national euphoria—a euphoria that does not even take in arguments. A tendency to get carried away can be detected, because there has been much speculation on this subject touching on national sensibilities. The trip of participants of the Central Committee Plenum to Lithuania, the meetings and talks at various levels showed once more that the negative tendencies that have gained strength in the republic have as their source the largely artificial unitarian system of state and absence of genuine federalism which was installed earlier. This is also a reality. The vices of the Stalinist deformation of socialism have created a breeding ground in which the

seeds of distrust toward the center and the desire to secede have been ripening. That is how it is.

At the same time, as I have already said, public opinion is being shaped purposefully and emphatically and transferred to the level of emotions, where national feelings are being actively exploited. The argument in favor of isolation is, as a rule, general in nature—there are a lot of epithets, metaphors, and so on. At the same time, we have sensed that nobody is telling the people frankly what the ties with the union mean today, what will become of both the republic and the people if you start destroying them, and what consequences there will be for Lithuania and the union—this is being evaded.

I believe this is a conclusion for us, too, comrades. We have a lot of arguments: we need only publish the statistics for everyone to see the essence of the matter. I must say that the professors and academicians, some of whom I know and others of whom I got to know there, did not tell either us or the Lithuanian public anything convincing. Their arguments amount, in essence, to a list of stereotypes. It is asserted stubbornly that the inadequate dynamism of the changes in the country is holding back the process of renewal in the republic. The essence of the processes of perestroyka in Lithuania amounts to one thing: The need for national isolation and the republic's secession from the USSR.

These sentiments have also overwhelmed the Communist Party. Yes, I shall say it directly: This issue has been insinuated into both society and the party. Moreover, it is being insinuated by those who are connected with the bourgeois Lithuania of the past and with memories of the economic positions and political standing which they occupied then. People whose fathers or grandfathers cooperated with forces that were in no way progressive have come onto the stage.

Today they have seized the initiative.

We were told in Lithuania that the decisions of the congress have brought the party an unprecedentedly high rating. Maybe it is indeed so. Nonetheless, familiarization with the situation locally demonstrated that the popularity was achieved not due to upholding fundamental positions, but as a result of departure from them, of adaptation to separatist moods, of playing up to nationalist forces. A real split in the Communist Party and the registration of its two wings was the consequence of this. An impression is forming that the leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party, as before, is not aware of the danger of the policy being conducted. It is regarding many processes from positions of, so to speak, the unfolding political struggle and passions within the republic at the present time. There are dangers, and one can agree with this. But this, after all, is not all for a communist party, its policy, strategy, and tactics. An impresion is forming that not everything here has been weighed and well considered.

During our stay we constantly felt that people wanted to demonstrate: We have decided this way, and there can be no other approach. Comrade Brazauskas and other comrades even disp' yed anxiety that doubts about the correctness of the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party should spread under the influence of the sensible arguments made at our meetings. I think we should tell our comrades from the Lithuanian Communist Party once more in a friendly way about our common responsibility for the destiny of perestroyka of the federation and of all our peoples.

This affects all the peoples, since there are many representatives of other peoples living in Lithuania. And this is a part of our state. We must advise the comrades to overcome the weaknesses in their policy, which has led them to the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania.

The discussions that have taken place today, yesterday, and the day before yesterday of issues connected with preparations for the 28th Congress of the CPSU and with the drawing up of the platform of the CPSU Central Committee, which touches on the main directions of perestroyka and the development of our society in the short term, give our comrades from the Lithuanian Communist Party representing both parts of it an opportunity to see what huge possibilities are opening for removing all concern among the communists and working people of Lithuania regarding the profound reforms in the CPSU and in the Soviet federation.

Moreover, we have felt that they approached the congress under the sway of the moods and under the pressure of the situation. There has been time to reflect, and I think they can now consciously come to the conclusion of which we spoke at the last plenum and during our visit to Lithuania: The possibility of deep reforms will be ensured by the realization of the policy of perestroyka and by the renewal of the federation and the CPSU itself.

During the period that has elapsed we have become the witnesses of new facts—I mean the events in Azerbaijan and Armenia—which show once again how right it is to champion, on the one hand, the policy of strengthening the sovereignty of the union republics and, on the other, that of a full-blooded federation. It has always been said that a different approach is fraught with unpredictable consequences. I think it can now be said that the consequences are already predictable. What has happened shows that this is a most dangerous road.

Nor can we do without a definite assessment of the fact that the recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania submitted to the CPSU Central committee the proposal that the program and rules of the Communist Party of Lithuania should be viewed as a model for restructuring the CPSU that ought to be considered at the 28th Party Congress. I wish to be totally objective: This shows that our comrades in the leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party are nevertheless thinking of it. If steps in such a direction are also taken subsequently, I shall say that they are steps in

the right direction. In the declaration there is a grain of rationality. It does not, of course, consist in the fact that the documents of the Communist Party of Lithuania must be seen as the model for the CPSU, but in the fact that the Lithuanian Communists are not cutting themselves off from the 28th Party Congress or, in other words, from the CPSU. They are offering their own, admittedly most unusual, form of cooperation.

In any case, I think the Central Committee and, even more so, the congress will be prepared to discuss any proposals. This certainly does not mean that we shall accept them fully, capitulating before them, as it were. No, we are prepared to discuss them.

I think that all the comrades who were with me will confirm that we became convinced that among the party, (local) soviet and, particularly, economic leaders, as well as the creative intelligentsia, there are still quite a lot of people who, even in an atmosphere of moral pressure, have not lost their sense of responsibility and are standing firm on their internationalist positions. We talked to many people there, and Comrade Brazauskas and Comrade Burokevicius were together [with us] throughout the trip.

We also met the Provisional Central Committee on the CPSU platform. If we are to talk more specifically about their position, those comrades are also in favor of independence for the communist party, but within a renewed CPSU; in other words, they support what today is already our common stance, enshrined in the familiar provisions of the platform for the 28th congress. They are also in favor of renewing the party and the federation, of extending the rights of the union republics, of democratization, and of ridding society and interethnic relations of all the negative phenomena of the past. This must be said so that it can be seen that it is not yesterday's position, as some want to present it, but a forward-looking one, proceeding in the same direction as the processes of perestroyka. The more people that understand the threats contained in secession from the Soviet Union, the more supporters that section of Lithuania's communists will have. It must be said that the stance of the Communist Party on the CPSU platform is shared by many large internationalist working class collectives.

I consider it necessary to express our attitude to this, albeit briefly, since information we are receiving confirms that attempts are being made to exclude the Communist Party of Lithuania in the CPSU platform from the republic's social and political life and that even threats to declare it illegal are being heard.

So, these comrades do not find it easy there. They are defending the people's radical interests on the basis of a fundamental policy which is the only one that can take us out onto a broad path. And yet they are almost declared to be traitors.

Therefore, I think that while inviting the Communist Party of Lithuania and its leadership represented here to think and seek a way out of the situation, we must at the same time give support to the comrades who have continued to stand for connection with the CPSU.

At the same time, I wish to return to the initial thesis we have formulated as follows: To show maximum patience, respectfulness, and consideration since this is very important for everyone. We have tried to remove passions by going there and by having contact with people. This was a correct measure. Nevertheless, the decision of the 20th Congress of the Communist party of Lithuania to form an independent communist party is a step aimed at an organizational and political break with the CPSU. It is necessary to determine possible ways out of the situation that has arisen, proceeding from the fact that this republic is a constituent part of the USSR—our Soviet people of various nationalities reside there—and we must proceed from the fact that it is not only the provisional committee but also the Communist Party of Lithuania that is announcing joint efforts.

There is every reason for the plenum of the Central Committee to abolish the decision of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party as contradicting the CPSU's program and rules or to express its political attitude toward the party that has been proclaimed independent as having split from the CPSU. However, this approach entails, we think, many negative consequences for the life of the party and society as a whole. The confrontation, inevitable in such a situation, would deepen even more the split and worsen interethnic relations between the republics.

We think, I want to stress it, comrades, that the possibilities for a dialogue and for searching for the way out from the critical situation that has come about are not finished—the more so since we are entering a responsible stage of radical perestroyka and of a renewal of the party itself on the basis of the political platform, and are heading toward the 28th party congress.

A draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on the decision of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania has been read. First, having listened to the report on the results of the trip of M.S. Gorbachev and a group of those taking part in the December Central Committee Plenum to the Lithuanian SSR, the plenum notes that the meetings with working people of Lithuania that took place in the course of the trip, the frank exchange of opinions, and the character of the many letters and telegrams that have been received testify to the support in the republic of the policy of perestroyka pursued by the CPSU.

Second, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, bearing in mind that the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania convened within the framework of the CPSU and that its delegates did not have the authority to decide on the question of the Lithuanian Communist Party's withdrawal from the CPSU, is suspending until the 28th CPSU Congress the resolution of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party regarding

the declaration that the program and the rules of the CPSU have lost their force for the organizations of the Communist Party of Lithuania, as well as suspending a number of the provisions of the statute or the rules of the Communist Party of Lithuania which concern membership of the party— (the statute says that they are members of the Lithuanian Communist Party and not of the CPSU.)

Taking into account the ideas expressed by the plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party's Central Committee, which I mentioned, the documents of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress and the program and the rules are to be viewed as proposals to the 28th Party Congress. Support is to be given in work to the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the platform of the CPSU), having taken measures for the creation of the necessary conditions for its activity.

The CPSU Central Committee recommends that the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the platform of the CPSU) conduct elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from party organizations of the republic in accordance with the procedure which will be established by the CPSU Central Committee.

Third, the CPSU Central Committee makes it binding upon the Politburo of the Central Committee, on the basis of the political platform approved by the plenum for precongress discussion and of other party documents, to continue work toward the rapprochement of the positions of the communists and party organizations of the republic in the interests of stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

The CPSU Central Committee expresses hope that the communists of Lithuania are sincerely devoted to the socialist ideals and the goals of perestroyka and, realizing their historical responsibility, will not allow loss of the revolutionary acquisitions of the Lithuanian people and will make their contribution to the renewal of the CPSU, and to the strengthening on a wholesome and sound basis of our free and voluntary union of peoples.

Given such an approach, the functioning of two leading bodies of the communist parties—the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform)—is allowed.

The proposed decision, if it is adopted, would enable the republic's communists and the entire communist party to take part in the work of the 28th Congress and to delegate their representatives there. Both leading bodies of the Lithuanian Communist Party, as I have already said, would hold elections of delegates to the congress in connection with this according to the relevant procedure.

Consequently, all of Lithuania's communists, especially those who are today standing at the crossroads, would be granted the opportunity to weigh up once more their attitude to CPSU membership and the future destiny of the Communist Party of Lithuania and to make their choice on the basis of the precongress documents.

In general, we are leaving the doors open in the hope that the Lithuanian comrades will use this opportunity to look together for a way out of the situation that has developed. Of course, this will depend to a significant degree on them, but also in no small measure on us.

We proceed, as before, from the premise that we must seek to eliminate the causes which provoked the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania not by backtracking away from the policy of perestroyka, but by continuing to step up our efforts in the direction defined by the CPSU Central Committee's political platform for the 28th Party Congress.

That is how it is proposed to approach the solution to this issue.

Speakers on Lithuanian Congress

LD0802235790 Moscow TASS in English 2331 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—The decisions of the 20th Congress of Lithuania's Communist Party were discussed at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on Wednesday afternoon. The Plenum ended that day.

An opening address to the participants in the plenum was made by Mikhail Gorbachev. Eleven speakers took the floor in the discussion.

Substantiating the decisions of the 20th Congress of Lithuania's Communist Party, first secretary of Lithuania's Communist Party Central Committee Algirdas Brazauskas said it was necessary to enter the 21st century with a qualitatively different level of self- awareness, on the principles of cooperation, equal partnership, mutual confidence and respect.

In Brazauskas's opinion, economic relations based on market relations and mutually beneficial economic interests should be established between the union republics. The main task now is economic independence, real political pluralism and parliamentary democratism, Brazauskas said. He said that the plenum should give a serious consideration to the state of affairs in the republic and take no decision till the 28th CPSU Congress.

Mikolas Burokiavicius, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of Lithuania's Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform), said that the separation of a major part of Lithuania's Communists from the CPSU was "a strike on the durable revolutionary and internationalist positions of Lithuania's Communist Party, a renunciation of the Lithuanian Communists' ideological-organisational

unity with Communist organisations of Russia, with Communist Parties of the union republics."

Vladislav Shved, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of Lithuania's Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform), dwelt on fundamental differences that arose between the reorganised Communist Party of Lithuania and the CPSU as a result of the 20th Congress' decisions. They boil down to the question—to be in or out of the USSR.

"We also favour Lithuania's independence from diktat, voluntarism, power pressure and bureaucratic centralism," he said. "But we want an independent, socialist and free Lithuanian Republic within the union of such republics."

Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Aleksandr Yakovlev also believes that what happened in the Lithuanian organisation is a strike on perestroyka at the most difficult, most responsible and critical time. "This is above all to the benefit of the conservative forces: nationalists and chauvinists who reject the principle of internationalism and self-determination of nations," he said. Other speakers spoke much in the same vein.

Member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) Yuriy Maslyukov said that the way out of the obtaining situation was through bringing closer the positions of Lithuania's Communists on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform. Economically, he believes, the provisions of the draft platform, the government's programme, and also the council of Ministers' draft decision on priority measures for the Baltic republics to go over to economic independence and self-government open broad possibilities for these republics within the framework of the union.

Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and CPSU Central Committee Secretary Yegor Ligachev stressed the exceeding importance of the Communist Party's unity at the present stage. He expressed profound confidence that without an efficient and highly organised party it was impossible to lead society out of a very acute situation. He declared for a search of compromises which, in his view, are necessary and possible, without principled concessions. The Communists, in his opinion, should denounce the activities of the present leadership of Lithuania's Communist Party, aimed at splitting and weakening the unity of the CPSU and the Soviet Federation.

Ligachev Speaks on Lithuania

PM0902102590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Debate Speech by Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! I think we acted very wisely when at the December plenum we deemed it necessary for Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and a group of party Central Committee members to visit Lithuania in view of the exceptionally important events that have developed in this republic.

I don't think you will suspect me of insincerity if I say that I rejoiced just as much as you did at the, in my view, extremely meaningful and masterly work of Mikhail Sergeyevich and our other comrades during their stay in Lithuania.

But now the time has come for action and decisionmaking. Unless this happens, we will devalue what went before.

Comrade Brazauskas has tried to convince us here that the Central Committee's platform for the congress is based on his proposals. That many of them have already been utilized and approved; we are told we are following in their footsteps.

I noticed long ago that comrades who abandon Leninist positions very often act as follows: After the party has done something, has elaborated something, they pick it up and appropriate it themselves as political capital.

Unfortunately, Comrade Brazauskas, too, has been unable to avoid that temptation. But the Central Committee platform for the congress does not contain the point that divides us. The platform does not contain what the [Lithuanian] Communist Party's present leaders are fighting for—namely, withdrawal from the CPSU.

Comrades have declared that, you see, they are marching ahead of all social forces in the republic, have strengthened their trust among the people, and have gained great political dividends. But at what price? That is the question. As the facts show, attempts to make out that they are seeking only what is progressive are scarcely convincing. We, too, are seeking. We are all engaged in a quest. But we are not traveling the path of destroying party and state unity. I would like to say this once again. Now, at a fateful time, the unity of our Communist Party is exceptionally important. I am profoundly certain that without a battleworthy, highly organized party it is simply impossible to extricate our society from an extremely acute situation.

I am in favor of compromises, they are necessary and possible, but compromises without fundamental concessions.

As the ancient Greeks used to say—Plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth. And the truth is that, in my view, today we ought to adopt the following decision.

One. We ought to condemn the present Lithuanian Communist Party leadership's activity aimed at splitting and weakening the unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Federation.

Two. The party Central Committee plenum supports the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) directed toward the ideological and organizational rallying of our party and toward strengthening the multinational socialist state.

In adopting such a decision it should be remembered that this is important both for Lithuania's communists and for communists in all the union republics. This is of fundamental importance.

Kardamavichyus on 'Joint Election'

PM0902095390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Debate speech by V.-Yu.Yu. Kardamavichyus, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform) Provisional Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 7 February]

[Text] I don't want to embark on a polemic and debate with Comrade Paletskis, who spoke before me and whose position is absolutely not in line with that of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who visited Lithuania just recently, and the Politburo members. Draw your own conclusions from this, Central Committee members. I want to ask the members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Central Committee what kind of compromises we are seeking today on this Lithuanian issue of ours? We have been in session for three days but not everyone has understood how it is necessary to work. Once again there are compromises, once again there is irresolution, once again there is duplicity. I am referring to the draft. But Brovikov, Ligachev, and Saykin have said what many of the Soviet Union's Communists are thinking.

I want to say that if Comrade Yakovlev has his own opinion and right to speak, we too have our own opinion and right to speak. We want to tell comrades once again that Comrade Yakovlev's stay in Lithuania actually introduced a number of unhealthy things in our republic. You, Comrade Yakovlev, probably indirectly had a hand in the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. This is very widely said in the republic. This was reflected in your meetings with certain of Lithuania's intellectuals. Let us speak honestly to Communists.

Lithuania, Comrades. One. At its 20th Congress the Lithuanian Communist Party withdrew from the CPSU and it is not going to return. What is the point in fostering illusions here? Two. The title Lithuanian Communist Party on the 20th Congress Platform is merely camouflage. It is not communist and there is very little that is communist left in it.

Three. The Lithuanian Communist Party Statutes are not the statutes of a communist party. They are the statutes of a social democratic party. I would go further—they contain, they embody certain details from a petty bourgeois standpoint. Surely the members of the party Central Committee realize this now?

Four. The content of the work of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the 20th Congress Platform is determined by the position of people elected at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. By the composition of the party Central Committee, the composition of its bureau, and the composition of its secretariat. We know many of these people, the positions they espouse are not communist positions. They include people, some people, who espouse even reactionary positions alien to socialism. Their aim is to tear Lithuania away from the Soviet Union. Yet after this once again there are to be compromises?

I think that the members of the CPSU Central Committee will not tolerate that today. You must display the maximum principledness, rather than an attitude of pliancy and compromise toward the fixers [regulyatory]. I propose that the decision of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress be regarded as a break with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I totally go along with the proposals regarding paragraph one made by the first secretary of the Vologda party oblast committee.

I think you should recognize as competent the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform and the decisions of the Sixth Party Conference of the Lithuanian Communist Party and provide all necessary assistance in order to ensure the normal work not of a faction [krylo], but of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

We have a good base on this question, Mikhail Sergeyevich, we have a multitude of Communists who support our positions. We have the Institute of Party History, the Vilnius Higher Party School, and other attributes which can help us in order to ensure the normal activity of this Communist Party.

Last. I propose that the point regarding the joint election of delegates to the 28th Party Congress be deleted from the draft.

M.S. Gorbachev: It's not joint election...

V.-Yu.Yu. Kardamavichyus: Okay, maybe it isn't. I propose that this point be deleted altogether from the draft.

What is the logic? The Lithuanian Communist Party on the 20th Congress Platform has withdrawn from the CPSU, it is a party alien to the CPSU, yet it is going to elect delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress!

Gerasimov: Power Shifted to Soviets

PM0802123690 London ITV Television Network in English 2200 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Interview with Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov in Moscow by news presenter Trevor McDonald in London, live on the ITV "News at 10" program]

[Text] [McDonald] It's now just after one o'clock in the morning in Moscow, and joining us live is the Soviet Union spokesman and a close aide to President Gorbachev, Mr Gennadiy Gerasimov. Mr Gerasimov, we've heard a great deal about multiparty systems, pluralism, and democracy, yet as a result of what happened today, Mr Gorbachev seems to have reinforced his own personal grip on power. Is that right?

[Gerasimov] That is what I predicted two days ago, which was reported beautifully in the DAILY MAIL yesterday—or is it today? —and the DAILY MAIL didn't agree, but I was right, I guess. He got his support from the party—what he needed.

[McDonald] Now, when will this boon of the multiparty system actually begin to operate? Mr Gorbachev said "at a certain stage:" When will that be?

[Gerasimov] In many ways, we have already a multiparty system, in the sense that we have so many different organizations which you can easily call parties, and you mentioned yourself just only several moments ago that all shades of public... all shades of political opinion were represented during this Sunday rally in Moscow.

[McDonald] Many parties, Mr Gerasimov; but when will the multiparty system begin to operate? Many parties, yes—but the system?

[Gerasimov] It is not the Communist Party job, actually; it's not the Communist Party business. The Communist Party is now going to be one of the others: All parties are going to be equal. Of course the Communist Party will want to be more equal than the others, but we are changing the article—we were talking about "the" party, and now it's going to be "a" party—one of... one of many parties...

[McDonald interrupts] Mr Gerasimov, could you...

[Gerasimov] But when? But when—It depends on the parties themselves...

[McDonald interrupts] Could you help us with this?

[Gerasimov] The new parties, I mean.

[McDonald] Could you help us with this? How will this reform actually help solve the problems which are facing Mr Gorbachev at the moment: the problems of the nationalities, the problems of the economy?

[Gerasimov] I think that with political pluralism here we'll have political freedom, and with political freedom we're going to have better economy. Because we learned during these years of perestroyka, then: To have a better economy, you must have also political freedom. They go together.

[McDonald] Has Mr Gorbachev finally demolished the challenge from the right and from the left?

[Gerasimov] Well, they "Americanized" themselves into the parties: Now they have this possibility or will have, and... but you see, his position is like this: He wants his party to be the dominant one, but he says it must be... it must win this position in free competition with other parties.

[McDonald] And could you tell me this: Is he running to keep up, or is he leading the charge in solving these problems?

[Gerasimov] Say it again, please?

[McDonald] Is he just running to keep up, or is he leading the charge to solve the problems?

[Gerasimov] Well, the party must solve the problems—the Communist Party—because we're now in power, after all, and we have challenges from the left, we have challenges from the right; but the party is now responsible. Of course, the party wants to shift the power to the Soviets, and this is actually the main result of this plenum. It's not that we are going to have more parties: The main result of the plenum is that we're going to shift the seat of power from the Central Committee to the Soviets—to the local... to the common sector.
[McDonald] Mr Gerasimov, thank you very much for joining us.

Vagris Comments on CPSU Plenum

LD0702160290

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0500 GMT on 7 February carries a 6-minute recorded telephone interview with Janis Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, by correspondent Imants Austrins on the CPSU Central Committee plenum in Moscow, which Vagris is attending.

Austrins asks Vagris for his assessment of the course of the plenum and specifically the two issues to be addressed: the platform for the 28th CPSU Congress and the question of the 22d Lithuanian Congress. Vagris says that during the first two days of the plenum, only the first issue has been addressed and discussed.

He says: "Well, about the proposals: It is bad that, as I already said in my speech, at the very beginning, we were not acquainted with these proposals earlier. Well, probably, being acquainted with them is not that important. The couple of days beforehand—when we arrived—were probably adequate for becoming acquainted with them; but the most important thing is that we did not participate in working them out."

Then Vagris is asked about the proposals by Latvian communists, a year and a half or a year ago, and if it is true that they could be included in the platform. Vagris replies: "Well, that is so because, after all, when these will be published, these propositions, when they are finally polished they will be published in the press and our communists will notice that. Nevertheless, these questions, as I also already said, a year or a year and a half ago, about a new structure of the union on the basis

of treaties—independence of the Communist Parties of the union republics—were not adopted at all. Without doubt there is gratification that now these are being accepted as normal phenomena."

Austrins then asks Vagris about criticism at the plenum and "also about party policy, about the policy of the state as a whole. How would you describe it? In which instances is this criticism constructive? In which is it not? And are there direct and specific reproaches to Gorbachev?" Vagris replies: "Well, if it concerns criticism, then it is more kind of declarative, is it not? And there is, for all that, comparatively little constructivism."

"Addressed to Comrade Gorbachev? Well, there is criticism, too—well, perhaps not directly calling him by name. In context it (?appears) that it is also addressed to the Politburo, to individual members of the Politburo—also to Comrade Gorbachev; but I would say that the criticism is favorable, and not sharp. It is not especially popular and acceptable to speak of criticism, criticism concerning the matter."

Austrins then refers to Vagris' remarks in his speech on the need for a law determining the procedure for republics to leave the union. "But should we not start by determining by law how we should live together, justly and honestly? Would you already have on this proposition any comments from the side, on how this has been recieved?"

Vagris answers: "No, for the time being I have not because I think that we have not, really, if we think about the union, as strengthening the union. Then it should not be started from how to leave it, but how we should live together, as I said. Well, and second, I think that if we began to draw up a law on leaving, without doubt all kinds of obstacles would be created in that law in practice, so that leaving would be quite problematic."

To Austrins' question on whether anybody had already mentioned the Lithuanian communists congress question, Vagris replied: "Practically no one, because already more than 50 people have spoken during these two days; only some such remarks were made in passing." "But, in principle, this subject has not yet been begun to be dealt with."

In conclusion, Austrins asks for Vagris' prediction on whether the plenum will end its work today. Vagris replies that according to his predictions, the plenum will end today.

'No Distractions, Demagogy'

LD0702193890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Throughout today, while the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee has been in progress, my colleagues—correspondents from our editorial office—have been stationed at the gates of the Kremlin's Spasskaya Tower waiting for the chance of an interview. One of our correspondents has just returned to the office from there.

[Correspondent Igor Minayev, identified by caption] Here at the Kremlin's Spasskaya Tower, there is exceptional excitement. Dozens, hundreds of people have come out here and are waiting impatiently for the first plenum participants to appear. There are many Soviet and foreign journalists here. Cameramen are literally attacking with their cameras everyone emerging from these gates. [video shows correspondent standing among a crowd of onlookers; cuts to show S.S. Shatalin, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences—identified by caption—being interviewed]

[Shatalin] The plenum is going very constructively. On the third day of proceedings, there have been no distractions, no demagogy. It has been an honest and comradely exchange of views—very constructive, it seems to me. The platform appealed to me very much as a whole, although naturally in the course of discussion many other proposals will unquestionably also arise. So this is just the beginning. But I think that the platform that will be put out for discussion is a good platform to enable us to make headway seriously. I could see that there was no division of people into those who are enemies and those who are not. Sometimes certain emotional outbursts, so to speak, have occurred. But we are human, we still have to spend a long time learning this.

'Personal Responsibility for Mistakes'

LD0702164890 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Excerpts] The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has completed the discussion of the party's platform for its 28th Congress and adopted its final wording. The session was resolute in demanding personal responsibility for mistakes in the economic and ideological fields Personal (?accounts have) been required from political bureau members Nikolay Slyunkov, Vadim Medvedev, and the alternate member Georgiy Razumovskiy. The plenum will conclude its work today.

6 February Report on Central Committee Plenum

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[Excerpts] In the afternoon of 6 February the plenum continued discussing the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th CPSU Congress and of M.S. Gorbachev's report on this matter.

N.N. Slyunkov, politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, noted that the draft platform outlines approaches and a program for contemporary socioeconomic policy, and added his voice to the proposal by B.Ye. Paton: The platform has to be supplemented with a policy for the direct influence of the state on the

resolution of the strategic tasks of scientific and technical progress. A way out, in the view of the speaker, has to be sought along two interconnected avenues of economic reform. First, through the erosion of monopolism and the establishment of a sufficiently tough market competition. And second, through the state regulation of prices, taxes, and credit rates.

I won't repeat my critical assessments and proposals voiced with regard to the government program at the December 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the Central Committee secretary went on. They remain in force. What is happening in our consumer market? As a result of inadequate state regulation, over the course of four years the population's deposits in bank accounts have risen by 50 percent, and disposable cash by a third. Such an influx of money has upset the consumer market, emptied the shelves and shop counters of all goods, and created a certain social tension. Of 1,200 product range groups of goods, 1,150 fell into the deficit category. The measures taken by the government were inadequate, ineffective, and late.

The mechanism for creating economic normatives from the growth in profit has made it possible to create high incomes and [wage] funds without enhancing efficiency or a rise in production. Price reform has not been implemented within the set timescale, nor has the tax system been brought into play. These measures, you will recall, have been postponed in the government program for implementation in 1991.

The speaker believes that great damage was inflicted on the economy and consumer market by the so-called "new mechanism" in the construction sector, introduced in 1986. This is a ruinous, wasteful mechanism. As a result of its action, the volume of uncompleted projects in the construction sector, just in terms of state capital investments over four years, has grown by R60 billion. The entire increment in the country's national income has gone on this. And more than R20 billion have been paid out for this in wages. Huge material resources have been frozen. A final solution to this question is being protracted. Time must not be lost: analyses and calculations give grounds for asserting that serious moves toward rectifying the situation can be made even this year so that goods start to appear on the shop shelves. There are three main ways of solving the problem of a consumer market, which require emergency measures, decisively and rapidly, from the government.

First. There has to be a real increase of R40 billion in goods turnover. This is not easy but it is possible. For the moment, the planned volume of consumer goods production is not backed by material resources. There should therefore be yet another examination of the possibility of redistributing supplies for nonmarket requirements and export, thereby increasing supplies to the domestic market by approximately five billion to six billion rubles' worth of essential goods. Construction materials, must be delivered without delay to meet the stated demand, so as to remove tension among the population with regard to such materials.

Another area is that of rigidly linking incomes to the results of work. This is not a new issue. Unfortunately, the negative trend continues in January and growth in the wage fund amounts to about 10 percent.

The tax adopted on the growth in the wage fund does not do what it is intended to do. It is vital, as an emergency measure, to introduce regulation of the wage fund within the limits of the growth in the volume of production.

The speaker [Slyunkov] also proposed immediately stopping channels for the flow of money from a non cash to a cash form, strengthening the control of the financial bodies, mobilizing tax inspection and bringing order to price formation.

The third direction is to divert the mass of money already amassed among the population. It is in excess of R165 billion. If we do not find a use for it we will not bring order to the market.

Rapid implementation of specific measures to tie up a considerable proportion of the money, to sell bond certificates and to develop commercial and commission trading straight away is essential.

The situation regarding state insurance has been extremely neglected within the country. The scope of the insurance field is 26-40 percent. Restructuring the insurance system and its mechanism would permit the mobilization of an extra four billion to five billion rubles.

The whole set of measures could, given the relevant work, be effected in the next two months. In this way, the consumer market could seriously be put to rights as early as this year.

The speaker supported the proposal to increase the rights of the head of state and extend his powers and the proposal to hasten the time for holding the 28th Party Congress.

The current plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is taking place at a very complex and crucial time for our party, said S.D. Niyetullayev, first secretary of the Karakalpak Oblast Committee [obkom] of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. The failure to resolve many socioeconomic and interethnic problems has led, in essence, to a crisis situation in the country's sociopolitical life. The explosion of ethnic strife, cases of brutal violence and vandalism, the flouting of Soviet laws in certain regions, and disorder on the state border have clearly marked out the whole complex of processes jeopardizing the destiny of the country and socialsim, which bear out that the enemies of perestroyka are striving to turn democracy into disregard for rules, and on occasion not without success. The speaker called for decisive and effective measures to normalize the situation on the part of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the country's government.

Indeed, how many cases have there bee.. of manifestations of nationalism, public speeches with antisocialist slogans and unsanctioned meetings? But in a number of regions of the country they have not been given a proper rebuff, which has strengthened the feeling of licentiousness. We are for glasnost, but one cannot agree with one-sided glasnost when the mass media, with relish and on a major scale, show cases of desecration of the state flag of the USSR and portraits of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, without even trying to voice their attitude toward them. All of this, and also miscalculations in our propaganda, ideological, and organizational work are leading to a deterioration in the sociopolitical situation.

People expect decisions from our plenum today, they expect a CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress. It is essential that its provisions should not bear the character of a theoretical abstraction, but should take account of the existing realities, meet life's demands, clearly mark out the CPSU Central Committee's position on the most burning issues relating to the renewal of the party and society. Does the draft meet these demands? In the view of the speaker, not in all sections. It is clear, for example, that we need a renewed federation of republics in which unfailing account is taken of national interests, and respect for originality and recognition of the equality of every nation is guaranteed. Let's see how deeply this content is revealed in the draft platform. Section 5—on the one hand, it stresses the principle of preserving the country's integrity as a federation of free and equal peoples. On the other hand, it says that the transformation of the Soviet federation should be oriented toward the establishment of an optimal link between the union republics and the union as their overall formation. Where is the equality here, and where in that case lies the new level of independence of all types of national autonomy, the strengthening of the sovereignty and the expansion of the rights of autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs, as the draft platform says? What is meant by a small people having the right to fully-fledged autonomy? These are questions that are far from rhetorical.

The speaker proposed writing in the draft platform that autonomous formations, on a level with union republics, are subjects of the federation and participate in the elaboration of a new treaty on the USSR.

The mechanism that has been set up to defend the political and economic interests of autonomous formations, and also the regulation of the general principles of management of the economic and social sphere demand the definition and [as received] status of their party organizations and committees.

For this reason, the obkom first secretary noted, it would be logical for the platform of the CPSU Central Committee to reflect also the issues of expanding the rights and autonomy of the party committees of the autonomous republics. It is essential to fix their quota and give them the chance to delegate their representatives directly to the membership of the central bodies of the party and of the Central Committees of the communist parties of the union republics.

As to what the distortion of the basic principle of intraparty life, that of democratic centralism leads to, the speaker pointed to the case of the Aral tragedy. Over practically the lifetime of one generation, only one third of the previous volume of water remains in the sea. About three million hectares of sea bed has been left uncovered, from which hundreds of millions of tonnes of sand and salt are blown away every year, the quality of river water has worsened extremely, and the fertility of the land is falling.

After the adoption by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of the well known decree on the radical improvement of the ecological situation in the republics of the Aral area, the people took heart, but during its implementation doubt has started to creep into people's minds about the force of this document. The administrative-edict system of management of the national economy has resulted in the people of Karakalpakia in fact losing the way of life that they had built up, their traditional occupations, their fishing and shipping has been lost, their production of fur has declined. The natural feed base of their livestock has worsened and decreased sharply.

The system was deaf to the requests of the inhabitants of the region for help, and only perestroyka has half lifted the curtain of silence. In the last 20 years infant mortality in the Karakalpak ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] has doubled. Last year 51 children died for every 1,000 born, which is nearly twice as many as in the country as a whole. In fact, the very existence of about four million people inhabiting the Aral region has been called into question. It would have been relevant for the platform to have reflected the ecological situation in the country which is worrying everyone.

Bearing in mind the different levels of social and political development of the national-territorial formations, against which the failure to solve social and economic problems is sharply felt, the speaker proposed reflecting in the platform the starting positions of the union republics and autonomous formations, pointing out the necessity of equalizing them and also making clear a mechanism to implement this. [passage omitted]

Perestroyka should mean the complete dismantling of the administrative system and the construction of a civiv law-based society with a multiparty system and a mixed economy. The lack of other parties has led to stagnation in party life. There are no competitors, no rivals. Can you imagine an athlete who spends all his time running alone with nobody breathing down his neck. He would get fed up with running and could simply walk, telling everyone that walking was just a new way of running. People in the lower levels of our party are bored now too. The party long ago ceased to be attractive to energetic people. [passage omitted in which Fedorov says that

communists who impede progress should be recalled from positions of authority]

One can hardly remain indifferent to what is going on in states to the east of us, said A.N. Yakovlev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary. The processes there are varied and the results are varied. But there is one logic: The deeper the crisis, the graver the consequences. Thus, the transformations have been seriously delayed. But there were alarm signals —both in 1953, in 1956, and in 1968 and the 1980's. The German question is particularly complex and requires profound consideration for many reasons. Very energetic political-diplomatic work is going on in this area as well at the moment.

There arises here another question, too—that of our reaction. This has come up repeatedly at the Politburo, and at the moment it is still too early to draw final conclusions. All the same, if we are proclaiming the principles of freedom and democracy in our own country, then how can we refuse this to others. If we proclaimed freedom of social choice as early as 1985, there is no sense in today inventing some kind of magic recipes for halting events in these regions. Not everything is yet clear, but one thing is evident: We have to watch events closely, particularly from the point of views of the security of our country.

The speaker voiced support for the draft platform. Emphasizing the importance of the political situation, he singled out from the document points such as the serious advance in understanding of the principles and norms of a socialist community and the new way of posing questions of freedom of the individual, creative action and speech; of property and commodity-money relations; the market; new production relations in the rural areas and social reorganization of the countryside as a policy priority in the next few years; of working property; of political pluralism; the new understanding of the party's role in society; the change in all structures of power; and of the problems of self-government.

Much in the platform was only yesterday considered malicious loosening of screws on the road of socialism, but today it is practically becoming part of life. This will require qualitative changes in work and the highest competence, because only knowledge saves a person from prejudices, and lack of knowledge—from responsibility.

Taking issues with those who consider that the draft platform was made simultaneously by the right and left hands, the speaker said he would place that not to the debit but the credit of the document. It has grasped that political resultant on which it is possible to create a healthy political center of the party, it has established opportunities for mutual agreement and cooperation of all forces within the CPSU, and also with all restructuring forces and movements in society. Perestroyka is now very difficult, and it is contradictory itself. Having proclaimed and started radical reforms in the economy, politics, in the whole way of life of the party and people, perestroyka has come under criticism from right and left. For the rightists it is impermissibly revolutionary, for the leftists it is intolerably conservative and sluggish.

Perestroyka has formed the theoretical concepts of a breakthrough nature and came up against the tenacity of dogmatic tempers, against prerestructuring ideological fundamentalism. It called for the overcoming of mutual alienation nurtured by civic passivity and came up against fresh waves of human embitterment. It proclaimed the necessity for a new ethic, standards of merit, honor, decency, and there splashed to the surface amorality, plagiarism, spite, and egoism.

All this is reflected in the platform. But voting today to take the proposed platform to the 28th congress, it must be borne in mind that its contents is not the maximum, but the minimum, below which one cannot descend. Otherwise it will go badly.

The speaker supported the proposal to strengthen the supreme power in the country. Or, as is sometimes said, the idea of a presidency, built into the political system.

There are more than enough reasons for such a step, he [Yakovlev] explained. And it is not just a matter of supporting legality and order, state and general discipline in the country, although that is today very topical. Here world experience shows: There is always a specific sphere of most acute and urgent problems of domestic and foreign policy which are sometimes of a critical nature. There are tasks requiring initiative and the need for the quick and broad maneuver. In this consists the essence of operational political administration, which in its functions, tasks and forms, is distinguished from that which the Congress of Peoples's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet and the USSR Government are called upon to engage in. The requirement to organize supreme power in such a way lies not in our needs of today but of tomorrow, in the demands of normal life and normal, not crisis organization of the political process.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary expressed his view on a question connected with the characteristics of the processes taking place in society and the party. What we need like air is realism, soberness of appraisal, complete truth in everything, he stressed. But I do not share the panic. That is always a forerunner of disorderly flight and defeat. Only in peacetime it is harder to realize this than it was at the front. If only we can avoide working ourselves up into such a fear that can lead to paralysis of action. Political blindness is dangerous, of course. But no less dangerous are this whipping up and delusion of nightmares.

There are crises before disaster but our crisis is of a different kind. It is akin to the pangs of giving birth to the new. No denying it is difficult, agonizing, painful. For all the seriousness of the situation, for all the burden of problems of the economy, interethnic relations and others—I do not share the opinion allegedly that society or the party now face the prospect of a disastrous crisis.

But it will arise, if we ourselves procrastinate, limit ourselves to halfbaked solutions, vacillate, or waver.

In these conditions, the speaker went on, we particularly need qualities such as comradeship, understanding and mutual respect. However, alongside the all-round analysis of the matters under discussion, a certain clamorousness and suspiciousness have emerged.

In connection with this I would like to express my disagreement with both the content and the tone of the speech by Comrade Brovikov. I have known you a long time, Vladimir Ignatyevich, you know your way around foreign affairs, but in this way, as if in passing, with hints and smears, using emotions and not arguments, in essence you strike out everything that has been done in the international arena by the Central Committee and its Politburo. You know through Poland how difficult the processes in motion at present are. Of course, there is hardly a purpose in speaking of the foreign policy results of perestroyka only in delighted, uncritical tones. But it is a fact that a giant leap toward a peaceful future for the whole of mankind has taken place, a fact recognized throughout the world. And to see in this someone's ambitious pretensions, you must agree, is unjust, and it is something offensive for a person to hear. If we now start to divide the party according to the characteristic of who is a sincere, true believing support of genuine socialism, and who, supposedly, wants to destroy socialism, then the outcome is obvious. "Head hunts," the search for "enemies" or artificially creating them, have never led to any good.

The specific nature of the moment is that perestroyka, its spiritual and political results, have accelerated the process of decay of everything that has outlived its time, the speaker stressed. But our tardiness, difficulties in getting going and blunders, together with the efforts of the forces of inertia, have put brakes on the creation of what is new. It is this gulf that must be overcome more quickly—with the institution of order, leaning upon the law, but also with the accelerated implementation of what is new and revolutionary.

The 28th Congress must be the congress of consolidation and of a leap forward on the basis of perestroyka, and not a congress of splits, it must be a congress of revolutionary overcoming of the contradictions that have accumulated which are fraught with an explosion. The draft platform opens up such a possibility, a possibility for a democratic accord on a democratic basis, and not for disorder. Not to let this opportunity slip—that is the main political issue at the moment.

Communists, workers of the oblast, N.F.Tatarchuk, first secretary of the Kalinin Obkom and CPSU Central Committee member said, expect from this plenum specific and unambiguous answers to questions about how to live and work in the future, what direction to move in and what the party's platform will be. Many people have formed the conviction that events in the country are developing spontaneously and opinions on a crisis of power are being expressed more and more insistently. There is disorder in the country, discipline has decreased, corruption exists as well as a mafia which is freely trading in very valuable natural resources.

It is becoming more and more difficult to conduct political work. Our party is losing prestige in the eyes of the people. Much of what has been promised by perestroyka over the past five years has not been carried out. [passage omitted]

The speaker came out in favor of seriously strengthening the section "Soviets of People's Deputies" in the CPSU Central Committee draft platform. He proposed that a special working group be set up including experienced local soviet officials so that these and other necessary legislative acts on the local soviets be adopted during the near future. In this case, the leader of the oblast party organization considers, the local soviets really will become sovereign bodies which consistently express the will of the people and will concentrate in their own hands the threads of state administration. The positions and prerogatives of the USSR Council of Ministers, its working bodies, especially the ministries and departments and above all Gosplan and Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], should also be strengthened.

Further, the obkom secretary expressed doubts about the correctness of the abolition of a number of bodies which have been entrusted with the implementation of foodstuffs programs, A year ago the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum took place—at which the main tendencies in this sphere were defined. But what, practically speaking, has been done about giving the agro-industrial complex priority, he asked and answered himself; Financial and other issues have not been resolved. Meanwhile, people's mood today and their attitude toward the party depends directly on how, specifically, over what time periods, people will be provided with foodstuffs and essential goods.

So far, during the fifth year of perestroyka, we may only establish a worsening of the situation. It is no longer believed that we will produce R66 billion worth of consumer goods this year and that the production of food products will be significantly increased during 1990-1991. [passage omitted]

Our party, posessing the political will, can and must act more decisively. Today, as never before, the cohesion and unity of its ranks and the political and social protection of its bodies are needed. The situation demands specific measures for bringing about order in the country. Not forgoing the values of perestroyka, already won, it is time to evaluate and in the necessary cases curtail the activities of those movements, associations, and fronts which, naming themselves "protectors of the people," are destabilizing the situation. It is necessary, finally, to put a stop to the decrease in state and labor discipline.

According to the plenum participant, the state of party work in the Soviet Army also demands political evaluation. The situation there is unfavorable. In connection with this a mass of critical remarks addressed to Comrades Yazov and Lizichev were expressed.

Specific proposals were submitted on behalf of communists of Kalinin Oblast, in particular that the 28th congress, having called it an emergency one, be held in June of the current year. The communist of the oblast also came out in favor of an All-Russian party conference being convoked before the 28th Congress which should determine and decide the structure of the Russian party body.

[Passage omitted] V.A. Kryuchkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo chairman of the USSR State Security Committee, stressed that all Soviet people are waiting for the political platform for the 28th Party Congress to be put forward for nationwide discussion. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of its consolidating influence on society at the moment of the crisis now being experienced. The main task of the party at the present stage is to consolidate the efforts of all healthy forces of our society to achieve creative aims.

We need perestroyka. The events in the socialist countries we have all witnessed show convincingly once again that we have acted correctly in putting forward the slogan of: "Revolutionary renewal of society."

In effect we have entered a period of political struggle in which many of our opponents stop at nothing. The struggle is being fought on the arena of state-ethnic entities, labor collectives, and among young people and the mass media. We were unprepared for such a struggle.

The ideological face of the various forces recently became clear: from radical left and social-democratic hues to frankly nationalistic, anticommunist, and even monarchistic ones. Many of them are linked by the destructive, antisocialist nature of their activities. Whereas earlier they lined up under the slogans of perestroyka, now, as a rule, they reject the policy of the CPSU and are striving to seize power. They put in motion moral terror, threats of physical retribution against local soviet and party workers and against those who are not in agreement with them. Purposeful discrediting of the party, the organs of power, the Armed Forces, and the law enforcement bodies is being carried out. As a means to acheive their aims they have chosen to whip up nationalistic passions, to inspire mass illegal actions, and to destabilize state power.

The speaker recalled that under the influence of extremists the population of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh was brought into a state of extreme psychosis. Nationalistic intoxication led to human lives being placed on the altar of uncontrollable political ambitions. The fate of their own people and the intersts of the country were consigned to oblivion. After giving a detailed descripton of recent evens in that region, the chairman of the USSR State Security Committee replied to criticism of the state of affairs on the Azerbaijan section of the Soviet-Iranian border. He reported that irrefutable information had been received that it was the leaders of the Peoples Front in Baku who were behind the disorders on the border and said at the present time the State Security Committee is conducting an in-depth study of the state of affairs on the borders of the USSR. It is intended during the course of 1990 to work out a new concept for guarding the border which will take account of the interests of the security of the USSR, and to the greatst possible extent, the interests and needs of the inhabitants of the border zone.

Perestroyka, its ideas, and ways of implementing them are by no means an opportunity of disorder, irresponsibility, and anarchy. Nor are they an opportunity to display extremism, including political extremism. It is clear that one cannot pacify extremists by sermons, which only serve to rouse them. We are all in favor of political methods of resolving problems. [passage omitted]

PRAVDA Publishes 6 February Plenum Speeches

Kryuchkov on Recent Violence, Law

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[Debate speech by V.A. Kryuchkov, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of USSR KGB, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! All Soviet people are waiting for the CPSU Central Committee political platform for the 28th party congress to be submitted for nationwide discussion. The importance of its consolidating effect on society at this time of crisis can hardly be overestimated. The consolidation of the efforts of all healthy forces in our society to achieve creative goals is the party's chief task at the contemporary stage. Thanks to perestroyka, we have seen our society in cross section for the first time, and each of us has been horrified at the low point we have reached in individual areas.

A natural desire has arisen to achieve results as quickly as possible. However, the entire experience of the historical development of mankind as a whole and of our perestroyka in particular indicates that the question of the pace of progress is one of the most complex and delicate aspects of development. Every process, particularly such a profoundly revolutionary one as our perestroyka, has too many components which differ in nature, depth, and scale. We speak of the new thinking, but is new thinking in the form in which we would like to achieve it realizable within short spaces of time? Therefore, should we not make a more thorough assessment of the point of development we are at? And maybe even stop in some respects and, at any rate, better calculate the steps forward.

We need perestroyka. The events in the socialist countries which we are all witnessing convince us once again

that we acted correctly by advancing the slogan of the revolutionary renewal of society.

We have, in practice, entered a period of political struggle in which our many opponents do not disdain to use any means. State-national formations, labor collectives, the youth environment, and the mass media are becoming the arena of struggle. We have proved unprepared for this struggle.

The ideological face of various forces has recently become clearly apparent: from left-radical, social democratic hues to overtly nationalist, anticommunist, and even monarchist ones. Many of them are linked by the destructive, antisocialist nature of their activity. Whereas previously they adjusted themselves to the slogans of perestroyka, they now, as a rule, reject the CPSU's policy and openly seek to seize power. They employ moral terror and threats of physical violence against soviet and party workers and those who disagree with them.

They are purposefully discrediting the party, organs of power, the armed forces, and law-enforcement organs. They have chosen as the means of achieving their ends the fanning of nationalist passions, the inspiring of mass illegal actions, and the destabilization of state power.

The population of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh has been plunged into a state of extreme psychosis under the influence of extremists. Nationalist intoxication has resulted in the sacrifice of human life on the altar of irrepressible political ambition. The fate of our own peoples and the country's interests have been consigned to oblivion. There has been an escalation of armed clashes, hostage taking, killings, and pogroms on both sides of the border between the republics. Militants armed with criminally seized small arms and even armored equipment have accumulated in their thousands.

The problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has begun to recede into the background, highlighting the true aims of the violent overthrow of Soviet power. The blood of innocent victims has already been shed, in some places sooner, in others later. And only as a result of the sending of troops —totally justified in this situation—into Baku, into a number of other rayons of Azerbaijan, and into Gorisskiy Rayon of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic has it been possible to stop the crisis from escalating into a more profound general national [obshchenatsionalnyy] catastrophe and to create conditions for a search for political solutions.

I would like to respond to justified criticism of the KGB for the state of affairs on the Azerbaijani section of the Soviet-Iranian border. For an understanding of the situation it is important to know the truth. Starting 31 December 1989 and prior to sending the troops into Baku, the Azerbaijan People's Front provoked mass disturbances and violations of the Soviet-Iranian border. Crowds of people, frequently as many as 10,000-12,000 strong, headed for individual sections of the border. They began destroying engineering and technical structures and crossing into Iran en masse. They frequently placed women and children at the front. Some would very much have liked to provoke bloody conflicts. An unprecedented situation took shape around Soviet border posts. And yet, these are small subunits, numbering up to 40 or, at best, 50 men. It was possible to defend the structures and prevent border violations only by recourse to arms. It was clear that that would entail great casualties, including among border guards.

In those conditions, the decision was taken to show restraint, not to open fire, to document the facts of the violations, and to normalize the situation on the border as forces were built up and as the situation changed favorably. That proved to be the right decision.

The damage caused as a result of extremist actions was far greater than Comrade V.V. Kozlenkov mentioned in his plenum speech. Some 250 km of electric signaling systems were destroyed, as were 235 km of aerial communication lines and approximately 300 km of cable lines, and 30 watchtowers were burned down. According to preliminary data, the material damage amounts to approximately 7 million rubles.

The situation on the border was normalized 22 January. Since then, more than 2,500 people have been arrested for attempting to violate the border. A group of border guard political workers has been sent to the border and is carrying out a great deal of work with the local population. Irrefutable data have been obtained attesting that People's Front leaders in Baku were behind the disturbances on the border.

The KGB is now conducting an in-depth investigation into the state of affairs on the Soviet Union's borders. During 1990 it is intended to elaborate a new concept of border protection which will take account of the Soviet Union's security interests and, to the maximum degree, the interests and needs of inhabitants of the border zone.

Perestroyka, its ideas, and the means of realizing them are in no way an opportunity for disorder, irresponsibility, and anarchy. This is not an opportunity for displaying extremism, including political extremism. Otherwise perestroyka could turn into a tragedy for our country whose consequences it is difficult to guess in advance. It will take years to rectify the state of affairs.

Since we consider extremism inadmissible, and any form of it presupposes violence, is it not time to express most clearly and decisively our attitude toward violence as a means of achieving political ends and ambitions?

We have recently encountered violence in various parts of our country and in various spheres of public life. It is clear that extremists cannot be pacified with sermons. These only make them more agitated. We all favor political methods of solving problems, including socially acute problems. But if these means prove inadequate, then violence must be stopped by force. It is not a question of a voluntarist approach to the struggle against

violence. Deriving lessons from the past, we must struggle against violence within the framework of the law and the law alone.

Law-enforcement organs fulfill their role here. Frequently, however, their indecisiveness and inability, on the one hand, and the lack of proper legislation, including criminal legislation, on the other, make the work of these organs still unsatisfactory. This is an important and urgent question. Delay can only exacerbate the situation and give rise to new casualties and to economic costs on a serious scale. The limit of what is permissible was passed long ago. Hundreds of thousands of refugees—these unhappy, unfortunate people—have appeared in our country in the eighth decade of Soviet power. And, instead of realizing that it is necessary to stop, we are having to address the fact that passions are threatening to take over new parts of the country.

As a representative of one of the law-enforcement organs, I would like to emphasize the importance of supporting their activity and creating around them a good-natured atmosphere, an atmosphere of trust, because working there are Soviet people for whom even peaceful days have become, and indeed always have been, dangerous combat days.

We need a law which will make it possible to ban the activities of those organizations which embark on the path of extremism or which incite people to it. It is necessary to use the power and the opportunities at its disposal to end the activity of any groupings which transgress the law and introduce into society instability, political, moral, ethical, and national enmity, and elements of violence.

Incidentally, there has been an increase in attacks on state security organs. So for whom are they causing problems?

You can frequently hear this question: Which way are the state security organs looking, and why don't they act? I would like to assure the party's Central Committee that chekists are, in general, oriented toward where it is necessary to look and are not inactive. The law and the truth have become the norm of our life. We have drawn the proper conclusions from the organs' history and do not intend to forget the lessons. We see our shortcomings: We lack decisiveness, we also lack flexibility and the ability to wage an effective struggle by political means. But there is one aspect of the state security organs' activity where chekists have not yet attained the necessary goals. I mean their link with the people. Within the framework of democracy and glasnost we have emerged onto the wide road of establishing and strengthening the link with working people. For us communication with people is a mighty source of new ideas and thoughts, for assessing our practical actions and obtaining essential knowledge and information about the life of the country. Perhaps for the first time in many years we have sensed how important it is to live the people's concerns, interests, and aspirations. It is not possible to find certainty and the optimum solutions to problems within the walls of administrative buildings or in the silence of offices. Only by having daily contact with people is it possible to make our work effective and not instantly find us and them on different sides of the barricades. We have realized this, as we have realized something else—that the renewed party can count on success and ultimately on victory only if it blends with the working people and acts in a single flow with them.

People frequently cite democracy in developed Western countries as a model of freedom. You listen to some speeches and you might get the impression that in this Western paradise there is quiet and plenty, full democracy and freedom, no violence, and that, supposedly, authority does not manifest itself. Some people maintain this while knowing well what the situation is, and so they deliberately distort the state of affairs, or they see one thing but say something else. Others are "talking through their hat." There undoubtedly are democratic values in the West, and many of them are worthy of study. But at the same time democracy in the West is inconceivable without a power which ensures order, including a quite strong, presidential power.

You and I recently learned from a television program the amazing story of how a comrade of ours at once became twice as free by twice flying around the Statue of Liberty. In short, as people say in Russia, it doubled itself.... In this connection, I would like to remark that if he had made another couple of circles, risen just a bit higher, and looked a bit more attentively, he certainly would have noticed how and by what means democracy is shored up in the United States.

To maintain public security within the country, the United States maintains a National Guard consisting of approximately 600,000 men. It has been used repeatedly to suppress mass riots and acts of violence. There have been casualties, and this despite the existence of a strong police apparatus.

There is also violence in another Western country—Britain, which has undoubtedly scaled certain heights in developing democracy. More than 2,500 people have died and more than 20,000 have been injured over the past 20 years in Ulster alone. Tremendous material damage has been done. So order, as you see, comes at a price. Preserve us from this in the Soviet Union! We favor genuine democracy, we favor the Soviet people's peace and tranquillity, we favor public order, we want people to live without fear and all problems, even the most difficult ones, to be solved by political means under conditions of genuine democracy and freedom.

Different opinions have been expressed here with regard to the proposed draft platform. It is possible to agree with many of them. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the proposed draft, although it may not be perfect, represents a felicitous search in our party for ways out of the present situation. It is, in my view, a good, constructive basis which gives communists and all

Soviet people food for thought with regard to the ways for society to develop at this historic moment. On the whole, no opposition force is yet proposing a better platform, aside from rally slogans. But if such proposals do follow, the party certainly would not reject them but would find within itself the courage to express its positive attitude toward them.

And, comrades, one small remark or, more accurately, a rejoinder outside the framework of my speech. I would like to address Comrade K.G. Fesenko, the miner from Donetsk who, like some others, touched on the question of the party apparatus and "party apparatchiks."

I must say that on the whole I have profound respect for his thoughts. I sense in them great concern for the party and its fate. But as regards the party apparatus, I would like to come out against the stream of wholesale disparagement of the party apparatus and, at the same time, of all its staffers—a stream which has swamped society and become fashionable. There are no grounds for this! The overwhemling majority of party apparatus staffers are well-trained, educated, experienced comrades and, most importantly, honest people. They devote themselves entirely and fully to the cause. It is wrong to think that they cling so firmly to their seats that they will in no circumstances give them up to anyone.

This is not how things stand! Many of the so-called "apparatchiks" are ready to leave the apparatus today, and they will settle down far better in life in the material and, maybe, moral respects. Theirs is difficult work, without normal daily routines or days off.

There are both flaws and shortcomings in the work of apparatus staffers. Chief among them is the fact that they still have little contact with people, visit the provinces little, and give little assistance. But how much they could do on this plane! I am far from inclined to defend in principle the apparatus system which has taken shape in our country. I am talking about people, our cadres, our comrades.

Fedorov Looks at Party Platform

PM0802164590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Debate speech by S.N. Fedorov, general director of the "Mikrokhirurgiya Glaza" Intersectoral Scientific and Technical Complex, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Deeply Esteemed Comrades! I am pleased to be attending this plenum. I believe that this is a result of April 1985. When read attentively, the platform arouses a somewhat ambivalent feeling.

First, you get a feeling of delight from the first pages, but gradually, toward the end, some feelings of uncertainty about this platform arise. All this is probably connected with the fact that the platform, it seems to me, wants to unite what cannot be united—old, obsolete principles and the new thinking—and to ensure that both "the wolves are sated and the sheep are whole." This is the feeling, and I think that this is not the position that must be expressed in the final version.

What is "humane, democratic socialism"? That same "united factory," but with a softer regime? No. It is abandonment of forced labor and the switch to man's free labor. What characterizes forced labor? Low productivity, a lowering of the people's intellect, bitterness, poor discipline, and nationalism, i.e., precisely what we have today.

It is natural that the individual's economic freedom is the basis of democracy. Humanism which today comes only from the state's system and not from a system of humane individuals and their ties is impossible. Thus, humane democratic socialism is impossible without the active participation of millions of people possessing full economic, political, and personal freedom.

Freedom does not mean anarchy. Freedom means people's disclosed initiative. At times, particularly in the second part, the platform is imbued with a certain spirit of a forcible centrist method of introducing humane democratic socialism. The party does everything and tackles everything. In the platform, the person as an individual is debarred from participating in this process. He is the passive object of the continuing social experiments of our party's theoreticians and practitioners. For the platform does not even include the person's right to choose his place of residence, and this is a most important human right.

It is not at all clear what proportion of "upholding," "concentrating," and "promoting" is shouldered by the party apparatus and what by ordinary party members. It is not clear what methods the party intends to use to "uphold," "concentrate," and "promote." The party must struggle actively against the administrative-bureaucratic command system which it created.

I believe that in a number of instances the party clearly must recall communists from bureaucratic posts and from those commanding posts which impede our progress today. There is a great number of such structures in our state. Clearly, this lever must also be used in the party's struggle against the bureaucratic government structure to which the party has become tightly knitted over long decades.

All the appeals in the platform turn on the struggle against the Stalinist economic monopoly in which we live, but at the same time the platform makes no mention of Lenin's new economic policy, which existed for quite a long time and worked successfully for several years.

Why do we not return to it but try to think up something half-hearted, vague, and frequently illogical? Lenin did not fear competition with private ownership, and state ownership competed with private. I will say from my own example that I will instantly crush any private ownership on the free market. Collective property owned

by an interested people is a fantastic, unstoppable force. This is the basic mechanism of Marxism—ownership of collective property and division of labor, i.e., the received labor owned by the collective.

Lenin frequently said and repeated that we communists must really become enterprising people and learn to trade. It was Lenin, our chief ideologue, who said this. We must learn to work in the market. So many tasks are set in the platform, and it can be said straightaway that it will be very difficult to fulfill them. It seems to me that in this platform we need, nonetheless, to single out the chief tasks of this minute, of today. These tasks are probably political and economic.

In the platform, it is possible to read the following sentence on page 8, for example: "The strengthening of the material and technical base in the processing and storage of produce and the reduction of losses en route from the field to the counter remains a priority area." Is this really a question for our party? If there are going to be millions of "Sivkov" kolkhozes and thousands of "Veprev" ones in the country, everything will reach the counter without our efforts. What is needed is a market, not a huge number of ministries.

It is natural that the chief questions of our society today are the question of ownership and the question of land, the question of the market, of free trade, and democracy in the party and in society. It is precisely these questions that have not been disclosed very clearly. Sometimes they cannot be clearly understood by our country's citizens who now expect from our plenum clarity on these questions. It is the blurred nature of these few ideas, I believe, that must be eliminated, and they must be defined more exactly.

Let us recall the clarity of the party's ideas in 1917: Land to the peasants, power to the soviets, factories to the workers. Why should we not fulfill those slogans today? They are just as topical, only with a minor difference—ownership must be taken from our administrative-party-bureaucratic team and transferred to the people, to persons, to individuals.

Marx described a monopoly well. All its attributes can be seen in our state. When all public life is in the power of a monopoly, other forces cannot arise, and so such a society is everlasting. Only hunger or the lack of a roof over one's head can destroy this monopoly. Perhaps we should abandon grain purchases from the United States, and then our monopoly, which seeks to be everlasting, will restructure itself into a society of humane individuals possessing all human rights? And this restructuring must consist in the full dismantling of the administrative system and the building of a civilian rule-of-law society with a multiparty system and a mixed economy.

The absence of other parties has led to stagnation in party life, for there is no one with whom to compete or contend. Picture an athlete who all the time runs alone on the track, with no one breathing down his back. It is boring to run, and he can walk, persuading everyone that this walking is a new way of running.

It is boring today in the lower levels of our party too. It has long since lost its attraction for active people. Life for a soldier of the party is like that of a recruit in Tsar Paul's army.

It is also necessary to look at the command personnel of our Central Committee. Can it be restructured in terms of its age and its biological and physiological capacities, accept new ideas, and actively implement them? The average age hovers somewhere around 60. As a physician who has practiced for many years, I can definitely state that this becomes impossible after the age of 45-50. At that age restructuring in the brain is possible for just one or two percent of people. The age of the party's Central Committee and its Politburo must be brought sharply down. This is possible only if communists directly nominate delegates to the 28th congress from below. The platform must define the times for the reforms which our party seeks, for it does not give a single time.

Human life is very finite, and our people who, like me, are over 60 years old want to see the economic and political ideas of October implemented. We must implement all the changes and the reforms enshrined in the platform in five or, at most, 10 years. By wasting time, we lose the right to be the vanguard of the people. It is necessary to clearly define the time for implementing reforms and realizing fine words about freedom of the individual and his rights.

The individual, the person, his needs and aspirations are the single aim of any party. We took the wrong path of strengthening the state. Yes, we made it a superpower by robbing, ruining, and sometimes crushing and killing individuals. But, having made the person weak, we at once became weak ourselves, became a state which all the time loses in its development and from which people flee. Last year—and this year too, it is terrible to read—approximately half a million fine young people want to leave our country for various other countries. We do not have time to debate the matter. This time was wasted long ago. It is necessary to work, Comrades.

Our chief work is to free the people from forced labor and to emancipate the people's economic potential, intellectual wealth, and moral norms. The party has taken on economic, political, and cultural tasks. It is dangerous for society when nonprofessionals tackle everything and do not bear direct and clear-cut responsibility for everything. Comrade Lenin spoke graphically about people's commissariats and people's commissars back in the twenties. I am even ashamed to repeat what he said: It is time for our party to concentrate on the chief goal of the "Communist Manifesto"—to build a society in which the guarantee of each person's freedom is the guarantee of everyone's freedom.

Our revolution occurred under these slogans of freedom. It is our pressing task to realize them even today. I

believe that our platform marks a tremendous step forward in this direction. It requires only certain amplification.

Slyunkov Backs Urgent Market Improvements

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8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4-5

[Debate speech by N.N. Slyunkov, member of Politburo and secretary of CPSU Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Comrades! Allow me to express a number of thoughts on the subject of the draft platform and the development of the economy. The document that has been submitted reflects the rapidly changing situation in society's life and comprises analysis, assessments, conclusions, and propositions which, with due account for the plenum debate, will provide communists and the party with an action program to accelerate the solution of political and socioeconomic tasks.

Many problems have built up in society or arisen in the process of perestroyka. The economy is the central component of perestroyka. The draft platform outlines the present socioeconomic policy approaches and program—the focus on people, ways to overcome their alienation from the means of production, planned organization of a socialist market, and healthy competition. The whole complexity of the economic groundwork which is being created is depicted with its diverse forms of ownership, economic accountability mechanisms, and the interconnected system of centralized economic levers, and taxation, price, and credit policy.

I share and back the proposal put forward by Boris Yevgeniyevich Paton that the platform needs to be complemented with a policy enabling the state to exert direct influence on the solution of strategic tasks of scientific and technical progress, structural policy, and the development of base industries. This is a major problem. In my opinion, the solution is to be sought in two interconnected areas of the economic reform. First, through the erosion of monopolies and the establishment of a sufficiently tough market competition. Second, through state regulation of prices, taxes, and credit rates.

The current technological revolution is stimulated by the economic conditions prevailing in the world market. We have to create such conditions in our country also.

Comrades! When debating the problems of the renewal of the party and the perestroyka of the forms and methods of its work in new conditions, it is impossible to ignore the problems of an economy whose development has been extremely unstable. The implementation of structural changes and the growth of social production and national income have been very slow. It must be openly admitted that a series of hasty decisions have been made and mistakes committed in the process of reforming the economy and during the adoption of important statewide measures. Furthermore, their consequences have not been properly evaluated.

The implementation of the economic reform is not comprehensive and deviations have occurred from the originally agreed stages and deadlines. Necessary economic regulators are lacking in the new economic mechanism and the principle of distribution according to labor is not being implemented consistently. The government is to blame for a weakening of state regulation of key national economic proportions between money supply and output volumes, between the population's money incomes and the availability of goods. The situation has deteriorated especially in the consumer market as regards both food and essential goods over the past two years. Unquestionably, the party Central Committee Socioeconomic Department bears equal responsibility for the situation which has taken shape. I am not saying this for the sake of providing information but for the sake of ensuring the adoption of more resolute and effective measures.

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov did not refer to economic problems in his speech clearly because he assumes that everyone is familiar with the government program to improve the state of the economy.

I will not repeat my critical assessments and proposals expressed in respect of the government program at the CPSU Central Committee December 1989 Plenum. They still stand. I want to say something else in connection with specific statements by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. I do not share his opinion that in the prevailing tense social and political situation it is impossible to implement radical measures in the economy. Difficult, yes, definitely difficult. However, the key to the most important factor of the stabilization of the overall situation in the country and the defusing of social tension in society lies precisely in the economy, in the normalization of the state of affairs in the national economy and above all in the consumer market.

What is happening in our consumer market? As a result of inadequate government regulation over the past four years monetary incomes have outstripped expenditure for the purchase of goods, services, payments, and dues by more than 160 billion ruble [R], while commodity turnover in this period increased by R79 billion. As a result, the population's deposits in bank accounts and cash in people's pockets increased by 50 percent. This money surplus has unsettled the consumer market, sweeping store shelves clean, creating certain social tensions, and even sowing doubt among the people in respect of perestroyka. Of 1,200 groups of goods, 1,150 are subject to shortages. The measures adopted by the government were inadequate and insufficiently effective and prompt.

The mechanism for the formation of economic normatives on the basis of increases in profit has made it possible to create high incomes and reserves without improving efficiency or increasing output. The price

reform was not carried out within the set deadlines, nor was the taxation system brought into play. These measures, as is known, have been postponed in the government program for implementation in 1991.

Great damage was inflicted on the economy and the consumer market by the so-called "new mechanism in construction" introduced in 1986. It is a disruptive, cost-based [zatratnyy) mechanism. As a result of the effect of this mechanism, unfinished projects in the construction industry in terms of state capital investments alone have increased by R60 billion over the past four years. This swallowed up the entire increase in the country's national income. Approximately R20 billion have been paid out in wages. Tremendous material resources are frozen in this way. The definitive solution of this question is dragging on. Unjustifiably and, I believe, without good reason, the adoption of a decision in this key area has been put off and postponed for two years. Even a partial inclusion of the "frozen" means in circulation would have enabled us during the past four years to experience virtually no difficulties in the provision of construction materials for individual construction and in the supply of credits.

Therefore, it is possible to claim that the shortage of construction materials and credits for individual construction in the country is of our own making rather than based on lack, that it has been created as a result of unsatisfactory management and a wrong economic approach.

The point now is this: If we manage to halt the deterioration in the economic situation this year, we will be able to consolidate the political situation, defuse social tension in society, and advance perestroyka. No time must be lost: Analyses and estimates enable us to claim that it is possible to achieve a major improvement in the situation as early as this year and ensure the reappearance of goods on store shelves.

There are three key avenues to solve the problem of the consumer market which require extraordinary measures from the government—resolute and swift measures, I would say.

First, it is necessary to actually add R40 billion to commodity turnover. This is not easy, but it is feasible. So far the planned volume of the consumer goods production is still not backed with the necessary material resources. The possibilities for a redistribution of deliveries to nonmarket outlets and exports should be reviewed and deliveries of essential goods to the internal market increased by approximately R5-6 billion. It is essential, without delay, to supply trade with the required quantity of construction materials to eliminate the strains among the population as regards construction materials.

In general, it is necessary to focus the attention of our entire party and the soviets on the production of goods and to mobilize public opinion.

The second avenue is the strict linkage of incomes with work results. This is not a new problem. During the past year, the increase in the labor remuneration fund totaled nine percent while industrial production growth totaled 1.7 percent. Unfortunately, this negative trend has been continuing in January, when the increase in the wages fund will total around ten percent.

The tax which has been introduced on increases in the wages fund has failed to solve the problem. It is necessary to introduce, as an emergency measure, the regulation of the wages fund within the limits of output growth.

It is necessary also to adopt other urgent measures: To block the channels used to transfer money from the noncash form to cash. This has been mentioned repeatedly from the rostrum. It is necessary to reinforce supervision by financial organs, bring tax inspection into play, and establish order in price formation. We must also realize clearly that directive methods of control have become a thing of the past once and for all. Only economic and financial control is possible now. It is necessary to step up economic control of the economic activities of the country's enterprises and organizations.

The third avenue is the absorption of the mass of money accumulated by the population. Postponed demand now exceeds R165 billion. Unless we find an application for this money, it will not be possible to establish order in the market.

It is necessary to swiftly implement specific measures to bind a considerable proportion of these means through sales of bonds and securities. It is necessary without delay to expand commercial and commission trade. Estimates show that in the course of the year it is possible to mobilize more than R10 billion of cash via commercial trade and also to supply the consumer with up to R10 billions' worth of essential goods.

State insurance is a highly neglected field in our country. Its scope accounts for 26-40 percent. A restructuring of the insurance system and its mechanism will make it possible to mobilize an additional R4-5 billion. This list could be continued.

A whole range of measures, given the necessary effort, could be implemented within the next two months. In this way, the consumer market could be markedly improved within the current year. I am dwelling on the consumer market because this problem has grown from a social problem into a major political one. In conclusion, comrades, I would like to express support for the proposal to boost the rights of the head of state and expand his powers. I back the proposal to bring forward the 28th Party Congress. When due account has been taken of the suggestions and additions put forward, the draft platform can be submitted for discussion by communists and the entire Soviet people.

Shatalin Addresses Plenum

PM0802154690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Debate speech by Academician S.S. Shatalin, acting academician secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics Department, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Comrades! First, I wish to thank the party Central Committee for inviting me to its session in such a difficult period for the country. And of course, like all of you, I am very concerned, because the future of our country, the future of the party and of socialism, concerns me greatly.

I would go further. Without whipping up the situation, I think it is now not only a question of saving socialism, communism, or any other "...ism." It is now literally a question of the need to save our people, our nation. Of course, I am not only talking about the Russians, I myself am a Russian. I am talking about all the peoples of our great country.

I would now like to give a general assessment of the platform. It will be a critical assessment. First, the platform contains too many "Byzantine moves." It seems to me that this document should be capable of absolutely precise interpretation. It should not contain deliberate omissions. Everything should be absolutely precise and clear. It is not like that yet.

Second, the platform does not contain the mechanism for its own implementation. It is static. It is not dynamic.

Third, the platform does not contain any evidence of the real attainability of its declarations. It is written in the language of faith, but it is not the Sermon on the Mount, in which case it would be irrational to ask for proof of its commandments.

Fourth, the platform does not contain precise—I emphasize that word—definitions of its main concepts. Chief among them is the concept of socialism. Yesterday my young colleague Melnikov from Moscow University said that there is a degree of tautology, and I share his view regarding the concept of democratic, human socialism. That is an absurdity. There is only one kind of real socialism—so-ci-alism! But we must define clearly and precisely what socialism is. The platform does not do that at present.

Therefore, Mikhail Sergeyevich, all your appeals, for all my enormous respect for you, and all the appeals of Politburo members and CPSU Central Committee members—to choose the socialist path of development, not to diverge from it, not to depart from it, not to run away, to regard departure from this "socialism" as heresy—all these appeals are incomprehensible to me, as a scientist. Because I have no right to talk in terms of something that is not defined, until we agree on what socialism is. And this is not a question of academic exercises, it is a question of strategy and tactics in our behavior. Until we do this, we will be marking time, slinging mud, stones, and much else at one another, and only harming ourselves and our people.

In a number of places the platform is written very scrappily, plaintively, if I may say so, and often unprofessionally. The platform does not gather together the intellectual potential of all communists, like, for instance, the documents of the All-Union Conference of Party Clubs and Party Organizations that was held in Moscow 20-21 January. That was a conference of communists, and I do not think that everything said there was bad or that it would not be possible to extract much that was constructive from it. I think that at the moment any intellectual contribution by any communist to the formation of the CPSU platform should be regarded as invaluable. And we should do everything to ensure that everything healthy that exists within our movement is reflected in a profound, fundamental platform of the CPSU Central Committee, of the party, for its 28th Congress—and I entirely support the proposals on bringing forward its date. I would not want to joke that our plenum is a February rehearsal for an October congress.

Fifth, the platform has a lot of political aplomb, an attitude of CPSU monopolism. But it does not need that. I personally do not want my role as a communist to be enshrined in any article of the Constitution, I am ready to argue on equal terms with all the republicans, democrats, fascists, socialists, and so forth. And I do not think I will necessarily lose the argument.

Sixth, the platform does not even raise the fundamental problem of the CPSU's attitude to social democracy. It "conceals" the issue of the circumstances of the rift between "social democratic" and "communist" socialism. It does not acknowledge what the "revisionist, reformist, opportunist" wing of social democracy has done in the West, and does not acknowledge that it was not that wing that bred criminals like Stalin and company, Ceausescu, Enver Hoxha... I will not mention the others. It is a waste of precious time.

Seventh, the platform does not mention the fact that social democracy has largely resolved the problems of political democracy, social justice, and economic efficiency on the basis of social protection of the people, a progressive system of taxation, and free enterprise. We should consider this lesson calmly, thoughtfully, and unemotionally. I agree with the call that we have already heard: Let us not make hasty assessments of what has happened in the countries of Eastern Europe. Let us approach all this with greater restraint and wisdom.

Eighth, the platform does not express its attitude to another kind of "socialism"—national socialism, or fascism. It does not acknowledge that great-Russian chauvinists have, to my shame, decided to revive national socialism—which, for me, is equivalent to national chauvinism—on our Russian [Rossiyskaya] soil. I would like

certain people to ponder this and moderate their ambitions, if they are really thinking about the well-being of the Russian people, which I, a Russian scientist and intellectual, very much doubt. I am opposed to the formation of a Communist Party of Russia and opposed to the formation of a Russian [Rossiyskaya] Academy of Sciences. You can call me a reactionary if you like.

Ninth, the platform does not raise constructively the question of regional economic accountability, the economic senselessness of which is obvious even to dilettantes dabbling in economics. Everything is in a state of confusion in our country. The regions want to tackle economics, and meanwhile we are asking "business" to step up its social functions. We want enterprises to raise calves, train sportsmen, ice hockey and basketball players, build creches, and so forth. The only thing we do not want them to do is to produce very efficiently the output for which they were set up.

We have created a kingdom of distorting mirrors, which I also perceive as the bankruptcy of soviet power. The bankruptcy to which we reduced this power by failing to give the soviets real economic and political power. I think our platform—and this is the only correct path—should say more firmly that the CPSU indeed hands over this power to the soviets.

Tenth, the platform asserts that a multiparty system is not a panacea. True. There is no such thing as a panacea. But the platform forgets that a one-party system is not a panacea either—against terror, crimes against one's own people, and the degeneration of society. Let us not forget this.

Eleventh, the platform, contrary to proven truth, asserts that the CPSU as a whole—and I emphasize this firmly—started perestroyka. I believe that this is not in accordance with reality. It was not the CPSU, but the CPSU's progressive forces that started the process of perestroyka. I do not want to talk about the main leader of this perestroyka, although I believe that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has fully earned not only abuse, but also occasional praise from academicians. It is therefore necessary to consolidate the party only on the basis of really democratic principles; only then will it really become a united force that really wants to be the guarantor of perestroyka.

Twelfth, if anyone had asked me what more should be done to discredit the CPSU and state power, as an economist and mathematician I would not have thought of increasing the wages of workers on party organs and other organs of power. Although my speciality is the development of methods and models for choosing optimum solutions. I think this mistake should be rectified.

Thirteenth, the platform does not show the slightest suspicion that by definition, as mathematicians say, it is impossible to invent a party reflecting the interests of the working class and of other strata of the population, that is, the entire people. No such parties exist. Not even Jesus Christ could unite the factions of Protestants, Catholics, and us Orthodox. Not to speak of world religion in general. I do not think we have any great superiority, at least over the Christian religion, when it comes to unification.

Fourteenth, frankly, comrades, I am sick of demagoguery of the kind that unfortunately remains even in our platform: "All power to the soviets, the land to the peasants, the factories to the workers." But I ask you: "What will you give to the intelligentsia?" Well, for the antipopular intelligentsia, obviously, there are the prisons. But what will you give to the people's intelligentsia? Tribal reservations? Or plants, since the platform gives only the factories to the workers?

Well, why are we coming back yet again to slogans that split our party and our society? We should not do this if we really want to unite. And this is not merely unprincipled unification. It is real unification, based on the predominance of the panhuman, panhumanist approach to the new socialist society.

I think our party has now chosen this path. For us to deviate from it would be simply a crime.

Fifteenth, the platform does not even raise this most difficult, fundamental question: Is it possible in principle, within the framework of the existing sociopolitical system, to extract our country from the economic, social, political, and moral crisis? We have no right to evade this question: People will not understand. We must boldly set about discussing it and try to answer this question with real action.

Sixteenth, as someone who has also studied dialectics, I would like to end with Marx' words, which I have quoted. As you remember, he began his famous work "Louis Bonaparte's 18 Brumaire" with these words: "Hegel once said," K. Marx wrote, "that all great world historical events and personalities appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce."

I must say that I long admired the logic of this elegant definition. Especially since for a long time we were given friendly advice not to argue with the classics. Well, now it appears that such friendly advice is no longer given, and it occurred to me: Perhaps Marx was carried away by the elegance of his fundamental dialectical statement, although it is indeed amazingly subtle dialectically. Because unless we tell ourselves the whole truth and call things by their names, there will be no farce, but the tragedy could be repeated.

Let us come to our senses before it is too late. We have one last chance. And not a step backward.

And a moment to reply to something.

Comrades! All my life I have hated praising the bosses. Comrade Brovikov, yesterday you managed to win applause from the auditorium. You know, if I set myself the goal of making everyone here now collapse with

laughter, rapture, humor, and so forth, perhaps I could do it. But you acted incorrectly from every point of view. You even violated the ethics of comradeship, if you will forgive my saying so. How could you accuse Gorbachev, without naming him, by saying, look, it is far easier to travel all over the West, to Paris, Rome, and so forth, than to meet with the people in your own country. Do you not realize that this "foreign" activity is very difficult, exhausting work, that it gives our people hope for the future, that it reduces expenditure on defense, that people in the West have at last begun to see us as people. They have started talking with us, they want to help us. And how could you, again referring to Gorbachev and those who support his line, accuse him of carrying out perestroyka not for our people, but in order to win praise from the West. What right have you to make accusations like that? Is that a comradely way to behave? Especially considering that Gorbachev and the others have given us all the opportunity to mount the platform calmly, not to grovel, but to speak the truth, without wondering, or rather, knowing that they will take you home, rather than taking you away in a "paddy wagon." Think about that, Comrade Brovikov. Others should think about it, too.

Nikitin on Certain New Concepts

PM0802135590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Debate speech by V.V. Nikitin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! The proposed platform is an extremely important document for the immediate future of the Soviet people and the party. It is very difficult in a short time to make a definitive assessment of its particular effects on life, so collective, profound interpretation of the draft's role and consequences is a matter for the future. But there is a need to speak out on certain points. And this need arose from contacts with people awaiting the plenum's decisions. The questions that emerge are not always simple.

First, there is the question of certain new concepts. For instance, our ideal is humane democratic socialism. What is this? The description in the draft is so universal that it would be correct for any modern society, even one whose orientation is nonsocialist. The supreme ultimate goal of the party's activity must be clearer to the present generation of people, who are familiar with various definitions of socialism. And another point, what is to become of communist ideals? I don't think they should vanish without trace.

Later on the new concepts of "labor private," "group," "proportional" [dolevoy], and shared [payevoy] ownership, self-management communities, a self-managing society, full autonomy, and factions with their own internal organization and discipline are introduced. Before the draft is published it would be good to define and assimilate the meaning of these concepts. At the same time I think that not all of them are necessary in a party document.

Second. A number of tenets of the platform are infelicitous, in my view. For instance: "Communists loyal to internationalism equally cherish the interests of all peoples of the country." Apparently there are also "disloyal communists." Or: "Communists can control not the work of the administration as such, but its leaders, as party members." That can be read as saying the leader must necessarily be a party member, but, if not, is there no point in controlling him?

Third. I cannot see why, especially in conditions of democratization of the party, the Russian Bureau should be elected at a Central Committee plenum. Russia's representation on the Central Committee is not regulated, and only some Central Committee members will have an interest in these elections. Surely the people of Russia should have the right to decide themselves? They will probably disagree with this approach.

Since the plenum is discussing the question of the draft platform simultaneously with the problems that have arisen as a result of the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, I have to express my attitude. I was in Lithuania as a member of the group of comrades sent there by decision of the CPSU Central Committee December (1989) Plenum. What conclusions did my meetings with Communists prompt? Yes, there is a lot of extremism there, separatist feeling runs deep. There is a massive propaganda campaign directed toward Lithuania's secession from the USSR. Soviet Lithuania's achievements are belittled, the republic's development is shown in a negative light, and the bourgeois Lithuanian state is idealized. Everything is done to ensure that broad strata of the population do not have objective data regarding the possible consequences stemming from the changes in the republic's socioeconomic development if it secedes from the union.

Everything I have mentioned is thickly mixed up with the people's dissatisfaction with the progress of perestroyka. Honest people who know how to work well want to get rid of the artificial difficulties, disobliging attitudes, inefficiency, and mismanagement. All this (and it has to be admitted that they are right in many respects) is associated with the center's diktat. Whether a large proportion of Lithuanian Communists return to the CPSU platform or other republics follow their lead will depend on our real steps and actions, including what kind of platform is formulated. The draft contains some aspects of the party's policy on questions of developing the agro-industrial complex. It reaffirms a commitment to the development of all forms of economic management, to resolving social questions in the countryside, to continuing to give priority to the agrarian sector of the economy, and to strengthening the material and technical base for the processing and storage of output. All this is really very, very important and has been repeated before. When your stomach is empty it is difficult to

retain equilibrium on any platform. At long last we must find the possibility of realizing the proclaimed policy. People sometimes cannot force themselves to believe lofty decisions because they are often not fulfilled.

For instance, we have long been talking a great deal about developing the industry for the processing of agricultural products. And there is the CPSU Central Committee and government decision on the retooling of the food sectors. But in the last four years targets for the commissioning of capacities have been only partly fulfilled. The ministries of the defense and machine-building complex are failing to keep to the schedule for supplying the most important construction projects with industrial equipment and are lagging behind in the creation and assimilation of new equipment. The Supreme Soviet decisions on building up the volume of deliveries of material resources are no longer being fulfilled either. At the same time we are continuing to speak tirelessly of the priority of food problems. The agro-industrial complex, while forming one-third of national income, receives by no means equivalent amounts of centrally allocated material resources, especially for operational needs. Means of production are actively wearing out and are immobile. This is affecting economic management efficiency. Moreover, the capital-worker and power-worker ratios in the countryside are only a little over half the ratios in industry. The reverse is the case in developed countries that feed themselves.

I am saying this not because someone does not know something, does not understand, or has a different viewpoint. The majority at all levels of management is unanimous so far as this is concerned. There are also appropriate decisions concerning priority to investments in the agro-industrial complex, but they are not fulfilled. Practically always. I think a state cannot be regarded as civilized if even a government resolution democratically approved by the supreme legislative organ of power exists only on paper.

But now Comrade Ivashko has declared that he will not fulfill them and will not provide meat, although he must be aware of the grain balance for the country. In this context the note in the draft that "the positions and prerogatives of the USSR Council of Ministers must be strengthened" cannot be deemed sufficient. The government must have legal means of defending its decisions.

And another topic. Today, six months after the creation of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases, many hasty assessments of its work can already be heard from offices at all sorts of levels. I would remind you that its first official birthplace was this auditorium. And the parents were the majority of people sitting here. I am not a coauthor of this management structure, but I think it is too soon to eliminate it. It is more than the 20th form of management of agriculture in the country over the Soviet period. Objectively it has simply been unable to demonstrate either its advantages or its shortcomings. It will take time to realize what to add to it and what to remove from it. The fact that, in conditions of republics' autonomy, it is unable to impede the development of initiative at local level is good in itself. Yet we tried to do this for so long.

Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the problems of the economic regulation of agricultural production can be overcome from the standpoint of the government commission. Admittedly, always provided that it is possible not to deform the commission under the influence of numerous attempts and not to turn it into an "agro-industrial committee in miniature."

Comrades! My regular meetings with people's deputies of the USSR and the republics and personnel of the agro-industrial complex make it possible to believe that the people want to work far more efficiently and can do so. They are capable of ensuring a high standard of living for themselves. I even think people are prepared to endure the many difficulties of the collapsing market. They realize: The sooner they get through the painful measures to stabilize the market of which Comrade Vorotnikov spoke, the fewer losses there will be thereafter. But they do not want endlessly to stand in lines that are an affront to human dignity, to wander round the stores with their passport or a visitor's card, and to see the social injustice of distribution mechanisms and the amorphousness of attempts to establish discipline and order in life. I think that success can be ensured by the weighty starting factors of the humane and democratic socialism whose platform it is proposed that the country's communists espouse, and they should be reflected in the draft.

Vylegzhanin Urges CPSU Conference in April

PM0902090790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

[Debate speech by V.A. Vylegzhanin, party committee secretary of the Kama heavy truck production association, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Comrades! At the 27th Party Congress, serious lessons were drawn from the analysis of our development in the past 25 years.

The first was called the lesson of truth. The report said: "A responsible analysis of the past clears the way to the future whereas a half-truth, shamefully avoiding the awkward problems, slows down the elaboration of real policy and hinders our forward movement."

With that lesson in mind, I should like to talk about the role of primary party organizations and the opportunity for an ordinary communist to influence the party decisions as they are being taken and share his ideas on what should be done to ensure that the the draft Central Committee platform's words "there must be the most thorough democratization of the party, which must be based on the power of the party masses," do not remain a mere declaration.

Despite the fact that, under the existing rules, primary party organizations are the basis of the party, they are even now assigned the role of mere executors. How does the structure operate? The Central Committee—the obkom [oblast committee]—the gorkom [city committee]—the economic leader. And even the salaries of party workers at enterprises, although paid from party funds, are still fixed as a percentage of the salary of an economic leader, not of a party gorkom or raykom secretary.

How can a primary party organization really influence decisions taken at CPSU Central Committee level now? By discussing a draft, submitting proposals, and that's all. The primary organization does not have its own representative on the Central Committee. CPSU Central Committee members are not assigned to specific party organizations, and there have been no meetings between party leaders and secretaries of major party committees, raykoms or gorkoms, on internal party life questions in the 5 years of perestroyka. Therefore, Mikhail Sergeyevich, we hope that the note to that effect that has been sent will be answered and that such a meeting will take place.

On 1 January 1990, the Kamaz [Kama Truck Plant] party organization had 11,725 party members and candidate members. In 1989, 268 communists were deleted from the party register. Among those who resigned there were party members of long standing, very intelligent people who were sincerely devoted to the party. Why did they hand in their party cards?

There are two main reasons. The first is dissatisfaction with the course of perestroyka. The second reason is expressed in a statement, part of which I am going to read out now. It comes from a statement to the CPSU Central Committee from someone who has been a CPSU member since 1963: "I would ask you to accept my resignation from the CPSU as of November 1989 because I disagree with certain points in the CPSU Program and with the CPSU's practical activity in the past and now. In view of the ordinary commuist's lack of opportunity to influence the solution of problems under the existing internal party 'democracy,' I consider it inexpedient to remain within the CPSU's ranks."

This is an abnormal phenomenon for the party. It also indicates that the party is experiencing a profound crisis and that radical actions are needed from all communists, not just leading organs of the CPSU, to overcome the crisis. In 1989 a party discussion began in the Kamaz party organizations on the party's role and place in society and the development of internal party democracy. The aim of the discussion was to elaborate the Kamaz communists' platform for the 28th Party Congress and the draft CPSU Statutes.

Now the drafts of those documents have been elaborated and will be discussed among primary party organizations together with the CPSU Central Committee draft platform.

What was our conclusion? We do not consider the Great October Socialist Revolution a mistake. The ideals proclaimed by the revolution meet the interests of the working man and retain their appeal today. We think that it is necessary not to reject Marxism-Leninism, but to elaborate a system of views and ideas for the development of society based on the rejection of the dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.

The Kamaz party organization believes that the immediate prospect for the development of society is democratic socialism. On questions of principle the Kamaz communists' draft platform coincides with the CPSU Central Committee draft platform.

I would like the Central Committee to more clearly express its position on the section "Democracy and political pluralism" and its attitude to the leading organs of the Russian party organizations.

Comrades! The Kamaz communists have sent a message to the Party Central Committee in which they say that only a renewed party is capable of bringing the country out of crisis. It is proposed that the Central Committee Plenum adopt a decision to hold the 20th All-Union Party Conference in April 1990 to examine progress in the discussion of the drafts of the party platform and rules. After the 28th Party Congress, there should be an exchange of party cards and the report and election campaign should be conducted on a renewed ideological-organizational basis. Even though the date of the congress will clearly be brought forward, an all-union party conference at the end of April is needed. Recall how we prepared for the 19th Party Conference. So many proposals and wishes were expressed! Some of the proposals became part of the conference resolution, some were consigned to oblivion, and communists never found out why.

During the discussion of the Central Committee draft platform different tendencies and opinions will inevitably surface. It is necessary to generalize them and highlight the questions on which principled differences may occur at the congress. The 20th Party Conference should examine all that very thoroughly and then hold a final discussion among primary organizations before the congress. Conference delegates must also be congress delegates, so that the same people will examine all the questions in detail and adopt the definitive decision at the 28th Party Congress on the basis of communists' opinion.

Comrades! In addition to the draft platform under discussion today, there are questions which worry ordinary communists very much, and I should like plenum members to express their attitude to them.

The first question is that of party subscriptions. We propose setting the maximum contribution not at 3 percent but at 1 percent of a person's wage or as a fixed sum, for example, from 5-10 rubles [R] for workers and R1 for nonworking communists, students, and pensioners [period not stated].

Then there is the question of party veterans. This is a moral question. Today enterprises have passes to sanatoriums and rest homes belonging to the CPSU Central Committee. It is surely right that such a facility exists. But why hasn't the next step been taken? Do communist veterans not deserve a few months' free vacation a year in a rest home? And is it not better to place a few rest homes at the permanent disposal of party veterans and redesignate them as residential homes? That is both right and humane. Our party budget and the number of homes and sanatoriums should have been fully discussed long ago so as to dispel the various rumors.

In conclusion, I should like to say the following: There are already several parties actually in existence within the party now. The ideological foundation has been eroded. The draft platform has now been elaborated. And no matter how hard it is for those who disagree with the platform's principled provisions after it has been adopted at the congress, the party must resolutely take a stand.

It was rightly said at a session of the Ideological Commission: "...even in the Year of the Horse you cannot ride two or three mounts at the same time."

One final point—the Central Committee plenum must adopt a separate resolution "On the current moment in the party." Events in Tyumen and Volgograd and the democratic platform and [its] publication in PRAVDA must be assessed.

Belyayev on 'Perestroyka's New Thinking'

PM0802161590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Debate speech by A.A. Belyayev, member of the CPSU Central Auditing Committee and chief editor of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] I listened with great interest and attention to the anxious and sincere speech made by Comrade Brovikov, our ambassador to Poland. I share his opinion that democracy cannot exist without discipline, without strict observance of laws, or without the selfless work of law enforcement organs making sure that our people feel safe in their homes and on the streets. All this is absolutely true. But it seems to me that, in one place in his speech, he stressed the wrong things. For 70 years, Western bourgeois propaganda has dinned into the consciousness of its countries' people's masses a blind hatred of October, of socialism, and of Soviet people, and has done so successfully. The Soviet Union was a symbol of evil, aggression, and inhumanity.

It is perestroyka's new thinking and the principle of people's diplomacy and open contacts that have made it possible to destroy all these preconceptions among the people's masses in Western countries over a period of only five years. I repeat, among the peoples of Western countries, not their rulers.

We have managed to avoid slipping toward a horrible thermonuclear nightmare and to halt the destructive arms race. I think that this is a great credit to perestroyka and to our foreign policy. It is another thing that we are still only making poor use of the favorable possibilities that are opening up for developing mutually beneficial trade, creating joint enterprises, and improving the lives of our people. That is a fact. Practical workers, the relevant ministers, and indeed the Council of Ministers as a whole should take responsibility for this.

I believe that we should continue to develop amicable relations with the world. Here I fully share the draft platform's stance on resolutely rejecting ideological tunnel vision, dogmatism, and intolerance of other views.

Second. Worried and alarmed voices have often been heard from this rostrum speaking about the people's loss of trust in the party and about the severe crisis in our party.

Yes, the situation in our society has become acute in the extreme. It is not by chance that Zbigniew Brzezinski, the well-known anti-Soviet Sovietologist, is already shouting from the rooftops about the collapse of socialism. But to my mind the party has not lost the people's trust. Do the elections that we held to the USSR Supreme Soviet not tell us anything? Over 80 percent of the deputies are communists. Surely the elections being held now, in which there are also over 80 percent communist candidates, testify that the people are seeking worthy candidates among party members?

What is discrediting the party, dealing it heavy blows, and almost knocking it down? In my opinion, it is the self-interested behavior of individual party and soviet dignitaries, who first load up their "Volga" with sausage and crates of liquor, as in Chernigov, and then go to Japan on tourist trips in place of working people and bring back a couple of second-hand Toyotas each, while others do not even have to go anywhere but can quietly buy a Mercedes while sitting at home - at quite reasonable prices, so they say. Not to mention scandals in other places.

The article "Aliyevism" that appeared in PRAVDA the day before yesterday. It shocked everyone. These are the type of people who undermine faith in the party, and that is why it should be written into the program that the plenum believes that this ostentatious behavior on the part of party leaders, the rudeness and bad manners toward comrades, and the use of official positions for self-interested, personal ends are incompatible with CPSU membership.

Today you and I have to say clearly to the people in the words of Lenin: The party will be ruthless with scoundrels who hold party membership cards, regardless of the post they hold. The press must play a very important role in this. Glasnost, real and irreversible glasnost, must prevent self-interested infringements by such people.

Third. We are returning to Lenin's concept of socialism. Lenin himself is now being subjected to concentrated attacks. Alas, not in the foreign press, but in our own. In some articles he is portrayed as a tyrant, and it is said that Lenin initiated the terror and that he created concentration camps. In other words, he is not the leader [vozhd] of the working people but some kind of a demon from hell.

Condemnations in books by Solzhenitsyn and Grossman help strengthen such views, while our current affairs writers, historians, and literary people seem to have fallen silent. It was only very recently that articles appeared for the first time in RODINA and PRAVDA that made a serious critical analysis of Solzhenitsyn's views on October and on Lenin, as well as an analysis of V. Soloukhin's essay "Reading Lenin."

We read serious articles in certain periodicals about the evil role of October and Lenin himself in the subsequent misfortunes of the Fatherland. It is said that Stalin merely continued Lenin's work as regards the terror. A detailed and critical discussion of this took place recently at the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Commission in connection with preparations for the 120th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilich. We have an obligation to update the ideological backup for the new phase of perestroyka and, freeing ourselves from Stalinist dogmas, to skillfully defend Lenin and Leninism.

And last. It seems to me that the proposals on the rapid creation of an independent Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party have not been properly thought out. Yes, Russia must indisputably receive far greater attention as regards its development. It must have its sovereignty and its own state and other administrative institutions. But I cannot imagine a CPSU without Russian Communists, because Russia is the backbone of our country and our multinational state.

Gumbaridze on 'Holding Ground'

PM0802180190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Debate speech by G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 6 February]

[Text] Comrades! The dynamic processes in our society and the struggle to preserve the party's leading role and authority by democratic means make this Central Committee plenum crucial. The credit of trust, largely exhausted by decades of discrepancies between word and deed, now needs a preferential boost, the implementation of fundamentally new, bold political ideas, consistency and strong will, and the democratization and liberation of social consciousness. This was reflected in M.S. Gorbachev's speech.

Will the renewed party live up to public expectations? The full answer to this question will be given by the 28th CPSU Congress. However, these problems are now squarely confronting the Georgian Communist Party, and they come down to one main question: How can we hold our ground in the leading positions of restructuring in the extremely contradictory social atmosphere?

The broad quest in this direction determines the nature of the discussions unfolding in city, rayon, and primary party organizations. The recent Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum, which essentially summed up the results of the Central Committee's political activity in an extremely complex, tense period for the republic—overcoming the upheavals and profound crisis phenomena of last year—served as an accurate barometer of public attitudes.

Work in the conditions of real pluralism has demanded great restraint, equanimity, and tact and a search for new forms of political self-expression. In the course of improving these forms, the dialogue with various sociopolitical movements has become a two-way affair and increasingly constructive, the level of political sophistication has been mutually enhanced, and experience has been accumulated. In reality, however, as is now obvious, it has proved to be the first experience of working within the framework of what is essentially a multiparty system. By virtue of the objective progression of life, a number of sociopolitical trends have in fact assumed the form of parties with a broad range of positions, including some which, from our point of view, are unacceptable. However, not only does this not exclude dialogue, it actually presupposes a deepening of dialogue in order to avoid confrontation and its dramatic consequences. What has been said at the plenum particularly underlines the need for a creative approach to life's problems and phenomena, which is an indispensable attribute of democratization.

It has been frankly pointed out, for example, that the inclusion of Article 6 in the USSR Constitution adds nothing to the party as a whole or to individual communists. It is a point of honor for the party to be the one to take the initiative in revising this article and to win its vanguard role in our society as a result of real action rather than on the basis of a formally enshrined right.

The plenum discussed and approved the concept of national development worked out with the participation of the broad public: a comprehensive program to develop the national culture and economy, resolve the problems of ecology, democratization, and so forth. The essence of the concept is to achieve these objectives not by encroaching on the interests of other peoples living in multiethnic Georgia but, on the contrary, by traditionally respecting their distinctive national features and broadening the possibilities for developing their spiritual self-expression.

At the same time, the plenum unanimously condemned displays of nationalism and separatism, which are demaging to restructuring and the people's fundamental

interests. It supported a policy of resolutely purging the Communist Party of corrupt elements that have attached themselves to it.

The adopted concept forms the basis of the Georgian Communist Party's election platform. It makes it possible for all party organizations to play a full and confident role in what is a very difficult election campaign.

In view of the immediacy of these urgent problems, the plenum took the decision to move the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress forward to April and to use that congress to deeply probe and discuss the questions of ensuring the Georgian Communist Party's independence, its legal, political, social, and constitutional status, and its role in resolving the economic and social problems connected with implementing national policy and improving interethnic relations.

Reading the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the congress, we are again convinced that these problems are topical for the whole of our party. The CPSU's authority in the future and the pace of further renewal of our society and our party are linked to the solution of these problems.

The platform's proposed qualitative organizational and structural changes in leading party bodies, which undoubtedly reflect the desire to deepen the democratic process in the party, and also the principles of consolidation advanced in the document, which will take this consolidation to the level of cooperation with all mankind, are evidence of determination and political innovation.

It must be pointed out that the new foreign policy thinking of the Soviet leadership confirms its commitment to the principles of humane, democratic socialism proclaimed by the platform, as distinct from the barracks type of socialism. However, similar consistency is vitally essential in internal matters, internal party processes included. The time when democratization could be made to fit a pre-written scenario has gone forever.

The processes have gained an objective momentum and now require constant analysis and interpretation, political forecasting, and acumen. The assessments sometimes given are far from being incontestable.

I cannot agree, for example, that the broad interest in the democratization of party life, which sometimes takes the form of rallies or protest actions, can be unequivocally interpreted as a sign that the party has weakened. This is an extremely one-sided attitude to take.

It is far more important to see that this heightened, interested attention means that society regards the party as a real political and consolidating force. Essentially, restructuring itself has helped to involve broad social forces in the process of the party's renewal by at last overcoming universal social indifference and civic passivity.

If, as declared in the platform, we cast off our claims to infallibility and a political monopoly, we are also going to have to totally eradicate the inveterate complex of regarding the party hierarchy as a ruling organism towering over society and beyond its control. For many years, we have willingly and often discussed party bodies' responsibility but have in fact reduced all this simply to fulfilling their rights, strictly speaking subordinating all organizational and political work to this aim.

This kind of inertia is a great impediment to the party's renewal. It is not easy to part with political comfort—or personal comfort either, for that matter. But a natural acceptance of democratic thinking and a democratic structure to life must become the personal credo of every Communist leader. Otherwise, it would probably be better to cede our place to other people who can think in the new way.

The country's social life has now really been given new substance. This process takes different forms but is universal. New forces and movements have confidently moved into the forefront of social processes. Political pluralism and a multiparty system are loudly making their presence felt as realities and demand clearer reflection in the party platform.

However, in our view, some formulas defining the framework of national self-expression and self-determination in the party sphere take inadequate account of this factor. Practice shows that the union republic communist parties' detachment from the national movements which are playing a very appreciable role among the new sociopolitical forces could lead to party organizations' becoming isolated and losing the political initiative. The refusal—enshrined in the platform—to place class interests in opposition to national and common human values must also signify a refusal to place class interests in opposition to national interests.

As is well known, we do not deny the differences in peoples' historical pasts, in the levels of development of their production forces, economy, and culture, in their historical traditions and scale of use of their national languages, or in their experience of statehood. Especially when it goes back tens of centuries. The rejection of standardized approaches is reflected in the document submitted to the plenum. However, it is no less important to ensure that these principles are soberly considered when drafting the relevant legislative acts.

In order to really abandon the Stalinist unitary model for our state structure, really give freedom to national-state formations as declared in the platform, and chose the form of structure of our life, we must give communists the possibility of a broad, creative choice and not impose an unnecessary regulating framework on the republic communist parties. The most logical approach would be

to work on the basis that the degree of their independence is to be determined by the real conditions in which they can retain their political authority and consolidating functions.

We must cultivate in ourselves a respectful attitude to our party colleagues and comrades, develop political tolerance, and learn to cogently argue our case. Mutual trust is also a factor in the democratization of internal party relations. No one should doubt that the stand taken by each of us reflects the objective balance of communists' opinions and interests and that this stand is dictated first and foremost by the desire to deepen democratization, work for further renewal, and find the most acceptable, effective forms and methods of consolidating social forces and peoples on the platform of restructuring.

The harmonization of interethnic relations demands that, when developing the fundamental principles of these relations and drafting specific legislative acts, consistency is strictly observed in the delegation of rights from the center to a union republic and from a union republic to an autonomous formation. This is the essence of real sovereignty for a republic.

In conclusion, there is one more thing I would like to say, which I feel it is my duty to highlight in particular. In addition to Georgians, Abkhazians, Russians, Osetians, Greeks, Kurds, Jews, and representatives of other peoples, around half a million Armenians and more than 300,000 Azerbaijanis are living in Georgia. The events in the Transcaucasus, in fraternal republics, wound us too and cause us great pain. They are our common, vitally important problems, and resolving them will require our cooperation, comradely discussion, and efforts to find solutions to these complex problems in the interests of ensuring national accord and peace in our region. We have so far made relatively timid, ultimately unsuccessful attempts in this direction.

Despite this, I feel that there are considerable reserves that we, the leaders of the three Transcaucasian republic communist parties, could use on the basis of our centuries-old experience of communication. I am sure that my friends and colleagues, Ayaz Niyazovich Mutalibov and Suren Gurgenovich Arutyunyan, fully support this approach. It is now, at this difficult, crucial time for restructuring, that we must protect the sacred achievements bestowed on us by our ancient and modern history, traditions of human warmth and goodness and the desire for peace, understanding, and respect between all our peoples.

Arutyunyan Warns Against Oversimplification

PM0802131390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Debate speech by S.G. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! I want to support on the whole the criticisms of the draft platform voiced here at the Central Committee Plenum.

At the same time I believe that both the draft platform and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's report outline the principled approaches to the renewal of our party and the deepening of the processes of perestroyka.

Today's bitter reality is such that more and more people are beginning to see the party which initiated perestroyka as a conservative force. Furthermore, the very concept of "perestroyka" has gradually become alienated from the party.

If it is true that the situation in the country should not be dramatized unduly, it is also true it that should not be oversimplified, either. In our region, as you know, the situation is not simply dramatic. It has passed the critical point. And the concern and anxiety which have been expressed at the Central Committee Plenum are perfectly understandable.

We in our republic evaluate the situation soberly and realize how complex and explosive the atmosphere is. We see the mistakes and omissions made in the region. We will do everything to ease the tension and establish peace and interethnic accord. But for that it is necessary to draw lessons from the tragic development of events, to evaluate impartially the true reasons and motives which led to the crisis, and to understand why the efforts aimed at normalizing the situation proved ineffective.

It is obvious that in our region the contradictions of today's restructuring processes are more painful. People's heightened social expectations clashed with unrefined mechanisms for society's democratic management. Furthermore, the inertia of the old thinking proved so powerful that the expression of will by the Armenian population of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], an expression brought into being by perestroyka, was perceived as encroachment by the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] on the neighboring republic's territory. I want to emphasize once again that the NKAO question is not a territorial dispute. It was raised not by Armenia but by the Nagorno-Karabakh population itself, and what it boils down to is the self-determination of the people.

Unfortunately, the search for political solutions to the problem began to be outstripped by other processes. The mass pogroms against Armenians in Sumgait turned the question of mutual relations between the autonomous unit and the union republic into an interethnic conflict. The economic blockade of Armenia turned the interethnic conflict into an interrepublic one.

I think that the fact that we did not notice how deep a wound Sumgait had inflicted on the course of perestroyka was a grave mistake. A prompt political evaluation of the crime in Sumgait was important not just for the Armenian people or the Azerbaijani people themselves. All our society needed that evaluation.

A consequence of the Sumgait syndrome is that an unprecedented phenomenon has entered our lives—peacetime refugees. More than 300,000 Armenians have been forced to leave Azerbaijan and 157,000 Azerbaijanis have had to leave Armenia. Our duty is to alleviate their plight in every way and not place on them the responsibility for the social cataclysms.

To equate the events in Armenia with those in Azerbaijan, as some mass media organs are doing, is to mislead public opinion. For all that the processes occurring in the two neighboring republics are indeed interconnected, it must be seen that they are substantially different.

No conflicts with neighbors can be used to explain or justify what happened in Baku, Nakhichevan, Lenkoran, and other places—the pogroms and killings, the seizure of party rayon and city committees and Soviets, and the destruction of the USSR State Border for hundreds of kilometers. All this showed graphically that the fueling of passions over Nagorno-Karabakh was just a smokescreen for certain forces pursuing a far-reaching aim—the overthrow of the lawful authority.

What happened is impossible for normal human consciousness to encompass, and it convulsed our republic. Thousands more refugees appeared—a third wave. The situation was complicated in the border regions and the blockade of Armenia was intensified, exhausting its resources of energy, raw materials, semi-finished materials, and food in the depth of winter. Life was paralyzed everywhere, including the earthquake zone.

The atmosphere, to be blunt, reached fever pitch. The republic party organization had to make literally desperate efforts to prevent an eruption of emotions and stop the situation getting out of control.

Understand us, comrades, the blockade has meant that for many months now the republic has been virtually in a state of siege. All supply programs, both into and out of the republic, have been wrecked, as has the program for restoring the disaster zone. This engenders a lack of faith in decisions taken at union level, stimulates hostility toward the center, and seriously complicates our work.

When the people are in a state of shock not everything can be kept under control. On 15 January, when the Baku pogroms and the attacks on Armenian population centers were into their third day, when the State Border a few dozen kilometers from Yerevan was virtually unprotected, and when large armed detachments had built up in regions adjoining the republic, the law enforcement organs were unable to prevent the seizure of weapons.

We in no way excuse these unlawful actions. Armenian SSR prosecutor's office organs have instituted 104 criminal cases for theft of weapons. But it is necessary to see the whole truth. This was rather a natural self-defense reaction born of the people's bitter historical experience and dictated by present-day realities. Once people sensed the army's protection they began actively supporting the military's actions and voluntarily began to surrender the weapons that they had seized.

We evaluate the state of affairs self-critically, we do not seek to shirk responsibility. It is not up to us to evaluate the work that has been done, but in these very difficult conditions it was possible to direct the work of all links of the republic's party and state structures toward restoring people's faith in the future, to prevent chaos and disorganization, to avert strikes, and to ensure the population's vital services with the help of the soviet organs.

The people's collective reason, wisdom, and restraint proved more reliable and durable than short-term emotions and outbursts.

We do not identify the extremists with the Azerbaijani people, and we support dialogue between the republics and the search for a mutually acceptable solution to the crisis. It is clear to everyone that the road to interethnic accord will be hard and long. But we are ready to go our part of the way. A basis for talks must be created at all levels of leadership, enlisting the sensible forces of both republics in the discussion of questions and utilizing the potential of people's diplomacy, too. In the prevailing situation the real way to prevent further confrontation is to temporarily place Nagorno-Karabakh under the jurisdiction of the center. I believe that the whole range of problems connected with the situation in the region, including the question of the autonomous oblast, must be the subject of special examination at the forthcoming USSR Supreme Soviet session.

Comrades! I want to support the opinion expressed here on the need to bring forward the date of the 28th CPSU Congress. This is demanded by the situation created in the party and the country.

The provision that republic communist parties should have the opportunity to elaborate their own program documents and the right to participate directly in the solution of the most important questions of the whole party's life is in principle correct. Events in recent years in a number of regions have shown that it is precisely because the republic communist parties avoided raising and resolving many questions troubling the people, which are often an expression of the distinctiveness of the republics, that the communist parties' authority declined and their political influence on the course of events weakened.

The republic communist parties' programs will also help the CPSU Central Committee to understand in greater depth the specifics of the problems being resolved locally and to avoid a standardized approach to the evaluation of the union republic communist parties' activity.

It is highly important that the draft platform confirm the party's adherence to the Leninist principle of nations' right to self-determination. The lessons of past years prove that only the consistent implementation of that

principle will make it possible to resolve the complex problems of interethnic relations.

The draft platform notes that the CPSU will struggle to preserve its position as the ruling party and win the people's mandate to form the organs of power at all levels. It is thereby acknowledged that in our society other political structures have already been formed capable of challenging the CPSU's monopoly position in society. I think that it is necessary to say this openly, to enshrine the fact that a multiparty system has begun to form in the country, and to provide the CPSU with an opportunity to enter into a bloc with the most progressive of those organizations for the sake of achieving common goals.

I believe it would be right if the party itself put forward an initiative to revise Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. Let us be frank: Its retention in its present form does not aid the CPSU's standing.

We need a strong democratic authority capable of helping society out of the crisis and ensuring its dynamic development. World experience attests that the democratic structures of social management work effectively when combined in the best way with a form of presidential rule. And it seems to me that the country needs a president endowed with broad powers.

Niyetullayev Raises Plight of Aral Area

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[Debate speech by S.D. Niyetullayev, first secretary of Kara-Kalpak Uzbek Communist Party Obkom, at CPSU Central Committee plenum 6 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! This CPSU Central Committee plenum is taking place at a very complex and crucial time for our party when the failure to resolve many socioeconomic and interethnic problems has effectively brought about a crisis situation in the country's sociopolitical life. The situation in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic republics is arousing increasing concern among Kara-Kalpak Communists and working people. The explosion of ethnic enmity, cases of brutal violence and vandalism, flouting of Soviet laws in individual regions, and disturbances on the state border have all clearly revealed a whole set of processes that present a danger to the fate of the country and socialism and illustrate that the enemies of perestroyka are endeavoring to transform democracy into total license—sometimes not without success. More resolute and effective measures are needed from the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the country's government to normalize the situation.

Why am I talking about this? Because not everyone has a correct understanding of the true meaning of democracy and some people want to turn democracy—people's power—into the power of the mob and anarchy. I believe that the reason for these manifestations is the fact that we have been unable, we have not managed to transform fear of the law, which is characteristic of the administrative-edict system, into a respectful attitude to legal norms in the life of society.

Indeed, how many manifestations of nationalism, public demonstrations with antisocialist slogans, and unauthorized rallies there have been. However, in a number of regions of the country they were not properly rebuffed and this reinforced the feeling of total license. In these conditions, the proper atmosphere of public condemnation of those who impede perestroyka was, unfortunately, not created. We advocate glasnost but we cannot agree to one-sided glasnost whereby the mass media relish providing closeup coverage of cases of desecration of the USSR State Flag and portraits of Vladimir Ilich Lenin without even attempting to express their own attitude to this. All this, along with miscalculations in our propaganda, ideological, and organizational work, has resulted in the worsening of the sociopolitical situation.

I am convinced that if we are unable to seize back the historical initiative, the crisis within the party will become irreversible. People expect decisions from our plenum today and expect a CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress.

It is necessary to ensure that its provisions are not theoretical abstractions but take existing realities into consideration, accord with the demands of life, and clearly reveal the CPSU Central Committee's stance on the most burning issues of the renewal of the party and society. Does the draft accord with these requirements? I must say that not all of its sections do. That is why I would like to express some ideas on the questions under consideration.

First, on behalf of the communists of the Kara-Kalpak oblast party organization we state that we firmly stand by the unity of the party, which now acts as a highly important factor for consolidating society and preserving the union state.

Today these concepts are being imbued with new substance. It is clear that we need a renewed federation of republics where national interests are taken into consideration without fail and respect for identity and recognition of every nation's equality are ensured. Let us see how profoundly this substance is revealed in Section 5 of the draft platform. On the one hand, it underlines as a key principle in questions of the development of nations and interethnic relations the principle of preserving the country's integrity as a federation of free and equal peoples.

On the other, the transformation of the Soviet federation must be oriented toward establishing the optimum links between the union republics and the union as their common formation. Where is the equality here and where then is the new level of independence for all types of national autonomous formation, the strengthening of

sovereignty, and the broadening of the rights of autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs, as written in the draft platform? Who is meant by small people with the right to fully fledged autonomy? What is fully fledged autonomy? These are by no means rhetorical questions and we must seek answers to them together, all together, so to speak.

For my part, I propose recording in the draft platform that autonomous republics as Soviet socialist states—as enshrined in their constitutions—are subjects of the federation and participate in elaborating a new treaty on the USSR on an equal footing with union republics.

In order to ensure that the party retains perestroyka's vanguard positions, it is necessary, as the report said, to adopt a new statute and, in the future, a party program consonant with our current ideas of the CPSU's place and role in society and according with the real state of affairs. Clearly only our common program aims will ensure our party's unity.

At the same time every union republic communist party and autonomous formation party organization must build its policy in the light of specific socioeconomic and national-cultural traditions in order to achieve these goals.

The mechanism that is being created to defend autonomous formations' political and economic interests, and also the regulation of the general principles for leadership of the social and economic sphere also require that the status of party organizations and autonomous formations' committees be defined.

In our view, the CPSU Central Committee platform must also reflect questions of broadening the rights and independence of autonomous republics' party committees in resolving local questions. It is necessary to define a quota and give them the right to delegate their representatives directly to union republic communist party central committees.

The deformation of the fundamental principle of intraparty life—democratic centralism—prompts serious thought today. In many respects it has effectively become the principle of bureaucratic centralism not only in the party—it is also penetrating all other spheres of state life.

The Aral tragedy is a clear example of such centralism and such decisions. In virtually a single generation's lifetime only one-third of the former volume of water is left in the sea. Approximately 3 million hectares of seabed, from which hundreds of millions of tonnes of sand and salt are carried away by the wind every year, have been revealed. Owing to the continuing discharge into the Amu-Darya of used collector and drainage water, the quality of the river water has deteriorated greatly. Today it is only fit for industrial purposes. The population of the Aral area is forced to drink this water. The fertility of the land is declining and the situation is virtually beyond man's control.

I mention this because improving the environmental situation in the Aral area is above all a guarantee of political stability in the region. The people took heart after the well known CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution on radically improving the environmental situation in the republics of the Aral area, but in the course of its implementation doubts began to creep into people's minds as to the force of the governmental document and its scientific validity in view of long-term forecasts. This is by no means an easy question for the zone of irrigated crop farming in Uzbekistan, including the Kara-Kalpak ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic].

The administrative-edict system of economic management resulted in the people of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR effectively losing their prevailing way of life and traditional occupations, in the loss of fishing and navigation, and in the decline of fur production. The natural feed base for livestock raising sharply deteriorated and declined. The system was deaf to requests for aid from the region's inhabitants. Only perestroyka has lifted the veil of silence.

In the last 20 years infant mortality has doubled in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR. Last year 51 children died out of every 1,000 births, more than twice the rate throughout the country. Two-thirds of the adult and child population were found to have serious health problems. In the last year alone the incidence of viral hepatitis rose by 2.3 times. More than 80 percent of women of childbearing age are anemic.

In effect the question of the very existence of the approximately 4 million inhabitants of the Aral area has arisen in the region. We realize that cotton is an important and necessary product for the country, that more of it must be produced, and that volumes of food output must be increased to feed the people, but the Aral also needs to be saved. Saving the Aral Sea is not only a regional, but also a general human problem. It would be advisable for the platform to reflect the environmental situation in the country, which worries everyone today.

When pondering the platform, each participant in the plenum, as it were, measures it against the problems of his republic, oblast, and kray, which are close to his heart. If there is no answer to worrying questions, it means that something still remains to be done. Any other approach is futile. I am referring to our national-territorial formations' different sociopolitical development levels, against the background of which the fact that socioeconomic problems remain unsolved is acutely felt.

Under these conditions we have no doubts today as to the validity of formulating the question of economic regions' starting position when switching to economic accountability and self-financing.

I believe that it would be opportune for the platform to reflect the starting positions of the union republics and autonomous formations. Judge for yourselves, in the

Kara-Kalpak ASSR per capita industrial production is approximately six times lower than the average union indicator and half the average republic indicators. One-fifth of the able-bodied population is not engaged in socially useful labor. This illustrates how substantial the differences between the level of socioeconomic development in republics and regions are.

That is why the CPSU Central Committee platform must obviously reflect the need to even them out and also reveal a mechanism for doing this.

Anufriyev: Kazakhstan Gets Chance To Speak

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[Debate speech by V. G. Anufriyev, second secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Finally Kazakhstan has democratically gotten the floor. Considering that five representatives of the Ukraine, and even two representatives of Russia's Supreme Soviet (both the chairman and his deputy) have spoken, I request an extra two minutes as compensation for the likely fact that I shall be the first and the last to speak for Kazakhstan.

Comrades! The present plenum is discussing a question of the kind of importance that has surely not been discussed in recent decades. And yet the preparation for this was conducted in great haste. I have to say bluntly that I would call the draft which was handed out to us the product of the Central Committee apparatus, worked out by a very narrow circle of people. For drawing up decisions that are of such importance for the desiny of the party why was it impossible to enlist party workers of various levels and especially members of primary party organizations? Why was the work not organized in the Central Committee commissions. After all, there are some great minds and great practitioners in the party. Finally, there are the Academy of Social Sciences, and the party institutes.

It seems to me that the party has been looked at from on high, panoramically, so to speak, as if from Olympus, and so many details remained undiscerned. So, the various levels—primary party organizations, party committees, and communist parties—have become blurred. I ask myself this question: Will we not become transformed into a voluntary society for the promotion of something or someone, like the "Sobriety" society which is the direction in which Comrade Yeltsin is summoning us? The lobbyist, declarative nature of the document, which contains more philosophizing than practical measures, and the lofty language which not everyone will understand are more than apparent.

But the party and the people have been waiting for this document. They expect radical changes. They expect an honest analysis of our failures and they expect practical measures. Yes, we did lose time in the first three years because the partial reforms proved inadequate. Under conditions of the advancing crisis of the economy, the leadership lost its confidence, compromises appeared and this led to ambiguous decisions and half-measures. Perplexity and a naive faith in appeals and addresses led to the exacerbation of interethnic conflicts and strikes.

It was felt and it can be felt now that many decisions are being made on the basis of emotions and without practical calculations and analysis. We are being hurled about, back and forth. We have been proceeding by trial and error and this has cost us dear. We wanted to create a market in which the ruble would circulate but today we have created not a market but that primitive form of commodity exchange which is defined for us on the pages of "Das Kapital" as: One ax equals three sheep.

And so today meat, a sheep, a pig, or a cow, operate as units of value and not the ruble.

The political reform began with the banishment of party structures from the leadership of the economy without having created new ones within the soviets. The economy has lost its management and is collapsing. We decided to sail through the transitional period by taking a running jump, but we came up short. The lack of experience has taken its toll and likewise the incompetence of some leaders to control these processes. It is necessary, comrades, to sober up and comprehend that you cannot bring perestroyka about through half-measures.

Yes, today we have a mixture of heterogeneous reforms. In some we have moved forward a little, but it has to be stated bluntly that as yet no radical reform has come about. And in many directions, especially on the political plane, we are lagging seriously behind. This also applies to the party. The key question is the radical renewal of the party. Proceeding from the realities of the present day and not from the depths of the last century, we need to take a new look at the very concept of "party," at its role in society and specifically in the conditions of perestroyka. The main thing on this path is the development of the local and primary party organizations' autonomy, the provision of actual power for the party masses, and the creation of the kind of mechanism of intraparty relations which will enable every party member to exert a decisive influence on the drawing up of party-wide policy and on the formation and activity of elective bodies.

Comrades, the party's main and serious sickness is the sickness of its grass-roots—the party's lowest, but most crucial level. The silence and inertness of the party masses which obediently discuss and vote for directives from higher bodies, whether or not they are correct, and whether or not they affect the interest of this primary party organization or labor collective—these factors to a large extent predetermine the crisis phenomena in our party.

What is to blame for this is the imperfect nature of a series of clauses of the Statutes which retain points which

were adopted back in 1934 and in which to a substantial degree the idea of the severity and centralization of authority is preserved. Has nothing indeed changed in our world over half a century? In this connection Mikhail Sergeyevich's thesis undoubtedly finds support: he says that it is necessary to interpret in a new way the concept of "democratic centralism" placing the stress on the word "democratic" with all the ensuing consequences. The primary party organizations do indeed need to be granted rights: to admit people to the party, to define their own program of activity and organizational structure, to fix the time schedules for holding meetings, to elect delegates and members of party bodies of all levels and to recall them, to examine personal matters, and to use a portion of the membership dues for their own needs.

Consider that important question of the preparation for the congress—namely, the election of delegates. Many Communists in our republic are in favor of direct elections of delegates. A corpus of delegates elected democratically and on the basis of glasnost will express the views and sentiments of Communists to a greater degree.

Comrades, we ought to think too about the time schedules for the holding of congresses. Why do they have to be convened once in five years; is this not too long an interval? So maybe they should be convened as the need arises though their elected delegates would retain their plenipotentiary powers for those full five years, because direct elections will be a costly business. But how many unforeseen situations we would have been able to avoid by delegating a series of super-important powers to the congress! For example, I am convinced that as distinct from a plenum, a party congress would most likely not have elected Chernenko as general secretary for he was an unpopular person in the party.

Many questions and propositions are arising and they need to be attentively examined. Why are we afraid of party-wide discussions on this toipic? Why does the concept of "discussion" remain in the party Statutes at all when it has not been implemented in practice in recent decades?

The Communists of Kazakhstan deem it essential to take the path of a substantial broadening of the rights of literally every Communist and party organization, from primary level to republican level.

Rejecting the principle of federalism, they are insisting on a considerable expansion of the communist parties' rights in resolving organizational, cadre, financial, and other questions in the context of the CPSU Program and Statutes. We believe that the republican party organizations must have the right to draw up their own action program to determnine the timeframes for convening congresses and conferences, to conduct referendums, and to establish interparty ties. The CPSU Central Committee's relations with the communist parties and their central committees must be built not on orders and peremptory commands, on party diktat and willful pressure, but on the basis of jointly drawn-up decisions, mutual respect and support. In this connection I would like to propose that the content of the work of the CPSU Central Committee departments' territorial sectors be changed. At the present time they stand, as it were, over the republican party organizations but it is necessary that they should be the mouthpieces of the republican party organizations' interests, that they represent the communist parties of the union repubics in the CPSU Central Committee and that they be formed from representatives of the communist parties delegated to them. Attempts to impose cadre decisions like assignments from the center without any consultation with the communist parties, even if the people assigned are very wise party leaders, must be totally excluded. The lamentable outcome of the December events in Alma-Ata of 1986 or the "assault landing from the north" into Central Asia must serve as a good lesson.

Today the communist parties are simply obliged to become the mouthpieces of the interests and moods of the republics' inhabitants. Can, for instance, the Kazakh Communist Party not share the alarm of the millions of people living in the nuclear test zone in Semipalatinsk or those living in poverty in the Aral Sea area? It is necessary to define our stance precisely—yes the party is with them and shares their pain and alarm.

To turn to certain provisions of the platform. The interpretation of the party's role cannot fail to engender disputes, comrades. Let me quote: "...The party separates itself (as the church was separated from the state) from direct state and economic management... But this... does not mean a reduction of its political responsibility for the state of affairs in the country." How does one balance and implement these two concepts? To go on. "The party organizations and Communists can monitor not the work of the administration as such but of its leaders as party members." But what if a leader is not a member of the party? And there are now many such leaders! What is the role of the party organization in such an instance? In such a case will not the party members set up strike committees and strengthen the party stratum in these so as to have at their disposal at least some kind of levers with which to exert their influence? After all, as is recorded, it is necessary to take responsibility for the state of affairs. Incidentally, any social organizations, comrades, monitor the administration, the conditions of everyday life and labor, and the safety equipment. But the party organizations cannot?

Political parties, comrades, are created precisely in order to participate in political and state ligfe. Incidentally, neither the members of the Interregional Group, nor the National Front are about to withdraw from state affairs and the political struggle. Total clarity is needed here and no reservations. They have disarmed our party quite enough as it is, especially at our last elections.

I would have formulated separately the section concerning the transitional period. Until the new economic

laws start to operate and until the economy starts to develop under its own momentum, the party must exercise its leading role, using new management methods which have been produced in recent years. It is, of course, impossible to work in the old way. But to retreat from the battlefiled at this crucial moment would likewise to be guilty of desertion. I am confident that a more sophisticated political superstructure is being organized on the new economic base. But for the time being there is a patent power vacuum and we can see who is filling it. Borders are being broken down, blood is being shed, there are hundreds of thousands of refugees, and so on.

What it to be said about power? The Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources has been at work for almost a year without a minister. A tug-of-war is going on between the government and the Supreme Soviet but using not a rope but Palad-Zade [first deputy minister of USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources]. The government itself has become a hostage to the Supreme Soviet squandering time at its sesions. Yet the matter, comrades, is in abeyance.

To continue. It is necessary to clearly define our stance on the multi-party system. We have hundreds of very real parties under various signboards. We must not hide our heads, ostrich-like, in the sand, but realize the objective reality. The era of cooperation and sensible alliances has arrived, the era of political struggle and no compromise, about which we have already forgotten. This also has to be worked out and also recorded.

And one more thing. Why, comrades, have we suddenly taken fright at the post of general secretary and are shifting to a party chairman and then, maybe, to a manager? What sort of fashion is this that has appeared for renaming posts that are sacred to all of us. And a political executive committee is being set up for this. There has already been such a thing in Romania. That means that the chairman will stand over the political executive committee and then collegiality and the representation of the union republics will be purely symbolic. Let's give it some thought. I do not think that 200 central Committee members will promote the democratic processes; it is too narrow a body. The number must be more than doubled. I propose that quotas be established for the union republics, say, 20-25 seats on a rotation basis.

It is impossible not to see the patent contradictions in the program issues of ownership and land. It is alleged that land and what is under the ground are the common property of the people. How can this be tied in with the thesis that real sovereignty of the republics is impossible without their economic autonomy, if the republics are alienated from their own territories? We are in favor of real sovereignty of the republics.

In conclusion I want to say that the platform needs further substantial work. Numerous proposals will of course be made during its discussion. It is essential to set up a commission under the chairmanship of Comrade Gorbachev and to draw up a more precise document for the congress. The congress, comrades, must undoubtedly be brought forward for neither the present composition of the Central Committee nor of the Politburo any longer have sufficient prestige for the adoption of fateful decisions. Certain individual members of it already need to be thinking about resignation. Someone, comrades, must take responsibility for the collapse of party unity and for the ideological failures, and someone must answer, comrades, for the events in Eastern Europe about which no one here wants to talk. Our buffer zone has been destroyed, good luck to them, let them live as they like. But, after all, today they are already making territorial and material claims, smashing consulates, committing blasphemies against the graves of our soldiers and our sacred places, and humilitaing a great country. Yet we are still shelling out millions to them while robbing our own people. We hospitably receive the Mazowieckis and others of that ilk [i prochikh shvedov]. We need to do what is necessary so as not to fatten up foreign countries with the result that they enjoy the good life. We need to do what is necessary so that life is better here than it is there. Then they will come to us with their friendship of their own accord. Who is to say, comrades, what Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Cuba are costing us? Everything must go to Soviet Man and this also needs to be recorded in the platform.

I addressed a question to Comrade Pavlov: To what extent are foreign countries indebted to our state? Here we all are saying that we are beggars, that we owe R43 billion to someone. He tells me: "That's a big secret. A minister cannot respond to a deputy's question." So I'll tell you: It is known from foreign sources that this sum is far bigger than our foreign debt. So, comrades, perhaps someone will, nevertheless, explain all these processes to us. They say that Comrade Yakovlev is a designer and comrade in arms. Abroad he is called such, a designer. I shall say that Comrade Yakovlev is our man of few words, par excellence. He has a brilliant speech to do with the jubilee of the French revolution. I take my hat of too that speech. But, Comrade Yakovlev, please explain to us these process, your schemes, and your ideas. Perhaps we will believe what you have to say. But at the moment there is alarm. At the moment, comrades, all these processes are giving the people real pain.

I, comrades, am waiting to hear the stance of the people from Leningrad. Why do we still have in the Central Committee Comrade Solovyev-the-Mercedes? Why is the question of his exclusion from the Central Commkittee not being raised? And about the exclusiuon of a number of other persons who have made a mess of the party and brought dishonor upon it? Why are we not tackling this question too?

And finally, I ask the members of the Central Committee—I am not one of them—to examine the question of granting to all plenum participnats, including invitees, the right to vote on the draft platform. No one here must be left in the role of mere onlooker when far-reaching documents are being adopted.

Seleznez Defends Working Class

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[Debate speech by A.I. Seleznev, first secretary of Kursk party obkom, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Comrades! The CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th party congress undoubtedly signposts the route to the future from the crossroads at which our society finds itself. But in choosing this route it is important not only or, I think, not so much to sense the acuteness of the question of the need to speed up reform as to not to be mistaken in the choice of direction.

The draft undoubtedly incorporates, and speakers have already said this here, much that is new and democratic, which will enable the party to change substantially and fulfill its purpose as the political vanguard of the working class.

I would also like to express my opinion on a number of the draft's provisions. First, the draft, I think, is wrongly silent about the basis and and forms of the alliance of the working class and peasantry. In Section 7, where it says that the renewed CPSU is conceived by us as a party with a socialist choice expressing the interests of the working class and all strata of society (incidentally, the comments here yesterday about "strata" of society were correct), the peasantry as a class is not mentioned at all. I want to ask the question: Is this right? Particularly at the present time, a time of deterioriating relations between city and countryside. I think that the unity of our party will depend in many respects upon the correctness of the political line here.

Second. A number of declarations in the document need to be coupled with mechanisms for their implementation. On the one hand, as has been said here about this, the production-territorial principle of party building is asserted, which undoubtedly accords with the functions of a party of the ruling class, but, on the other hand, it is proposed to virtually deprive the party of organizing the right to monitor the administration's activity.

Third. The party's stance on cadre policy is not disclosed in the draft platform. It says almost nothing about this, and I cannot agree with that, for there is no need to prove that the cadre problem is fundamental and is the source of many of the conditions governing the course of perestroyka itself. It can positively be stated that the party does not yet have in the proposed draft platform a scientifically validated cadre policy which has been tested in practice and which meets the needs of perestroyka itself.

Allow me to dwell in more detail on this problem. It is well known that the improvement of any social structures requires enhancement of cadres' activity. We, however, repeatedly tackle isolated questions of cadre policy by fits and starts: Raising professional training standards, then cutting numbers, or democratizing the process of promotion.

But in order to embrace the problem in an integrated way you need, I think, to coordinate all the organs and functions of the management system—training of cadres, selection, transfer, and placement—in clear conformity with the forms and methods of the scientific organization of their labor.

Life undoubtedly does demand that we urgently draw up norms, means of political control, and social mechanisms protecting our cadres' interests.

Let us look at the way we train cadres. During the perestroyka of higher education we have focused our efforts on two problems—the computerization and the humanization of education. But we have pitifully few computers so far while our educational plans remain essentially the same. In VUZ's [higher educational institutions] it is still impossible to master the scientific organization of modern production. VUZ graduates have a poor understanding of the finer points of economic accountability and are ignorant of the rudiments of social psychology and social engineering. There are many other problems, too, concerning questions of the quality of specialists' training. The qualitative aspect, in my view, once you think about it, is not always correctly interpreted either. It is well known that the figure of 18 million people employed in management is cited in our country. Whenever we come to a crossroads we say, I think unjustifiably and without reflection, that there are too many. But are there?

In the United States, for example, one in three workers is employed in management. Modern civilization relies everywhere on the faster development of the human factor in information support for production. We consequently lag substantially behind not just in the quality of people engaged in mental labor in production but in their quantity. That is an indisputable fact.

But the main point here is not that, but the incorrectness of the political approach of such an orientation of society when, either through ignorance or misunderstanding, we quite often describe intelligent people who are managers as nothing less than "parasites on society." That is the way things stand in our country regarding national economic cadres. But let us look at how things stand with cadres in the party. Is it better? The cadres are formed haphazardly, are selected in the main subjectively, and are trained randomly. Let us try to answer the following question: What social protection mechanisms do they have? They are simply absent. A party organization secretary has, say, completed two terms, how do we decide what to do with him next? There is complete ignorance as to what to do next. The exchange of cadres, their reassignment, and on-the-job training have in general not been worked out at all. The current system of training in general has long failed to match the modern

requirements of party life and the level of skills required of modern political activity.

Party workers above all lack high professionalism, new economic thinking, and political thinking. Party obkoms [oblast committees] need, let us assume, theoretical social scientists, political organizers, sociologists, and specialists on the problems of internal party life. But where are they to be obtained?

I don't think there is any need to prove that party work is itself managerial work of the highest degree of complexity and consequently demands the highest skills. Amateurishness here can be even more harmful to the goals of perestroyka than it can in other spheres of management activity. Of course, it has to be admitted that the Central Committee January (1987) Plenum played an important role in reviving Leninist approaches to work with cadres. A serious step toward democratizing the cadre problem was taken on their basis and the preconditions were established for objective, real participation by working people in the solution of questions concerning the promotion, transfer, and assessment of the activity of leading cadres.

But, comrades, practical experience has revealed that a number of new social mechanisms were insufficiently well thought-out. For example, in many collectives it is quite often considerations of group egoism rather than concern for state interests that prevail in the election of leaders. What do spontaneous contested elections give us? I stress spontaneous, rather than well organized ones. You would think that the very fact of the election of one in every two leaders of enterprises in the material production sphere in our oblast was in tune with the spirit of the times. However, analysis of their qualitative makeup shows that there are no women or adequately trained people among the leaders. Candidates are sometimes timeserving, encourage group egoism, and are indulgent toward indiscipline. All this discredits perestroyka. I tell you that the assertion that there is no alternative to the principle of one-man leadership in modern production is being made with increasing certainty among workers.

In this regard the proposal that soviet organs should propose top leaders of state enterprises to the collective for election is worthy of support. Constant political support for the entire cadre training system is needed from the party. A center to elaborate cadre policy strategy is needed, in my view, and here valuable experience and local initiative should be built up, general and particular problems worked out, and a complete democratic mechanism developed.

Comrades! The very progress of our life and of our society convincingly demonstrates that the Central Committee should draw up an overview of cadre policy and submit it for party discussion.

In conclusion I would like to say and express my hope that party cadre policy will be more clearly and specifically reflected in the CPSU platform. I think that without such a policy the party will not become the genuine theoretical and moral-political vanguard of society and will be unable to effectively head the processes of its revolutionary renewal.

I endorse the concern already voiced here regarding the lack of information possessed by us, communists, and party committees on the state of affairs which has recently taken shape in the countries of Europe and regarding the Central Committee's unjustified silence on this score. Here the name of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, member of the Central Committee Politburo, has been mentioned. I think that the single report given to us in party committees in all this time is clearly not enough.

One last thing. I have doubts concerning the correctness of the viability of the platform theses on reducing the number of Central Committee members. The creation of a restricted permanent Central Committee could, in my view, turn it into a second Central Committee apparatus. Essentially the Central Committee will seriously weaken the organizational capacities of its members at local level and the link between Central Committee members and primary organizations, including oblast organizations.

Lithuanian Party's Paleckis Comments on Plenum

LD0702164390 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] What Lithuania discovered half a year or a year ago, is now being discovered by the vast and sluggish country. This is how Justas Paleckis, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, described two day heated debates at the Plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. The Plenum did not end today [6 February], as had been expected. In a telephone interview to the Lithuanian Radio, Justas Paleckis noted that time was working now for the Lithuanian Communist Party. By this he meant a long spell of time since the first part of the Plenum that ended at Christmas and the length of the current Plenum. The independence issue of the Lithuanian Communist Party will be presented in a new light, said Justas Paleckis, though he warned that a hard battle was ahead. The secretary said that at the Plenum backstage ever-growing support for Algirdas Brazauskas was being voiced. Justas Paleckis described the Plenum as the one of the infuriated and retiring and expressed confidence that following the 28th Party Congress, something like 10 percent of the present Central Committee will remain in power.

Shishlin: Gorbachev Will Have 'Strong Hand'

PM0702110490 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee member Nikolay Shishlin by correspondent David Smith in Moscow on 6 February on Channel 4 "News" program—recorded]

[Text] [Smith] How will Mr Gorbachev's new democracy work, and will it do anything to solve the nation's crisis? Tonight we spoke to Nikolay Shishlin, a member of the Central Committee staff and an adviser to President Gorbachev. Is the party truly going to share power?

[Shishlin] Yes, quite sincerely, quite sincerely. The party is ready to give up with this famous Article 6; the party is ready to adopt a multiparty system, but this system should work on the basics... on the basis of laws: We want to be a democratic state.

[Smith] What about the president's position: Is he going to be chairman of the party, or is he going to move aside and be president alone?

[Shishlin] Now I'm quite sure that he'll be the chairman of the party, and he'll be our president.

[Smith] More changes at the top, a new role for the party: But is this even going to begin to solve the crisis out in the country?

[Shishlin] I think now we can see a new stage of the policy of perestroyka —when perestroyka begins in the party itself. That's a very important moment in our life, and I think it will accelerate all positive processes in my country, and it will help us to overcome the crisis.

[Smith] But many people out in the country don't care about what the party's doing: They're already taking their own steps; they're already taking power in their own way. And isn't there a danger that everything you're doing is simply lagging behind what the people themselves are doing?

[Shishlin] Now look, I can say that really the party lagged behind perestroyka, and you mention different movements: Yes, you are quite correct. But I think starting from this plenum, the party begins to move.

[Smith] Do you see any threat to Gorbachev after this plenum?

[Shishlin] No, I don't see any threat to him just now. Yes, he is criticized by members of the Central Committee—one can hear stupid speeches —but after this plenum, I think Gorbachev will have a strong hand.

[Smith] He'll have gotten rid of his last remaining opponents?

[Shishlin] Step by step.

[Smith] One by one?

[Shishlin] Maybe one by one, if you prefer such an expression.

'Somebody May Resign'

PM0702150490 London ITV Television Network in English 2200 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee member Nikolay Shishlin in Moscow by news presenter Trevor McDonald in London, live on the ITV "News at 10" program]

[Text] [McDonald] Joining us now live from Moscow is Nikolay Shishlin, an advisor to Mr Gorbachev. Mr Shislin, will Mr Gorbachev be the winner at the end of the plenary session tomorrow, and will there be agreement to end the Communist Party's monopoly on power?

[Shishlin] Look, first of all, I'm quite sure that Mr Gorbachev will be a winner. As to this notorious Article 6, I am quite sure that this article will be omitted from our constitution.

[McDonald] But at what price will this victory be bought, Mr Shishlin? Because, after all, today we heard Mr Gorbachev being attacked from both right and left, and he's had once again to get into this ground of compromise—the vague middle ground.

[Shishlin] That's a normal process when you have a revolution: You have right wing, left wing, you have different circles. But look, we have no choice. It is necessary to go forward on the road of perestroyka, and so I'm quite sure that Mr Gorbachev will win.

[McDonald] Fill us in a little bit on the form, will you? What happens after tomorrow's plenary session: Will you be able to drop from the Central Committee some of those conservatives who obviously so totally disagree with his approach?

[Shishlin] No, I think it will happen at the Party Congress, which means...

[McDonald interrupts] So no momentous announcements after tomorrow's plenary session ends?

[Shishlin] Let's wait a little bit, because I think maybe somebody will resign, but the total reconstruction of the party will happen after the 28th Party Congress.

[McDonald] And what now for the fate of perestroyka, because there have been so many criticisms about it, and Mr Gorbachev seems unable really to make any headway in the process?

[Shishlin] I can't agree with you. You see, we have answers on our problems, but we must be persistent, we must be wise, and we must be bold.

PRAVDA Publishes 5 February Plenum Speeches

Knyazyuk Urges 'Single, All-Union Party'

PM0702150790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 4, 5

[Debate speech by M.A. Knyazyuk, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Ivanovo Oblast Party Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Comrades! On the eve of the plenum, during the election meetings, we held a dialogue, a very difficult discussion both at labor collectives and in places of residence, with veterans and young people. We talked, held consultations, and tried to persuade people. People ostensibly understood us.

Suddenly after many hours of strenuous discussion the following question arose: Tell us what will happen in the party and the country tomorrow—a split or consolidation, stability or pogroms, disintegration or progress along the path of socialism?

People speak bluntly and demand: Show us the party Central Committee plenum, show us the Supreme Soviet session so that it is clear that the party and the government have the strength to hold the country back from chaos and lead it onward both in politics and the economy.

"We must have the courage to face up straight to the bitter truth. The party is ailing. The party is in a fever. Because it is a question of... whether within a few weeks (prior to and at the party congress) the party can make a complete recovery and render the disease's recurrence impossible or whether the disease will become protracted and dangerous." These words spoken by Vladimir Ilich Lenin in January 1921—however hard it is to admit—to some extent also define the current political situation.

It is not only a matter of destructive political forces threatening party unity or of some Lithuanian communists having already broken away. The reasons are that CPSU statutes have ceased to operate within party organizations and the program regulations adopted by the 27th Congress are not being fulfilled. The CPSU platform on the nationalities question is not working. Factional activity effectively exists within the party.

Communists include those who are making efforts to advance perestroyka and are assuming responsibility for its results, along with those who are striving to eliminate the CPSU from the political arena, separate it from the state, and anathematize Marxism-Leninism. This does not constitute pluralism of opinion but ideological disorder and intraparty struggle for influence over communists.

What is particularly alarming is that this struggle is assuming an uncontrolled rally-oriented nature and depends on ideological confusion in the minds of many communists. Do all communists today grasp the essence of the differences between various party platforms? Of course not, since it is only today or tomorrow that we are to complete our discussion and go to the people with the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress. In this context I propose adopting a plenum decision for all members of the CPSU Central Committee, the Politburo, and the government to report back to primary party organizations and labor collectives about their activity, the work of the CPSU Central Committee, and corresponding bodies, and provide clarification on the CPSU Central Committee platform in order to strengthen the ties between the party Central Committee and rank-and-file communists, between the government and the people. I propose that the drafts of the new party congress documents be based on communists' opinions and proposals.

We reckon that reports and elections will only be able to be held in party organizations after a well-prepared party congress, where fundamental party documents will be studied and highly important political areas of party activity at the stage in question clearly determined. This has also been proposed by many primary party organizations.

We are in the fifth year of perestroyka, which was intended and designed to improve the life of people and society as a whole. But reality unfortunately brings us to several other assessments. Perestroyka is designed for the honest person, but forces with a dubious reputation have sprung up, speculating on difficulties both verbally and actually.

The economic mess, the real deterioration in the position of working strata of the population and pensioners, shortages, distortions within the cooperative movement, increasing crime, declining morals, rising inflation, strikes, the concentration of millions in the hands of shady operators, and more and more seats of tension are aggravating the situation and paving the way for a wild outburst of extremist elements.

I believe that, rather than extinguishing these seats of tension separately, the crux of the question, our task—both that of the government and the Central Committee—is to consider the situation as a whole, elaborate a consistent, constructive policy as a whole in the interests of improving people's lives, bring our laws into play, and defend every person's elementary rights.

Events in a number of republics, notably Azerbaijan, have shown most convincingly that political forces are active in the country that have openly mounted a struggle for power and the right to control and command people's minds and have embarked on recarving the socialist system itself. Dual authority has been established in a number of areas. Ordinary people, women, children, and old people are suffering as a result of this.

It is time to tell the people the whole truth. It is time to name the political forces which must share responsibility with the CPSU for creating a socially tense, explosive

situation in a number of regions, expose their true aims, and disband nationalist and extremist organizations.

It is a matter of urgency at government level and within scientific subunits to carry out thorough, in-depth studies as to the possible results, primarily for the peoples of the republics themselves (in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus), of the severance of economic and scientific ties with the Union. We must express our emotions and propaganda fervor in the field of the economy and through sober dialogue.

We must speed up the elaboration of a law on the mechanism for a union republic to leave the USSR and possess self-determination, including secession. We must elaborate laws and mechanisms ensuring the republics' economic responsibility for the fate of refugees.

If I may, let me say a couple of words in connection with the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. I will not hide the fact that after the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and Mikhail Sergeyevich's meetings with communists and working people in the Lithuanian republic there was some hope that reason and sober forces among the Lithuanian people would prevent a growth of centrifugal forces. However, I must be frank and admit that there has been no effective dialogue and that the CPSU Central Committee actions were too late.

I am profoundly convinced that at this difficult hour the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the Central Committee Politburo must channel all their efforts into preserving the integrity of the single, all-union political party. I propose to assess the situation within the CPSU as it really is and not alienate those communists who stand by the CPSU platform, recognize their right to participate in perestroyka and do political work among the masses within our party, support them, help convene the congress, elect leading bodies, and reserve material resources for this party.

The question of what the party itself should be like, where it is to operate, and to what its members should be directed is a highly fundamental one: Should they be directed to organizing the working masses, to a concrete result, to responsibility for the implementation of party policy, or to permanent debate and empty phrases?

What do we advocate? Not severing the party's ties with the broad working masses. It was the workers' organization and eminent political maturity that resulted in the prototype of Soviet power—the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Municipal Council of Workers Deputies. It was their cohesion, militancy, supreme political activeness, and close links with the masses that enabled party organizations in very difficult periods of history to retain Soviet power.

Today is also a critical period in the country's history. Our task is to make party organizations and communists real masters within the party rather than weaken or disband party organizations or allow ourselves to be inveigled into more and more parliamentary skirmishes, intrigues, and compromises.

We must restore Lenin's understanding and principles of democratic centralism. Which elements are outmoded? Can we rally our ranks if we have violated this principle of party structure? I believe that the new party statute must enshrine the concept of self-management and independence for party organizations, along with freedom of debate and discussion. But the principle of free withdrawal from the party, for which many people are fighting earnestly, is not perceived uniformly. Let us ponder whether we are transforming the party into a halfway house which you leave when the going gets tough without bearing responsibility for your actions and deeds. Do we realize the consequences of this innovation? Is this not an attempt to fit in with what is indeed already virtually happening? It would be useful to hold consultations on this and other questions at the All-Russian Communists Conference and later at the 28th Congress.

Lastly, it is obvious that we have become excessively keen on the superstructure to the detriment of developing the foundations. In political reform we are as it were "zooming" ahead, but in economic reform we are lagging behind. Sluggishness and inconsistency in implementing radical economic reform have increased inflation and the deficit and lowered the population's living standards. Who is answerable today, who will set things to rights, on what force in society can we rely? Who has relieved the party of responsibility for people's lives, for society, and socialism?

We are opposed to laying all responsibility for the slow progress of perestroyka solely at the door of the Politburo, the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, and the government. But it would be wrong to believe that perestroyka is only being retarded in the localities, where a great deal is indeed not succeeding at present.

The CPSU Central Committee March Plenum published a program for boosting agriculture while in practice collective farms and state farms [sovkhoz] have fallen into financial difficulties. We say that nothing is more important than the task of increasing production of goods for the people, while textile workers are still not provided with cotton even from the state order. In response to our request for support Uzbek comrades have proposed a doubled price and payment in hard currency, meat, equipment, along with the organization of joint enterprises provided that goods remain in Uzbekistan. Or take another question—a number of resolutions regarding the development of the Nonchernozem region are in operation. Uzbekistan is helping us build housing and create new sovkhozes, but the housing which we ourselves are producing (90,000 square meters of apartment blocks) is virtually all taken out of the oblast and sent all over the country.

We are profoundly convinced that at this difficult hour for the party everyone to a man must step up their efforts

in all areas, rally together, and not be afraid to admit mistakes and shortcomings. But we must realize that greater discipline, greater restraint, and greater firmness and resoluteness in action are required of everyone in every post.

Platonov Criticizes Politburo Members

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[Debate speech by V.M. Platonov, secretary of the "Chelyabinskiy Traktornyy Zavod" Production Association party committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Comrades, the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th Party Congress reflects many proposals and thoughts expressed by our association's communists and Chelyabinsk Oblast's communists. This evokes some satisfaction. However, the draft certainly does not reflect many issues that have accumulated in the party and in our society. Most importantly, it does not meet the expectations and vindicate the hopes that not only communists but also nonparty people are pinning on it.

In my view, the only things that can make good this deficiency are broad debate, consultation with every communist, and the discussion of certain questions on a multiple-choice basis. The right to choose these should be given to communists, maybe even via a referendum within the party before the 28th CPSU Congress is convened. This approach would make it possible to unite communists on a platform of perestroyka. Precisely such an approach should be implemented in discussing the draft of the new party statutes.

In the course of sharp debates on the eve of the Central Committee plenum—and, clearly, during the preparations for this plenum the questions referred for its consideration were for the first time very widely discussed in party organizations—many communists in our oblast and its party organization expressed the thought that our party's political prestige and mobilizing force are declining because the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo lack a clear position on many political and ideological problems of perestroyka, especially in domestic policy.

The correct decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference which are so ardently supported by the Soviet people are being implemented slowly and inconsistently. The party and the Central Committee are increasingly lagging behind other social organizations in questions of democratization. The inconsistency in actions, half-measures, inability to carry matters through to completion, and gulf between word and deed are especially intolerable in the work of both primary party organizations and central party organs.

The central question of perestroyka is the economy. If we had succeeded in raising people's living standards even a little over the last five years, we would have avoided many troubles, difficulties, and even tragedies. So I support the proposal that the draft platform should reflect the emergency measures envisioned by the party Central Committee, which could be a kind of action program for the communists representing the party in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and also for the communists working in the government.

Unfortunately, the processes of perestroyka and democratization in the economy are often reduced to absurdity. An argument is under way about what size the state order should be. But the problem is that the state order is not being fulfilled today and there are no levers and therefore no certainty that it will be fulfilled. We have discarded the administrative-edict system, but as yet cannot offer adequate economic methods of management.

Having adopted a correct course of expanding enterprises' rights and independence, we underestimated the matters of economic and legal responsibility. Yet without equivalent responsibility to society rights can cause trouble.

Indeed, this is what has happened. Taking advantage of their rights, many collectives are reducing output and are using their monopoly position in the market to dictate prices and delivery terms. Now, in order to provide the allocated quotas of metal, components, and materials, suppliers are demanding that a certain proportion of the material incentives fund or even of hard currency be transferred to them, that workers be assigned to them, or simply that they be provided with detergents. But while interruptions and disruptions in the supply of metal or machines can be endured one way or another, breakdowns in deliveries of food goods have exacerbated the situation in the Urals region to a critical point. Direct ties between enterprises have become in practice not a lever for movement forward toward the market, but movement back toward physical barter.

In my view, many of the national economy's ills stem from incompetence, and sometimes also from errors at the center. The terrible shortage of consumer goods in the market is spurring on uncontrolled growth in the wages not only of cooperative members. The removal of restrictions of the size of wages has led to a downright orgy in some sectors. For instance, in our Chelyabinsk subsidiary of the tractor scientific research institute the monthly wage of many staffers has now risen by an order of magnitude and totals over R13,000 per month!

This kind of "perestroyka" merely evokes perplexity and protests among our association's workers and employees. Incidentally, the government knew of these processes. And N.I. Ryzhkov raised these issues at a government session a year ago. But it took a whole year to rectify the situation.

I also have to express my opinion about regional economic accountability. In the form in which it is now reflected in the draft of the relevant law, it is a direct

path to aloofness and isolation. This mechanism has not yet begun to work with full force, but regions' desire to resolve their own problems more rapidly by means of what is produced on the spot is emerging with terrible force. In this context the demands from the center for regional self-sufficiency in consumer goods and foodstuffs can only be regarded as an attempt to shift the responsibility for the center's errors onto local organs. If food self-sufficiency is demanded of Chelyabinsk or Sverdlovsk Oblasts, for instance, why not demand self-sufficiency in metal from Estonia or Krasnodar Kray?

The economy is the foundation of perestroyka in society. Therefore, I think that this problem should be set out in a more detailed and specific fashion in the third section of the program. For instance, as a party committee secretary I cannot grasp the role of the primary organization and how it can now influence economic activity if the collective elects leaders and there are now more and more nonparty people among them. Control over the administration's activity no longer operates in the form that had existed in our country. The party's strategy in the economy is not bolstered by the tactics, that is, by new forms and methods of work by primary organizations.

I think that recent resolutions by the party Central Committee pay insufficient attention to seeking constructive new approaches. We are abolishing many things. For instance, the old system for work with cadres and the system for party leadership of the mass news media have now been smashed, but new systems have not emerged.

Certain Central Committee decisions of recent years are viewed negatively in party organizations. Thus the need for holding the CPSU Central Committee April (1989) Plenum did not contribute to improving matters and was not understood by many communists. The poor standard of the CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum on agriculture is noted, and there were also objections to the decision of the December (1989) plenum on creating the CPSU Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. We believe that party organizations should be consulted on such questions.

It is also very important for the cause to know the authors of particular drafts that have brought failures for the country and the party. This is necessary in order to correctly understand the reasons and assess the competence of a particular leader. For instance, communists in our association do not know the position of certain members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on specific issues. Processes in the economy are complex and difficult, but Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member Comrade Slyunkov does not speak out on this issue, we do not know his position, and we do not know Comrade Medvedev's position on many ideological issues. But we would very much like to know it. For instance, we cannot understand Politburo Candidate Member Comrade Razumovskiy's silence about the crisis processes taking place in a number of oblast party organizations. In general, communists and nonparty people are perplexed as to why Politburo members and the communist deputies representing the CPSU in the supreme organ of power remain silent when often there is wholesale criticism and denigration of the party at the Congress of People's Deputies. It is quite impossible to understand why Politburo members remain silent when they are sharply criticized in the press. The things that have been said about Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev. Yet this is absolutely not in the interest of the cause. I think that the Central Committee either should use its prestige to support [him] and sweep aside these unsubstantiated charges, and, therefore, Yegor Kuzmich ought to go to court, or else organizational conclusions should be drawn, for such publications cast aspersions on the whole party. Semiglasnost in this matter breeds all kinds of fantasies, as happened after the CPSU Central Committee October (1987) Plenum.

In the opinion of communists in our oblast and our party organization, the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo are failing to set an example of glasnost and democratism. This also applies to the recent elections of CPSU Central Committee secretaries and Politburo members. The lack of full information about the CPSU Central Committee December (1989) Plenum and about the internal situation in the Lithuanian Communist Party prompted certain communists to doubt the objectivity of its decisions. On the whole communists condemn the separatism in the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, but they would like to know the situation in more detail.

The fundamental issue perturbing us all is the role of the party in present conditions. Today in society there is no other political force capable of assuming responsibility for what is happening, and also the role of political vanguard. Everybody realizes this—both communists and nonparty people. We are profoundly convinced that attempts to resolve pressing problems without the CPSU will only lead to still greater destabilization. Therefore, the question of our party's unity and cohesion is a question of our society's stability and its movement along the path of perestroyka.

However, the time has come to view the party's unity from a different standpoint. We are now in great need not of unanimity, but of consensus on the basis of pluralism. That is, platforms and groups must be recognized in the party and there must be debate. Incidentally, we have already tried this very well during the election campaign. When we begin to hold an open, public, so to speak, dialogue with various political associations, people can correctly conclude where there is a constructive approach and where demagoguery and extremism. I think that it is precisely an example of dialogue that should be set by the party Central Committee. But we must do our utmost to strengthen the unity of our ranks, of our party, and prevent a split in the party.

The democratization of the party, pluralism, and glasnost are a new phenomenon for many of us party organization secretaries and communists. We must learn this and gain experience. Clearly, the time has come to give very serious thought to our system of work at people's places of residence. In this matter the party lacks a base, experience, forms, and methods. The loss in the elections in some districts showed that we lack approaches today and we cannot work with people—certain informal associations are ahead of us in this matter. In view of the processes that are taking place, there is also a need for new approaches in cadre policy. The decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum have proved to be theory out of touch with practice. The periodic replacement of leading personnel adopted by the 19th All-Union Party Conference has not been fully taken into account in the practice of the selection and placement of cadres. Because of lack of confidence in the future, many competent, capable, skillful specialists are refusing party and soviet work and economic leaders, too, are not consenting to take part in elections. I think these questions should be more fully and specifically reflected in the draft platform. It contains a short section about the apparatus, but there is nothing about work with cadres.

The draft platform, in my view, says very little about work with young people and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members. Without a youth organization, without the training of a reserve, the party is doomed to extinction. The Komsomol's activity in our country has to a great extent come to resemble a youth trade union and cooperative movement. Komsomol organizations do their utmost to avoid political work in the youth environment. It is certainly no accident that indications of a split and of isolation emerged earlier in Komsomol organizations. Therefore the party needs a specific, consistent, and on some level united youth policy capable of attracting and uniting the young generation around the CPSU and the ideas of perestroyka.

We are very worried by the fact that the party and the Central Committee are slow to act on many issues. In many cases we merely chase after events. I think that if the Central Committee had raised the question of Article 6 of the constitution earlier, this would have benefited the party's prestige. Today you have to take opinion into account, and the majority of communists—I say this on behalf of my party organization and other party organizations in Chelyabinsk Oblast—insistently ask that the Central Committee raise the question of changing Article 6 of the USSR Constitution at the third USSR Supreme Soviet session.

One last point. Though I agree on the whole with the proposals for bringing forward the congress, I believe that nevertheless there is an need for urgent measures to consolidate the party itself, otherwise it may flounder in exhausting debates.

We should hold direct, multiple-candidate elections of delegates in primary organizations, uniting them in party districts, as already said. Special working groups should be formed in advance from representatives of the delegations to prepare drafts of the main congress documents on a multiple-choice basis. The organization of the discussion of the political platform for the 28th party congress should be entrusted to a specially formed commission, which must examine absolutely all proposals that are received, because we feel a breakdown in communication. Communists are making proposals with very great interest, but they do not know their fate. This must be taken into account when discussing the draft platform for the upcoming congress.

The opinion of our party aktiv is: Since the 28th party congress must—we are convinced of this, it cannot be otherwise—must be a turning point in the CPSU's activity, it is advisable to hold the report and election campaign in the party after the congress and to use it to unite and rally our ranks on the basis of the platform of perestroyka.

Kiev CPSU Secretary Interviewed on Plenum

LD0502222790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2115 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Report on interview with Anatoliy Ivanovich Korniyenko, first secretary of the Kiev City Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, by unidentified Moscow television correspondent at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 5 February—recorded]

[Text] A CPSU Central Committee Plenum opened on 5 February. Today, a draft party platform for the 28th Congress was discussed. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev delivered a report at the plenum. Our correspondent interviewed Anatoliy Ivanovich Korniyenko, first secretary of the Kiev City Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

[Begin recording] [Korniyenko] I would like to emphasize that the participation by a number of secretaries of party committees supplemented the earlier debate with an even greater urgency, sincerity, objectivity and, if you like, also personal criticism directed equally at individual Politburo members and the party Central Committee as a whole. And naturally there was a sharp discussion about the role of the basic party organizations.

[Correspondent] Was the future of Article Six of the Constitution discussed at today's plenum?

[Korniyenko] Indeed, many of the speeches concerned this. But the main point is that no participants in the plenum tried to vindicate the wording which stands in the Constitution today in Article 6, because today it is impossible to declare the role of the party through constitutional provisions. [video shows interview] [end recording]

Transcaucasus Situation

Central Press Continues Reportage of Events

Extemists Still Have 'Thousands of Guns'

PM0802170590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Special correspondent Ruslan Ignatyev telephone dispatch incorporating interview with V. Varennikov, USSR deputy defense minister: "Weapons Which Should Not Fire"]

[Text] Baku—We have been informed by the republic's Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] that yesterday 169 of the city's 255 enterprises were working. In all 55.4 percent of planned output has been produced, and the total losses in the city since 18 January already exceed R180 million.

After a relative lull, tension has reemerged in the Azerbaijani capital and other cities. The attempts by local party and soviet authorities to get a grip on the situation and gain the initiative have not yet been successful. Extremists are continuing to call on the people to strike. Attempts have been made to picket continuous-operation enterprises and motor vehicle depots. According to operational information, just 18 percent of enterprises are operating on their normal working cycle in Baku. Between 70 and 75 percent of buses and trolleybuses have been running every day.

Leaflets are being distributed in Lenkoran calling for an armed struggle. The voluntary handing in of weapons that had begun in many parts of the republic had virtually come to a stop 6-7 February. Extremists and criminals still have thousands of guns and various kinds of explosives. Shots have again been heard in a number of regions. Over the past 24 hours shots were fired at troop details in Baku, Askeran, and Shusha. Armed guerrillas have appeared in the villages of Yukhary-Askipara, Ashagy-Askipara, and Baganis-Ayrum in Kazakhskiy Rayon. According to KGB information, in Dzhalilabdskiy Rayon alone guerrillas from the People's Front of Azerbaijan have 40 pistols, six assault rifles, and around 600 rifles....

"The collection and confiscation of weapons found on people is one of the most important tasks at the moment," V. Varennikov, commander in chief of the ground forces and USSR deputy defense minister, said. "Following the state of emergency, weapons started to be actively handed in in a number of regions of the republic (where necessary, force was used). At the moment, unfortunately, this process is gradually winding down. Why? Above all, because some of the republic and local leaders have been trying in every possible way to present the current situation in the best light: According to them, the state of emergency could already have been lifted. Instead of promoting the speediest confiscation and collection of illegally held weapons, everything is being impeded. Admittedly, I should note that the leaders in Gyandzha have done a great deal of useful work to persuade the population to hand weapons over voluntarily.

"Meanwhile leaders of the extremist wing of the People's Front had openly stated that they are going underground. And they did. They removed and hid all their arms dumps. It is now very hard to find them, although there has been some success. In Shaumyanovskiy Rayon a secret dump was discovered where 38 Kalashnikov assault rifles, a submachinegun, and 30,000 cartridges were discovered. There were also four portable military radio stations."

[Ignatyev] Are you now managing to keep the weapons situation under control?

[Varennikov] No. The difficulty in resolving this task is that, whereas in Baku itself at night, when the curfew is in force, it is possible to strictly control transport that could be carrying arms, for instance, or movements of people, during the daytime the extremists can travel freely around the city, organize their military dumps in various locations, and concentrate their resources. That is dangerous. We need to take appropriate measures. In a city under a state of emergency regulations should operate around the clock. Without hindering working people's normal lives, it would prevent the guerrillas from implementing their schemes.

[Ignatyev] From which sources do the guerrillas obtain their weapons?

[Varennikov] There are lots of home-made weapons among those we have confiscated. For instance, we have two mortars which, it has been established, were manufactured in Baku at the Lieutenant Shmidt Plant.

I personally have seen a curious example of a home-made weapon: a copy of a certain Schmeisser assault rifle. It was even numbered. It turns out that this was not just an isolated example. Nobody knows how many such weapons there are, and therefore we still have plenty of work to do in finding and confiscating them.

Another route is the delivery of weapons from various parts of the republic and from outside. We do have information on this. We will also have to inspect all institutions, including institutes, schools, vocational and technical colleges, and DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] institutes, where weapons and combat hardware is stored. Certain leaders of institutions had taken a criminal attitude to the storage of weapons, which allowed them to be acquired by the guerrillas.

We must take urgent measures, and they will be taken. But, at the same time, the collection of weapons and the disarming of the guerrillas is a concern for the people themselves. The republic's healthy forces are obliged to appeal to people to solve the problem in a sensible way.

Little Legal Provision for Baku Refugees

90US0448A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by special IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Mostovshchikov: "Charity Is Needed Again"]

[Text] "We are going to Russia, and over there they will not leave us to our own devices"—this is what the people who were forced to abandon their homes and leave the city where they had spent their lives, with their children in hand and with only a R10 bill in the pocket, told me in Baku. How will we welcome the people whom we now usually refer to as "refugees?"

Boundless as it is, Russia also amounts to a number of very specific departments and official echelons which are able to take care of people in distress. In order to pool their efforts, a special center was established in Moscow which coordinates the activities of transportation and hotel services, as well as those of organizations which have an opportunity to offer jobs to the refugees under the circumstances. The center is headed by V. Taranov, chief of the Moscow City Soviet Department for the Development of the Social Sphere.

He said: "According to our data, as many as 20,000 people have already arrived in Moscow on military airlift and Aeroflot aircraft, as well as by train. Approximately one-half of them are Armenians, and the other half are Russian. The stream of refugees is gradually becoming smaller. Therefore, the efforts to put them up will soon be replaced by more serious problems: Where can housing and jobs be found for these people?"

The housing situation in Moscow is bad; this is common knowledge. The issuance of capital city residence permits to the refugees is very much in doubt. As I was told, the city authorities are not planning to officially allocate apartments to those arriving in the capital. For this reason, the refugees will remain where they are housed now until regions are determined where the refugees could resettle for a long time and begin work. This is how they have been housed: About 2,000 live in Moscow hotels; about 1,700 in boarding houses and resorts in the vicinity of Moscow; over 10,000 in military settlements, in particular, in the compounds of the Taman and Kantemir Divisions. As they explained to me, the rest are staying with their relatives and friends. Besides, the Supreme Soviet of Russia has allocated 1,200 more beds at the boarding houses and resorts in the area of Moscow.

"When will they be able to start working and where?"

V. Taranov said: "Thus far, the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] and the ministries have not responded to these questions. Naturally, we will make sure that all who have come here have at least several options for prospective employment."

I hope that it will happen so, and that the people will be satisfied by what is offered to them. However, for now the issue of the damage sustained is the most important. The people have been left with nothing; they have abandoned their apartments with all assets. Who will compensate them for the losses and how? Currently, the registration of refugees arriving in Moscow is under way under the supervision of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations. Those who have registered are given R100 per family member in financial aid and the right to purchase clothing worth up to R200 for vouchers. All of this is good but it clearly does not solve all the problems.

It has already been reported in the press that no legal provisions for the status of refugee have been made in the USSR, and the responsibility of the state to a person whose safety and the inviolability of whose dwelling the state has failed to ensure have not been set forth. To this day, the accepted practice in our country is to act on the principle "when everybody pitches in the job gets done."

However, we should note that documents exist pursuant to which people who have been forced by circumstances to abandon the locality of their permanent residence may count on being fully compensated for their losses. They may. However.... This indemnity is paid out of the funds of local organs of power in the territory which they have abandoned. It turns out that under the current circumstances Azerbaijan should compensate the victims.

Who is going to determine the extent of damages in a republic in which a substantial part of its territory is under a state of emergency, and how? On which principles and along which guidelines? All of this currently is unclear. I was told that the Baku authorities responded to preliminary inquiries: The apartments abandoned together with the effects left there have been impounded, and the refugees will get all of their assets back. I am not so sure. When I was in Baku I saw other people moving into vacant apartments. I also saw ransacked dwellings.... Therefore, total preservation of the assets is out of the question. How is the USSR Gosstrakh [Main Administration of State Insurance of the USSR Ministry of Finance] going to act in the light of this? Understandably, it will pay damages only to those whose assets were insured....

A. Morozov, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosstrakh Board, told me: "The first claims by our clients have already been filed. We are monitoring them in order to meet all the obligations which we have assumed in keeping with the policies underwritten. Our specialists in the field will establish whether what we call an insurance event has indeed occurred."

What is an "insurance event?" In the case of assets, this is a fire, officially documented theft, flood, or another natural calamity. So-called "third-party actions" as a result of which assets have suffered are taken into account by the Gosstrakh only if a policy was issued after

1 January 1990 (new rules have been in effect since this day). Putting it simply, all those who insured their assets before the new year and had people break into their homes this year and, for example, smash furniture, will not be able to get money. Until recently, the Gosstrakh did not take pogroms into account. It is just that there weren't any in our country....

In a word, setting up a collection to benefit the victims still remains the most reliable way to help them. What can we do? Our legislative authorities have only recently begun to encounter events such as in Baku and thus have not yet managed to create pertinent legislation for such cases. However, let us hope that documents will still be worked out in our country which will set forth the responsibilities of the state for the refugees. For the time being, foundations for aid to the victims are being organized to which those who so wish may contribute their savings.

IZVESTIYA (No's 26, 27, and 28) has already published the numbers of accounts of the foundations aiding the evacuated families of servicemen. On 29 January, the editorial board of IZVESTIYA resolved to transfer R25,000 from the funds of the editorial office to the foundation benefiting the wives and children of Soviet Army servicemen.

Army Relations With Armenians Viewed

PM0702162990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Special correspondents S. Bablumyan and F. Ivanov dispatch: "Awaiting a Thaw"]

[Text] Yerevan—Only now, with the situation in the region stabilizing, are we beginning to realize the role that was and continues to be played here by the men in military uniform.

...Yeraskh, the name of this tiny Armenian settlement, became familiar to millions of people during the January events. Up until two weeks ago, shots were still being fired and the exchanges of fire at times developed into real battles here, on the border between Armenia and Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. It was also from here that news came about the first successful cease-fire talks. Things are relatively quiet here now. People have been given an opportunity to return home, to their families, and to resume normal work. Internal Troops and Soviet Army units, which were brought in here, have taken on responsibility for keeping the peace in this land.

An Internal Troops subunit of about 50 men is quartered on the territory of a small plant not far from the border between the two republics. We talked to the officers in a narrow room, with hardly enough space to turn around, which was until recently the office of one of the plant's shops.

Captain Yu. Fedorov told us:

"Clashes have completely ceased in our sector since 20 January. True enough, shots can still be heard, but things do not get as far as conflicts. The sides agreed to pull back armed people from the border, leaving only observers. But fear and mutual mistrust are still present. Yesterday, for example, an elderly man in a state of terrible agitation came to us at about 2000 hours and told us that his son had gotten lost somewhere. He usually returns from work early, but now there was neither sight nor sound of him; obviously, the father said, he had been captured by Azeris. We had to urgently send out an officer only to find out that the guy had simply been delayed by some friends, but much more time will have to pass before trust is restored...."

The service now performed by these Internal Troops guys is somehow reminiscent of that performed by Border Guards. The same procedure of around-the-clock details, vehicle inspections at checkpoints in case they carry arms, document inspections. Local residents are already accustomed to all this and treat it with understanding. Daily life problems are also being solved: Part of the servicemen's food comes from Araratskiy Rayon's public catering services.

Even so, it is still early to talk about complete trust and accord. A stronghold of the Armenian Pannational Movement is to be found not too far from the place where the subunit is stationed. Local residents mount guard there around the clock, relieving one another. When we called at the small house, we were met by a man already past his youth, and we could tell at first glance that he was more accustomed to a peasant's labor than to military duty. He asked us not to mention his name, but did not refuse to talk.

Why do they still need to mount guard; after all the troops can prevent conflicts if need be? Our interlocutor had evidently been asked this question frequently, and he replied without pausing for thought:

"We have no wish to attack anyone, but we must be certain that our homes and our families are safe. We trust the soldiers, but we want to insure against any surprises...."

When we asked him what he could do to help in the event of a conflict, the guard silently pulled a hunting rifle from behind the sofa.

There are still quite a few people here like our interlocutor—trusting, but doubting. A long time will have to pass before the wall of alienation between them and the servicemen finally comes down. How easy it is at times to destroy the bridges of trust which have only just been erected.

It was also here, in Yeraskh, that a Soviet Army battalion arrived in January. In addition to preventing armed clashes, its task includes the confiscation of weapons still in the hands of the population. From the very first few days, the battalion officers managed to establish contacts with local residents and representatives of informal

organizations. By explaining the Army's role in the villages, they managed to persuade many people to surrender their weapons. They delivered three hail guns, an armored personnel carrier, and rifles at the place where the battalion was stationed.

Relations between the Army and the people will now largely determine the duration of tension in the republic. These relations have gone through different stages since the time when troops were brought in. But—and this is an important point—we were told by the Yerevan Garrison command that not a single serviceman was killed and only three were wounded throughout the conflict in Armenia.

...Prior to leaving the battalion's station, we said goodbye to the soldiers. One of them, huddled against the icy wind, asked:

"Tell me something, is it likely to get any warmer here soon?"

We involuntarily exchanged glances—this question sounded so symbolic. Millions of people in the Transcaucasus are impatiently awaiting a thaw—both weatherwise and in relations between the peoples. They so much wish that it is not long in coming.

According to news received from the Yerevan Garrison command, Soviet Army servicemen stationed in Armenia's Gorisskiy Rayon came under fire during the night of 5-6 February. The shooting stopped after they opened fire in reply.

The garrison command also informed the population of the news that an armored train has arrived on the territory of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] for the purpose of providing assistance in guarding the USSR State Border, solving questions concerning the lifting of the railroad blockade, and performing other tasks.

A training armored personnel carrier and a museum tank were surrendered in the last 24 hours.

Moscow Radio Coverage of Transcaucasus Conflict

Varennikov Visits Nakhichevan

LD0802232290 Moscow domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] As reported by a TASS correspondent from Yerevan, the situation on the Armenian border with the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] remains tense. Trains are still standing idle on the railway. Traffic on the highway between Ardupa and Megri is at a standstill. Representatives of the military command and the Ministry of Railways have visited Ilyichevsk, a major rayon center of Nakhichevan to sort out properly the state of affairs and to agree with local railway workers on the resumption of train movement. Before embarking upon negotiaitons, USSR people's deputies—Army General Varennikov, chief commander of Ground Troops, deputy minister of defense of the USSR; Major General Surkov, chief of the Political Department of the Yerevan garrison; and Dzhalilov, first secretary of the Nakhichevan oblast party committee—met residents of the nearby villages and representatives of the rayon People's Front in Nakhichevan. It was not easy to conduct this dialogue. Often, emotions took the upper hand.

One detail for example is this: The negotiations at the railway junction were suddenly interrupted. It turned out that someone had circulated the rumor that the village of Verkhniy Yaydzhi had been attacked by some unidentified people from the direction of the Armenian village of Khachik. An armored troop carrier and a military helicopter was immediately sent to the place indicated. During the visit to several villages both in the Nakhichevan ASSR and on Armenian territory, it became clear that the rumors were patently exaggerated, although there was a certain proportion of truth in them. Some time earlier shots had been heard not far from the village mentioned. It has yet to be established who fired them and with what aim. A special commission appointed by the command will examine this.

It was possible to continue the negotiations with the railway workers ony by the end of the day. But it is difficult to say whether the trains will start moving. The representatives of the military command and the USSR Ministry of Railways are to have more fresh meetings. In order to ensure peace among the population, it has been decided to station additional troop subunits in a number of villages on either side of the border.

Rumors of Russian Exodus From Baku Denied

LD0702183490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Our special correspondents, Gennadiy Kolenov and Ivan Kuliyev, report from Baku.

[Kolenov] Here is today's report. It says that the operational situation in the city of Baku last night did not become more complicated. The intensifying efforts of the bodies of law and order is continuing to ensure a calm rhythm and life in the city. During the curfew, 89 people were detained, among them 33 people for violation of the passport procedure. Here is some news that I find alarming. Last night on the territory of taxi depot No. 1, the guard post for a block of flats was fired on from an automatic weapon. One serviceman was injured.

Further, the commandant's report states that there is no end to attempts to compromise the actions of servicemen by spreading false rumors about their illegal actions. The military commandant states with all responsibility that thorough checking on the rumors regarding the theft of a set-route taxi in Nasiminskiy district did not confirm that such events actually occurred.

Well, the report of the military commandant is an official document. But I would like to return once again to the problem of rumors, for that subject is, alas, a topical one in Baku at present. One of the most widespread rumors that one can hear these days, you see, is that the Russian-speaking population of the city is continuing to leave it en masse. We decided to learn what the true situation is, and for that purpose we went to the airport and interviewed several Russians we met there. [passage omitted]

Well, it makes one glad that people are just leaving on holiday, but we would not be absolutely honest if we did not say that the rumors about the departure of the Russian-speaking population are being cooked up, and sometimes very actively, in particular by some refugees from Armenia, of whom there are many in the city. They are people without a roof over their heads, frequently unemployed, without the means for a normal existence. Just as before, telephone calls are continuing to ring out during the night in the flats of the Russian-speaking population of the city. They are being threatened and there are demands that they should be evicted. I think that the time has come, long ago, for checks on the passport procedure. The residents of Baku are, incidentally, talking about that, for people genuinely want the situation to return to normal as soon as possible. Baku's military commandant, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Sergeyevich Dubinyak, spoke about that at one of the meetings with the public. The groundwork is being laid for such a check and very soon it will be conducted.

Tensions 'Running High' in Azerbaijan

LD0802083790 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Tensions are running high in Azerbaijan again after a period of relative calm. Local authorities have so far failed to take control of the situation. Extremists are again calling for strikes. Attempts are being made to picket factories and depots. In the capital city Baku only 18 percent of the industrial enterprises function normally. In Lenkoran leaflets calling for an armed struggle are being circulated. Army patrols in a number of cities of Azerbaijan have come under fire over the past 24 hours. The process of a voluntary surrender of arms has come to a standstill.

Situation Called 'Tense' Again

LD0802135490 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Vitaliy Gurov report, read by announcer]

[Excerpt] The situation in the Transcaucasus has again grown tense. The local authorities have failed to get it under control so far. There have been more calls for strikes and attempts to picket factories. More from Vitaliy Gurov.

We have had this report over the past few hours, and just before that official reports spoke of the situation growing stable in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, so it's probably too early to be over-hopeful. Only 18 percent of the factories in the Azerbaijani capital Baku are working. Leaflets calling for armed struggle are being spread in Lenkoran, a city on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Troop patrols have been machine-gunned in some of the Azerbaijanian cities. A Baku factory worker, Bakheshev, has told a TASS correspondent he will resume work only after troops have been withdrawn from the city, and one more factory worker, Rostamov, said the demands boiled down to a troop withdrawal at an early date.

Is it the presence of troops and curfew that keep irritating the people of Baku? No, the problem is rooted much deeper. There are the many questions around Nagorno-Karabakh that sparked off the explosion in the south of the country. There is the unwillingness of corrupted groups in the republic to give in and their resistance to perestroyka; and there is also dissatisfaction with the authorities that have lost control over the situation in Azerbaijan. Mikhail Gorbachev said as much at the full scale meeting the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has just held in Moscow. He said the corrupted groups opposed to perestroyka have seized leadership from the authorities and party bodies and misled the people.

Army and internal troops have forstalled an escalation of bloodshed, but naturally they will never be able to solve (?the) many problems the two republics are facing. They can only be resolved by the republics themselves. Unfortunately the leaders of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Communist Parties had more to say at the full scale meeting about mutual grievances and claims than constructive plans. Still, they can't do without a dialogue. A dialogue must bring together representatives of the authorities and the informal leaders of masses of people, naturally not the extremist representatives of either the Azerbaijani popular front or the Armenian national movement. [passage omitted]

Andreyev Comments on Situation

NC0802150190 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary: "The Situation in the Caucasus: the Baku-Tehran Axis"]

[Text] There is an adage that a close neighbor is better than friend or kin. Experiences today once again proves the truth behind this old adage. The tragic events in the Caucasus turned into a serious test of the strength of Soviet-Iranian relations.

Of course the Azerbaijan incidents are the domestic affair of the Soviet Union. But one should not ignore the fact that the incidents in Soviet Azerbaijan also concern Iran's interests. Meanwhile, the issue is not only that the two countries have a common border which was the scene of great unrest during the past month. What is

important is that there are about 10 million Azerbaijanis in Iran and naturally, they cannot be indifferent to the situation in Baku.

Soviet Azerbaijan is returning to normal life today and is regaining its stability and security. Pillaging and murders are no longer threatening the people. Armed clashes in the various parts of this republic have been stopped.

All this shows that the Soviet Government's decision to send forces of the Internal Affairs Ministry and units of the armed forces to some of the areas in the Caucasus was correct and timely, preventing an ethnic conflict from being transformed into a national tragedy and also stopping the bloodshed. Actually, the efforts by elements opposing the national interests of their own people to hatch a coup through violent means were aborted.

In his remarks at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that extremist elements acted with unprecedented violence. Had the state of emergency not been declared in some border areas and then in Baku, the blood of not only dozens but thousands and even of tens of thousands of innocent people would have been shed. The Soviet leaders' decisive steps prevented this tragedy. Now that feelings are not so strong, most of the Caucasus residents are expressing support for these steps.

There can be no doubt about the positive impacts that these steps had on the domestic political situation. But one should not forget that each step by the Soviet Government in Azerbaijan has a foreign policy aspect, too. It is interesting to see how the incidents in the Caucasus affect the situation in Iran.

First of all, it should be said that the stabilization of the situation in this area conforms completely with the national interests of the Islamic Republic. I should recall that the extremist forces in Azerbaijan granted priority not to Islamic ideas but to the ideas of Pan-Turkism. The issue was one of creating a great Azerbaijan, the center of which would be Tabriz. The price that would have to be paid to implement this plan was not important to the extremists. In fact, the fragmentation of Iran on the basis of nationalistic principles and the disintegration of the government structure of the Islamic Republic was propounded.

The social consequences of this development are unthinkable. Ultimately the intensification of the dimensions of this conflict would have meant the upsetting of the political situation inside Iran.

A fire on a border is always dangerous, especially when nationalistic demands are granted priority. Experience proves that national extremism and stability do not conform. The old adage that a close neighbor is better than kin and foe is very true. Peace and calm in the Caucasus are important, not only for the Soviet people but also for the people of Iran.

TASS Updates Transcaucasus Developments

Strikes Continue in Baku

LD0702164290 Moscow TASS in English 1625 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Baku February 7 TASS—By TASS special correspondents Boris Zverev and Yuriy Soltys:

Many Baku enterprises are still on strike almost three weeks after the emergency situation was introduced in the city.

According to the Azerbaijan statistical board, 169 Baku enterprises out of 255 operated normally yesterday. They turned out only 55.4 percent of the planned production. The losses incurred since January 18th have topped 180 million roubles. "Many people are incensed by the presence of troops and express their protest by refusing to work," Tafik Aliev, deputy chairman of the board believes. He told TASS that almost all the local chemical enterprises were idle. The situation is difficult in the machine-building industry too. On the other hand, oil workers have not walked out, but the output has nevertheless dropped. The oil processing enterprises are also working.

Summing up the results of February, Aliev noted that the "situation was improving little by little". Some sectors and enterprises are beginning to operate more rhythmically. It is good that transport traffic is returning to normal and trains are running again. After all, Azerbaijanian economy depends largely on deliveries of spare parts, raw materials and semifinished goods. Aliev believes that withdrawal of troops from Baku would help to improve the situation.

Indeed, the presence of army units in the Azerbaijanian capital is often the reason for continuing strikes. Workers of the Baku cement and ceramics factory did not report to work today, for instance. In reply to a TASS inquiry about the reasons of the stoppage, they said they were dissatisfied with the policy pursued by the centre and the republican party and local government leadership. They accused the press of failing to cover events in the republic unbiasly.

Withdrawal of troops is the main topic of talks in Baku today. But it can hardly be said that all local residents adhere to the same view on this score. Some say the army's presence was a destabilising effect, while others claim that only the army can now enforce law and order, guarantee the security of people and the city's normal life.

Despite the situation's diversity, there are definite signs of normalisation. The city transport facilities are functioning more smoothly, the shops are open, the food industry is operating efficiently. It did not stop work even during the most difficult days. All schools and higher educational establishments are open. True, the attendance is rather poor, because parents fear to let

their children outdoors. The winter examinations session has been extended until February 18 at higher educational establishments.

The first refugees are beginning to return to Baku. Russian families can be seen arriving by every Aeroflot flight in Baku airport.

Nevertheless, the situation in the city is yet nervous. Everything appears tranquil during daytime, but shots are heard in the night. According to a statement made by the city commandant on local radio, an army patrol was fired upon in the area of the taxi park. One serviceman was wounded.

Situation Updated

LD0702231190 Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—By TASS special correspondents:

The situation in Azerbaijan remained unchanged in the past day. It was learned from the Soviet Interior Ministry that no crimes based on inter-ethnic relations have been registered. Confiscation and voluntary surrender of arms continued in a number of large Azerbaijani cities.

The Soviet Interior Ministry has the information that 56 per cent of industrial enterprises did not function in Azerbaijan on Tuesday.

Only enterprises vital for ensuring life functioned in Stepanakert and the Martuni district of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

In the period from January 18, the total material loss resulting from the fact that enterprises are idle runs into 369.2 million roubles.

The blockade of highways continues. Transport moves only when accompanied by troop convoys. As many as 104 trains, including 69 meant for Armenia, congest the Azerbaijani railway.

The presence of troops in Baku is the main topic of conversations. The views of Baku residents on this question are differing. Some say that the presence of the Army is a destabilising factor. Others are convinced that it is only the Army that can introduce and maintain order at the given stage, ensure safety of the population and a normal pace of the city.

It can be said that there are some signs of the normalisation. There are fewer disruptions in the functioning of urban transport. Stores are open. There are studies in schools and higher educational establishments. Refugees started to return to Baku. Russian families return to the city with each flight of Aeroflot.

General of the Army Valentin Varennikov, USSR deputy defence minister, and Afetdin Dzhalilov, first secretary of the Nakhichevan regional party committee, today conducted negotiations in the Nakhichevan autonomous republic with railwaymen and representatives of the Popular Front about the resumption of traffic on the railway.

The population of the autonomous republic is tired of internecine strife. At the same time, there is much contradictoriness in the attitudes. Some demand troop withdrawal from Baku as the condition for restoring traffic. Others demand as persistently reinforcement of Army posts and garrisons to ensure tranquility.

The situation in Armenia remains unchanged. Arms and ammunition were being surrendered to organs of the Interior Ministry in the past day.

[Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0130 GMT on 8 February broadcasts a report attributed to a TASS correspondent in Baku. Moscow Domestic adds the following information: "Summing up the first days of February, one can say that the situation is improving to some degree. Some industries and enterprises are operating a bit more smoothly. Transport is working, and the movement of trains has resumed. Shops are open. Food industry enterprises are functioning as before. Classes at schools and higher educational establishments continue. The first refugees have begun to return to Baku, but people are still suspicious and worried. At night, shots are heard. Last night in Baku near a taxi fleet, a patrol was fired on; one serviceman was wounded."

Cities Paralyzed by Strikes

LD0802115390 Moscow TASS in English 1124 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—Several Azerbaijani cities are still paralysed by strikes. With more than 53 per cent of enterprises standing idle, damages incurred by the stoppage reached 390.5 million roubles as of Wednesday, according to official sources.

A total of 38 people were detained in Azerbaijan for curfew violations on Wednesday. Interior Ministry bodies continued to seize illegal weapons. A total of 102 goods trains, including 56 for Armenia, were standing idle on the Transcaucasian railway.

A road blockade continues in Nagorno-Karabakh. Road transport moves only with military escorts. In Stepanakert and the Martuchinsky district only essential services were working. Twelve people were detained for curfew violations in the autonomous region on Wednesday.

Things are much as they were in Armenia. More than 30 weapons, an anti-hail gun and an armored personnel carrier have been returned to authorities in the last 24 hours.

Blockades Causing Shortages

LD0802183990 Moscow TASS in English 1828 GMT 8 Feb 90

[By special TASS correspondents]

[Text] Yerevan, February 8 TASS—Serious shortages of food and raw materials are bringing industrial enterprises in Armenia to a halt. Railway blockades in Azerbaijan, through which over 80 per cent of Armenia-bound cargo travels, are mainly to blame for the crisis. Hundreds of thousands of tonnes of produce have accumulated at warehouses. Heating clinics, schools and kindergartens presents a special problem.

To save the electricity, a number of factories and plants started operating a night shift. Builders who arrived in the zone affected by the 1988 quake from all over the Soviet Union and from abroad have stopped work, unable to continue due to the lack of vital supplies.

Soviet Deputy Defence Minister General Valentin Varennikov attempted to normalise the situation on the railway through negotiations with Azerbaijani railwaymen and representatives of the Azerbaijani Popular Front. The general said at the talks that troops may be used to ensure normal operation of the railway.

Baku. The Soviet-Italian enterprise Bakmil formed in 1988 jointly with the Italian firm Merloni Progetti was among the Baku enterprises unaffected by the January events. The first batch of its output, motors for household electrical appliances, will be manufactured by the end of this year. Later the enterprise will be manufacturing electric mixers, mincing machines and other such equipment on the basis of foreign technology. Thirty-five per cent of the output is to be exported.

The new shop for Bakmil Enterprise is under construction on the territory of the Baku plant of air conditioners where the joint enterprise is situated. The enterprise has a multi-ethnic collective. None of the plant's employees left Baku when Armenians, and also Russian families, were leaving. Many people applied for jobs.

Adil Abdullayev, Bakmil director-general, told TASS that equipment is now being installed at the enterprise and a multitude of other technological problems is being solved.

"We should not stop. We have great responsibility to foreign partners and are interested in maintaining ties with them," he said.

Baku Radio Carries Announcements of Events

Mass Violations Easing

NC0802133690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Notice by Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku City on 7 February—read by announcer]

[Text] Mass violations of public order in the republic's capital were not recorded today. Six citizens were detained for violating the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree on the state of emergency, and 54 citizens were detained for violating the curfew. Some 309 individuals have been detained for violating the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree, and another 1180 individuals have been detained for violating the curfew since the state of emergency was declared. An administrative (?list) has been drawn up for this.

Arms are still being collected from the people. An investigation is being carried out to bring to light the crimes that were committed in Baku from 12 to 16 January. A total of 176 individuals suspected of being involved in disorderly activities and killing people have been detained and placed in custody. An investigation has been initiated.

The efforts of the military servicemen and the employees of the internal affairs department have been channeled toward maintaining public order and the people's security. However, a group of criminal elements continue to obstruct the stabilization of the city's situation. Consequently, they are prolonging the state of emergency. At 0330 this morning, military servicemen were targets of automatic fire from the taxi vehicles park in [name indistinct] district. One serviceman was wounded in the incident, but no civilians were harmed. I wish to note that such activities create serious dangers for the city's people.

Lawless activities by the (?local vehicle) drivers have been noted under the state of emergency conditions. Drivers are driving their cars when drunk, and they are removing the state registration plates from their vehicles. Furthermore, by grossly violating the laws and rules, they are creating road and transportation incidents and causing deaths. Naturally, this state of affairs causes discontent. In view of this, according to my order No. 11 dated 6 February 1990 on protecting public security, the movement of transportation vehicles without registration plates in Baku, including similar vehicles from the other cities in the capital, and the movement of military vehicles without identification numbers has been banned. Such cases will be seriously controlled, and the measures dictated by the law will be applied.

Rumors have been spread saying that USSR popular artist Zeynab Khanlarova has been sent to prison. I wish to make it known that these rumors are completely unfounded. I also wish to repeat that you can dial 98 28 10, I repeat, 98 28 10, for any kind of information.

It is possible to restore normal life in the city through mutual agreement with the people.

[Signed] Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku City.

Commandant Says Situation 'Unchanged'

NC0802130490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0430 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Notice by Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku City on 8 February—read by announcer]

[Text] The situation remained unchanged last night. Military servicemen and the employees of the internal affairs organs continue to maintain public order and security for the citizens.

Thirty-eight individuals were detained for violating the curfew, 40 others for violating the passport laws, and one person for committing a crime. Arms and (?military) equipment are still being collected.

[Signed] Lieutenant General Dubinyak, Military Commandant of Baku City.

Youth Affairs Delegation Visits Baku

NC0502162990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] To make an objective study of the causes of the tragic incidents in Baku in January—this was the reason for the visit of a delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Committee to Baku. After a state of emergency was declared in Baku, the Azerbaijan Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] appealed to the USSR people's deputies through the All-Union Komsomol, urging them not to rely on reports in the press and on radio and television in learning about the situation, but also to become acquainted with personal [word indistinct] and views by visiting the republic.

Viktor (?Vinin), deputy chairman of the committee and member of the [words indistinct]; Aleksander (?Pereskiy), member of the committee and a drilling worker affiliated with the 22d CPSU Congress section of the [word indistinct] production union; and Itibar Mamedov, a drilling assistant affiliated with the specialized technical equipment administration of the Caspian oil and gas extraction union, worked very carefully to compile information for two days. They recorded what those who witnessed the incidents had to say and visited the hospitals in the city, [word indistinct], and the cemetery in which the people who were killed on 19 and 20 January were burried. They also held talks with Sahib Alekperov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee, workers of the Komsomol organizations, and representatives of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan and attended meetings at the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, the Muslim Board of the Transcaucasus, and the commandant's headquarters in Baku City. Ayaz Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, received the members of the delegation.

Prior to the delegation's departure from Baku, the deputies held a news conference at the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee. Viktor (?Vinin) addressed the news conference. He said: We have determined that the mass media organs are not giving a full picture of the incident that has taken place. Hard work has to be carried out to let all the Soviet people know about this. We all agree that the incident must be assessed politically. Regrettably, we have been unable to meet with the troops which have been deployed in the city and with the USSR ministers of defense and internal affairs. However, we hope that the state of emergency will be lifted by the time the USSR Supreme Soviet meets. This is what the military officials and the residents of Baku want. Meanwhile, the policy pursued by the new leadership of the republic to establish political stability and dialogue with all the steadfast forces has created hope.

Meanwhile, Aleksander (?Pereskiy) said: We convey our deep and heartfelt condolences to the people of Azerbaijan, who are experiencing a grave problem. Our [words indistinct] and questions are not few. However, there are no replies to them for the time being. Why did the military troops enter the city at night? Is it true that it was impossible to prevent a high number of casualties? How was the decision reached on the movement of the troops? We shall bring all that we have observed and heard, including photographs and video materials, to the attention of the USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Committee. We shall do everything possible to ensure that our study is objective and multidimensional. I wish to say the following: Even if the people of Azerbaijan are in [word indistinct], they are still friendly as they were in the past. We have not felt any anti-Russian feeling during our stay in Baku and we shall definitely make this known in Moscow.

Later, the USSR people's deputies replied to the many questions that were put to them by the journalists.

Armenian Railway Situation Detailed

NC0602134890 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] The press center of the Yerevan branch of the Transcaucasian Railways has reported that Norashen station, through which the republic had to receive 22 trains of freight for the national economy each day, has not been operating for the last 25 days. All the by the union bodies, Armenian Council of Ministers, and USSR Communications Ministry have so far given no tangible results.

Ten trains with 500 freight cars arrived through Idzhevan on 2-3 February. On 4 February only two trains with 105 freight cars were received. They brought construction materials, industrial goods, containers, 12 automobile transportes, 12 freight cars of coal, 22 tanks of benzine and fuel oil, and so on.

On 2-3 February, 32 trains with 814 freight cars arrived via the Transcaucasian Railways. On 4 February, 21 trains with 528 freight cars arrived. The freight received through Georgia for these three days included 439 tanks of fuel oil, 123 tanks of benzine, 24 tanks of aircraft fuel, 31 tanks of diesel fuel, 44 freight cars of prefabricated houses for the disaster zone, 12 feight cars of meat, 4 of cereals, 26 of sugar, and so on.

Azerbaijan Raykom Changes Reported

90US0450A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 2

[AZERINFORM report: "Party Raykom Plenums"]

[Text] A plenum of the Pushkinskiy Rayon party committee [raykom] has taken place to consider an organizational matter.

The plenum relieved R.N. Zeynalov of his duties as first secretary of the raykom in connection with his transfer to work in the apparatus of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. The raykom plenum expressed its gratitude to R.N. Zeynalov for his many years of fruitful work in the rayon party organization.

As a result of a secret ballot on an alternative basis, the plenum elected S.Ya. Khammedov to the post of raykom first secretary; he had been working previously as chairman of the rayon people's control committee.

Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee member K.S. Gasanova and S.S. Abdinov, chief of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Organizational Party Work and Cadres Work Department, took part in the work of the plenum.

A plenum of the Agdamskiy raykom has taken place to consider an organizational matter.

A.M. Kuliyev was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the raykom in connection with his transfer to other work.

As the result of a secret ballot the plenum elected S.P. Verdiyev to the post of raykom first secretary; he had been working previously as chief of the soviet of people's deputies executive committee in the same rayon.

Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee member A.P. Abbasov took part in the work of the plenum.

A plenum of the Akhsuinskiy raykom has taken place to consider an organizational matter. A.A. Kaffarov was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the raykom in connection with his transfer to other work.

Four candidates were nominated for the post of first secretary: Raykom Secretary Kh.A. Mirzaliyev, rayon executive committee [rayispolkom] Chairman M.M. Nagiyev, raykom organizational department chief S.A. Mamedov, and S.I. Mamedov, chairman of the kolkhoz imeni Nizami. As the result of a secret ballot S.A. Mamedov, who worked previously as chief of the raykom organizational department, was unanimously elected to the post of first secretary.

S.S. Abdinov, chief of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Organizational Party Work and Cadre Work Department, took part in the work of the plenum.

Political & Social

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Meets 7 Feb in Vilnius

Vilnius Radio Carries Live Relay

LD0702210190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0800 GMT on 7 February carries a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session. The session opens at 0802 GMT and Lionginas Speteys reads the draft agenda for the sesion which is expected to last until 13 February. There are 23 points on the draft agenda:

"1. Conclusions made by the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet commission investigating the 1939 treaties signed by the USSR and Germany and the consequences of these treaties. The question has been presented by the above commission.

"2. Amendments and supplement to the Law of the Lithuanian SSR on amending and changing the constitution of the Lithuanian SSR, the basic law of the republic; draft laws on the foundations of local self-governing in the Lithuanian SSR. The question has been presented by the Council of Ministers.

"3. Make amendments and additions to the basic law, the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, section two on the system of the economy and draft laws of the Lithuanian SSR on property. This question has also been presented by the Council of Ministers.

"4. Draft Law on the Bank of Lithuania. The question has been presented by the Council of Ministers.

"5. Concerning the election of the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. The question has been presented by the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"6. Addition to the Law of the Lithuanian SSR On the Code on Land of the Lithuanian SSR. The question has been presented by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"7. Draft law on the press and other mass media of the Lithuanian SSR. The question has been presented by the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"8. Draft law on Archives of the Lithuanian SSR. The question has been presented by the Council of Ministers.

"9. The state of the law-and-order bodies in this republic and the role of the state organs and the society in fighting

the crime. The question has been presented by the Procurator's Office of Lithuania.

"10. Draft law of the Lithuanian SSR on militia. The question has been presented by the Council of Ministers.

"11. The law of the Lithuanian SSR concerning amendments of the basic law, the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR and the draft law on the structure of courts of the Lithuanian SSR and the legal status of judges. The question has been presented by the republican Supreme Court.

"12. Military service and alternative service to this by the citizens of the Lithuanian SSR. The question has been presented by Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"13. Concerning the setting up of the joint Italian-Soviet enterprise 'Ecolita'. Question has been presented by the Supreme Soviet Presidium."

"14. Draft law on holidays and days of rememberence and information about the decisions adopted by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"15. Concerning the reorganization of the state social security system of the Lithuanian SSR. The question has been presented by the Council of Ministers.

"16. The implementaiton of proposals made by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet provisional working rgoup of deputies engaged in the sphere of agriculture. The question has been presented by the Council of Ministers.

"17. Conclusions of the commission set up by the presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet to investigate the activities of Riabua, when he held the post of the minister of trade of the Lithuanian SSR. The question has been presented by the above commission.

"18. Information about the execution of the decision made by the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR on 7 December, 1989 Concerning the Protection of the Republican State and Departmental Archives. The question has been presented by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"19. Concerning giving back the houses of prayer and other buildings to religious communities. The question has been presented by the Council of Ministers.

"20. Concerning the responsibility for the extermination of the population. The question has been presented by the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"21. Concerning the protection of lawful interests of people who lost their jobs. The question has been presented by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"22. Concerning cancelling the validity of decision no. 750 adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 18 August, 1977 Concerning Awarding Bonuses to the Party, the Komsomol and the Trade Union Staff Members. The question has been presented by Lenkeviciute, deputy of the Supreme Soviet.

"23. Answers to the questions and inquiries made by deputies."

At 0829 GMT the Supreme Soviet votes on the agenda by item. Twenty-four deputies vote against the first item concerning the investigation into the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences. After a break, the debates on amendments to the agenda begin. Deputy Uoka proposes that the problem of homeless people in Kaunas be discussed and that apartments in Kaunas should not be supplied to the families of servicemen.

Deputy Masaitis proposes that the political and economic situation in Snieckus be debated. This especially concerns the granting of the town status to Snieckus and the delay in the introduction of the Lithuanian language as the state language in Snieckus. Both of these amendments are added to the agenda.

Deputy Landsbergis proposes that the inactivity of the executive authorities in Lithuania be debated. This proposal is not adopted: 108 deputies voted in favor, 101 voted against, and 20 deputies abstained. deputies also voted against an amendment on the introduction of a migration service in the republic. After three hours of discussion the agenda is adopted.

the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet begins discussing the first agenda point. Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Commission on the 1939 treaties between Germany and the USSR and the elimination of their consequences in Lithuania and president of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, takes the rostrum. He describes the 1939 treaties between Germany and the USSR and says: "Germany and the Soviet Union, in concluding and implementing these illegal treaties, have violated many concepts of international law, multilateral and bilateral treaties concerning Lithuania." "The commission has reached the conclusion that the declaration of the Lithuanian Sejmas of the 21 July, 1940 on Lithuania joining the Soviet Union and the corresponding law of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 3 August 1940 are illegal. The conclusions of this commission should be regarded as the proclamation of historical truth."

He continues: "Our commission has additionally expressed its opinion assessing legal acts adopted in 1940 by the republic's president, the government and the people's Sejmas. It stressed once again that the Soviet Union's illegal acts carried out on 14-15 June 1940—the unfounded ultimatum and the introduction of additional and unlimited contingents of the Red Army, was aggression which was followed by Lithuania's occupation and annexation."

Pozeln goes on: "The demand of the USSR Government immediately to change the Lithuanian Government crudely violated the universally admitted principle of noninterference in internal affairs. The government was

changed through manipulating the Lithuanian Constitution of 1938. By interpreting in one's own way the fact of retreating by president Smetona abroad, the change of the government took place formally within the framework of the constitution, but the government's personal composition was essentially dictated by the USSR representative. The new government, in spite of the opposition by some of its members, hurriedly passed a law on the elections of the people's Sejmas making use of the undemocratic 1939 Sejmas election law, and organized the elections of the Sejmas." "The elections of the Sejmas were not democratic; pressure, threats and falsifications were used." since the election platform did not mention the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, those residents taking part in the elections "did not empower the Sejmas deputies to adopt a decision on Lithuania joining the Soviet Union. In adopting the declaration on Lithuania joining the USSR, the Sejmas exceeded not only the limits of the platform announced to the electors, but also exceeded its constitutional powers." "The adoption of the declaration on Lithuania's joining the USSR was an act of a state organ which did not have constitutional powers. The commission regards that it has completed its work and proposes that the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet adopt its draft resolution, Pozela says, and continues: "In view of the fact that a decision of the congress of USSR People's Deputies on 24 december 1989 acknowledged that the secret treaties were legally unfounded and invalid from the moment of their signing, and striving to eliminate the consequences of this agreement in Lithuania and restore the rights of the Lithuanian state and the Lithuanian people which Soviet Russia acknowledged for all time on 12 July 1920 in the peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Lithuania, the Supreme Soviet resolves:

"1. To announce that the declaration of the Lithuanian Sejmas of 21 July 1940 on Lithuania joining the Soviet Union, which does not represent the will of the Lithuanian people, is illegal and invalid.

"2. To state that the USSR law of 3 August 1940 on the incorporation of the Lithuanian SSR into the USSR, based on the declaration of the Lithuanian Sejmas of 21 July 1940 is illegal and should be abolished."

Pozela concludes by stressing that the adoption of such resolution would facilitate the beginning of friendly negotiations with the Soviet Union.

After speaking for 16 minutes, Pozela answers questions on the procedure for possible negotiations with the USSR on proclaiming these treaties and elections in 1940 as invalid.

After an hour and a half break, the session resumed discussion of the first point of the agenda at 1300 GMT.

Deputy Juozas Nekrosius points out that today each document which bore any relations to the events of 1939-40 was of great importance to Lithuania. He invites all Lithuanians to take part in finding these documents; he also invited to support the decision on the findings of the commission.

At 1312 GMT, Vytautas Landsbergis takes the floor. He says that political steps toward independence should be clear and logical. Landsbergis says that new laws and regulations could be passed at the oncoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet which would curb the rights of the union republics and hinder their movement toward independence. He said Moscow would oppose all aspirations of Lithuania for independence by legal means, therefore, the decision on the findings of the commission on the treaties of 1939-40 between Hitler and Stalin would be a shield protecting Lithuania from Moscow's attempts to stop the restoration of the statehood of Lithuania.

Following this, he proposes some amendments to the text of the decision which would indicate the present position of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on this issue.

Egidijus Bickauskas argues against Pozela's claim that the elections to the Sejmas in 1940 were constitutional. Bickauskas thinks that elections to the people's Sejmas violated the then existing Constitution of the Lithunian Republic.

A. Smailys says that on principle it would be wrong to regard these elections as democratic since Soviet Armed forces had already occupied the republic and other political parties were not allowed to take part in the elections.

Povilas Peciliunas, representing the Lithuanian Democrats party, said that the aggression of the Soviet Union should be made clear; it should be stated clearly in the decision. Otherwise, he says, the decision would not have the desired importance. He says that this should have been done in September, although we were misled by fears that this decision would harm the campaign for economic independence. He thinks Lithuanians now realized that they will not have economic independence unless they gain political independence. He stresses that the decision should clearly state that Lithuania was annexed and occupied by the Soviet Union. Deputy Zabulis, who worked in the commission investigating this issue, opposes this saying that editing the text will hamper adopting a decision.

Debates on the proposed changes to the text of the decision begins. Vytautas Landsbergis insists that the USSR Supreme Soviet acknowledge the occupation of Lithuania and should declare this act illegal.

Laurinciukas says that we have to declare that Lithuania is ready not only to condemn the acts committed by Stalin but that Lithuania is also ready to negotiate concerning her independence. If we are a peaceloving nation we have to carry on stressing our desire to negotiate, he says, and continues: We have to do that if we want to build a bridge between East and West. Laurinciukas says that the world has gotten used to the

idea that Lithuania will declare independence, and he believes that the Soviet Union will get used to it, too.

Juras Pozela takes the floor again. He summarizes the proposals and agrees with the proposal to include a sentence in the text of the decision which says that Lithuania wants to negotiate about independence with the USSR Supreme Soviet. After 52 minutes, the discussion ends. It is decided that the commission will work on the text and present it for discussion again.

After discussing and approving a joint venture with an Italian firm, originally point 13 on the agenda, the supreme soviet begins discussing the draft law on the foundation of local self-government system in Lithuania. As presented by Kestutis Lapinskas.

He says that the law would come into force after elections to local soviets. However, he said seven amendments to the Constitution should be made before the draft law could be put into force. He adds that the presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet supports the idea of radical reform of local self-government.

"What is the basis for the proposed draft law on local self-government? First of all it is based on the democratic concept of local government which has been recognized by modern civilized countries in the west. Local self-government is the right of people of an individual territory to decide their matters independently within the framework of the law."

Lapinskas says that while preparing this draft law for discussion not only the existing laws of this type in western civilizations had been studied, the principles of organization of selfgoverning systems in the Republic of Lithuania were also given a careful attention.

He goes on: "We have to reject the inferiority complex which had been imposed on us during the period of half a century; we should stop being ashamed of or even afraid of traditions of the state of Lithuania. The features of these traditions are rather visible in the draft law; these traditions were not mechanically transferred from the past into the draft law."

one of the features of the draft law Lapinskas says is decentralization. If local authorities have the right defined by law to solve local matters independently, Lapinskas says, "it is incompatible with the currently existing command-bureaucratic system. Therefore, the choice has to be made between the two. Thus to go over to self-government it is necessary first of all to renounce the principle of centralism and hierarchic ties of the administration system based on it."

Lapinskas concludes by saying that the presently existing apparatus of local-government should be dismantled. The issue is debated until 1609 GMT Deputy Pozela returns and states that his commission has examined the 1939 treaties between Germany and the USSR and the elimination of their consequences in Lithuania. He does not read the commission's resolution on this problem, but only mentioned some amendments proposed during the debates. He states that the resolution says that negotiations should begin with the Soviet Union on the restoration of Lithuania's independence.

The whole draft resolution is then put to vote and is adopted by 208 votes in favor and 10 votes against.

The session adjourns after the vote.

Brazauskas Gives Address

LD0802121690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0929 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Address by Algirdas Brazauskas, Lithuanian Communist Party first secretary, at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Yesterday, a very responsible decision concerning the events of 1939-40 was adopted. The last pararaph of this decision entrusts us with the task of consolidating; we must be united in solving these issues in real terms. These are matters at a state level, these are of extreme responsibility, and only unity, only consolidation and concord can become the guarantee for the achievement of all these matters.

I would also like to share some thoughts, if you will allow me, about the plenum which concluded late yesterday evening.

The CPSU Central Committee Plenum lasted for three days. The platform of the Central Committee at the 28th Congress was given a long discussion. This was, I would say, an interesting and comparatively progressive and radical document. This document clearly dealt with setting up a Russian Communist Party, and the essential amendment of Article 6 of the Constitution. The idea of a multiparty system was given support, although this word, I think, will not be used. However, there is such a possibility. The CPSU Central Committee Presidium is to be set up consisting of representatives of all republics; these would not be elected, they would be appointed. There was also a question about a chairman of the CPSU.

A heated discussion developed around the question of the president and his status as a state leader of the USSR. After a very long discussion, the conclusion was reached that such a post is necessary for the Soviet Union and it seems that this will be written down as a recommendation. Of course, this is only a draft proposal.

This is what I wanted to inform you of concerning the platform of the CPSU Central Committee. Soon this will be published and I think there is no need to go into any more detail now.

The second and of course the most important issue to us, was that of the 20th LCP [Lithuanian Communist Party] Congress and documents and declarations which reorganized the LCP into an independent party. The discussion was very sharp. I must admit we did not expect the

discussion to be that sharp, especially after the visit of Comrade Gorbachev and his group here in Lithuania. However, the hall was filled with Central Committee members and a great number of people who had been invited from individual large industrial enterprises. [passage omitted] Half the day yesterday was devoted to our matters. All four Central Committee secretaries took part in the plenum—four secretaries from the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform organization.

Comrade Gorbachev made a brief report about the situation in Lithuania, laying very great emphasis on the moods to secede from the Soviet Union existing in Lithuania. He also spoke about aspirations for independence, which is widely spread in all layers of society, about nationality issues, and how acute these are in Lithuania. He also touched upon many other issues. He spoke about his impressions from his meetings at individual working collectives and enterprises, about the meeting with our intelligentsia, about the sitting of our party aktiv where, as you know, he took part and made a long speech. Following this, a debate started. People who visited Lithuania together with Comrade Gorbachev took part in the debate. Members of the Central Committee also spoke.

In brief, we were roundly condemned, we were not fully understood, although we appealed that the freshly adopted platform for the 28th Congress deal with our matters, and I think these elements, these points, will be given a wider discussion on the level of the entire country. I mentioned this in my speech. Neither my speech, of course, nor that of Comrade Paleckis—we delegated him....[sentence left unfinished]

Speeches made by Shved, Kardamavicius, Burokevicius, secretaries of the CPSU organization in Lithuania, or as they call themselves, the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communists of the CPSU platform, left a very depressing impression, and played a decisive role in the making of the decision. Their speeches presented the situation in Lithuania as being extremely tragic; they spoke about the great pressures organized against them. I was surprised when a woman, a worker from Siberia, stood up and said that she had received a telegram from the provisional Central Committee requesting help to save them from the existing situation. Of course, this woman voiced her own great concerns concerning the pressures with which the alternative party had to cope.

In my speech I again pointed out the arguments for the 20th LCP Congress being held, the documents adopted, and why they were needed. However, all this is connected with this matter. [as heard] I have already spoken about this, both at our Plenums and at meetings. Therefore, I do not want to repeat them.

However, the secretaries I mentioned of course devoted more time not on the consolidation of their party matters or solving problems; they were more concerned about the future of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party.

This is the information I wanted to give you. We have not brought the decision with us. [voices in the hall say that it has already been published in PRAVDA] Well, in that case I will make no comment on the decision. You have read it yourselves, and you can form your own impressions on how the events and decisions made here are being treated.

Well, further events. The 28th Congress will take place either at the end of June or the beginning of July. [passage omitted]

Further on Brazauskas Remarks

LD0802155490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1346 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Remarks by Algirdas Brazauskas, Lithuanian Communist Party first secretary, at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] I would imagine that the election campaign between the communists, the social democrats, the democrats, and Sajudis as well as everybody getting into groups and setting up their platforms to nominate their candidates for the Supreme Soviet, this election work, this election campaign—can even call it this way—should proceed in an honest and gentlemenlike way avoiding any biased approaches.

The Lithuanian Communist Party is independent today and the assessment of the party has been very good. We spoke about this this morning. It is not that the Lithuanian Communist Party is given a negative assessment in the center; it has been assessed very positively indeed. We receive very many letters of support. We even receive letters from Siberia asking us to allow them to join the Lithuanian Communist Party. They believe that today, when the whole communist movement in the world is going through a crisis, this path is acceptable. [passage omitted]

We are going through a very complex crisis. I still cannot forget yesterday's discussion on our issue, the whole procedure in Moscow. Allegations are even circulated that the leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party, including secretary Brazauskas, have made an agreement with the center, with Comrade Gorbachev, to stage a certain performance to raise the price of the shares of the Communist Party. [passage omitted]

Prunskine Seeks Independent Bank

LD0802151790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1328 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Remarks by Kazimiera Prunskine, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers Presidium, at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] I would like to remind you once again of the fact that you already know that attempts are made on the part of the USSR Government to ignore the Law on Economic Independence passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, which incidentally includes a clause saying that all banks except the USSR State Bank are to be transferred to the republican control system.

However, during several rounds of negotiations, we can see how the USSR administration is increasingly going back on what has been granted. If in the autumn the debate was about the USSR State Bank only, and to some extent concerning the Economic Bank—there were certain matters which we could even agree with [words indistinct]—but the conflict concerning the Agro-Industrial Bank and the Savings Bank has already turned into a scandal.

We have to form a bank which is not subordinated to the USSR State Bank and one that will be capable of leading the negotiations further and of taking up the task of establishing a Lithuanian banking system.

I think it is evident that this bank, having the right of [currency] emission, will be the factor which will continue solving the problem of the introduction of the national currency. [passage omitted]

Supreme Soviet Declares 1940 Act 'Illegal'

LD0702204390 Moscow TASS in English 2026 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Vilnius February 7 TASS—The 11th Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic is drawing to an end with a record of a kind. It turned out this afternoon when heated arguments ended on its agenda that it includes 26 questions.

Deputies heard the report on "Soviet-German treaties of 1939 and elimination of their consequences for Lithuania" by J. Pozaly, chairman of a Lithuanian Supreme Soviet commission and president of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences.

Confirming the findings of its commission published last August on the study of the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 and their consequences and also taking into account that the USSR Congress of People's Deputies recognised these secret agreements legally unfounded and invalid since the time of their signing, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted a decision declaring that the declaration of the Lithuanian People's Sejm of July 21, 1940 on Lithuania's accession to the USSR is illegal and invalid.

The Supreme Soviet began to discuss a bill on the fundamentals of self-government.

The session continues its deliberations.

'Step' Toward Secession Noted

LD0902065190 Moscow TASS in English 0644 GMT 9 Feb 90

[By TASS Correspondent Sergey Baliucki]

[Text] Vilnius February 9 TASS—The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet (parliament) has passed a resolution which cannot be regarded otherwise than a step towards this Baltic Republic's secession from the Soviet Union.

The resolution states that the Lithuanian People's Sejm's declaration dated July 21, 1940, on Lithuania's accession to the Soviet Union did not express the Lithuanian people's will and is unlawful and invalid.

In this connection the resolution suggests that bilateral talks on the restoration of Lithuania's independence be started. Besides, provision is made to abolish all constitutional obligations by Lithuania and its citizens with regard to the Soviet Union and to reprivatise some branches of the national economy.

Povilas Pecieliunas, leader of the Lithuanian Democratic Party, in a debate on the issue, voiced confidence that a new republican Supreme Soviet, to be elected at the forthcoming elections at the end of February, at its session will adopt an act of the recreation of the Lithuanian state.

However, by no means every one agrees with the session's evaluation of the past.

The decisions of the People's Sejm did express the will of the majority of the Lithuanian people, since they faced a dilemma in the 1939-1940: to get into Hitlerite slavery or join the Soviet Union, historian Statis Laurinaitis believes. And he is not alone in his conclusions.

Meetings took place in a number of work collectives in Vilnius on Thursday, with their participants expressing disagreement with the latest session's resolution.

The Lithuanian parliament session on Wednesday coincided with the completion of the plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee in Moscow. The plenum described the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania as an organisational and political breaking away from the CPSU. The evaluations made at the plenum can be also referred to the Lithuanian parliament's resolution.

The decisions taken by the republican parliament may hinder the realisation of the plenum's resolution in its section concerning the rendering of the necessary assistance to the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party adhering to the CPSU platform.

The point is that the Lithuanian draft law on political parties, published in the repubican press, envisages a ban on "the founding and activities of the political parties of other states".

Many Communists who champion the CPSU's unity believe that in the event of Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union the Lithuanian Communist Party standing on the CPSU platform will be the first to fall under the provisions of such a law.

Will Lithuania and the Soviet Union proceed along the road together or take separate paths? Here runs the divide between the two points of view existing in Lithuania on party and state development.

Time will judge who is right in this contention. It can only be stated so far that political tension in the republic is keeping on. And this is not the best thing with which Lithuania could enter 1990—the first year of the republic's economic independence.

Sakalauskas Tenders Resignation

LD0802142990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0903 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Written statement by Vytautas Sakalauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, read by Deputy Lionginas Sepetys, followed by address by Sakalauskas at the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [Sepetys] A statement has been received. Allow me to read it:

To the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. A statement by Vytautas Sakalauskas. I am sincerely grateful to the republic's Supreme Soviet for the confidence placed in me at the last session. However, representatives of various groups and movements, even on the same day, decided to raise the entire Lithiania issue, and obtain my resignation. Attacks and blackmail have become substantially stronger. To withstand all this one has to have sufficient strength. I cannot face up to this, especially as the load of my direct duties is also increasing. I therefore ask the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet to release me from the duties of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers. I wish the newly appointed chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers success in solving the problems which are of very great importance to Lithuania's residents. Once more, many thanks for your confidence. With respect, Vytautas Sakalauskas.

I draw your attention to the date: Vilnius, 22 December 1989.

Such is this statement. Esteemed Sakalauskas asked that it be discussed today. I will ask Vytautas Sakalauskas to speak.

[Sakalauskas] [Passage omitted] Many deputies will ask why I am doing this. There are many reasons. [passage omitted] I wrote my statement at the end of last year—Comrade Sepetys has just read it. According to the USSR Constitution I belong to the Union Council of Ministers, therefore, last December I informed Comrades Gorbachev and Ryzhkov about my intentions.

I have worked for many years for the benefit of Lithuania, while sparing no effort. However, it is possible to work creatively and fully only when one feels the approval and support of society. As you know, last spring I lost in the elections to the USSR deputies. This could not but have a negative influence on my prestige. I have received may accusations and demands to resign. [passage omitted] I love Lithuania, and my wishes for Lithuania to have a beautiful future are no less than of those people who speak about it a lot and loudly. [passage omitted] I have always done only that which is useful to Lithuania, what would improve its future. But I will never agree with maximalism, because we have lost a lot of time demanding everything, and achieving nothing. [passage omitted]

I would like to express my thoughts separately about a statement made by Kazimiera Prunskiene, which last Saturday was read by her assistant at the Sajudis conference. [passage omitted] She maintains that the commission for the implementation of the economic reform and the appointment of Prunskiene to the post of chairman of that commission and of deputy chairman of the council of minister is a wish to demonstrate that perestroyka is taking place, but that in all main structures of the Council of Ministers attempts are being made to leave all positions unchanged. Thus the idea was expressed that the apparatus of the Council of Ministers interferes with her work. [passage omitted] I have to explain to the deputies today the true state of affairs;

1. The duties of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and the chairman of the commission for the implementation of the economic reform have been entrusted to Prunskiene in order that she immediately, and in a concrete manner, solves all rather complex tasks of the implementation of our economic autonomy. Prunskiene has established in the apparatus of the council of ministers a sector of economic reform, engaging there young, energetic, but rather inexperienced workers. But she virtually does not engage in this work of other officials of the Council of Ministers, the majority of whom are competent and sufficiently experienced. [passage omitted] Comrade Prunskiene never submits any problems to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers for discussion, nor has she raised them at production meetings or with me personally. [pasage omitted] Therefore I state with full responsibility that to accuse the Council of Ministers or its aparatus of interference, or the lack of desire to work in an active manner in implementing economic reforms is not only unjust, but dishonorable.

2. In solving the problems of economic self-dependence, Kazimiera Prunskiene has acted independently, and avoids consultations both with me and other deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. [passage omitted]

My slogan has always been to avoid excesses, ill-considered actions, suspicion, and inciting people. [passage omitted]

I would like to wish from the bottom of my heart the present and future republican government every success and tenacity, wisdom, never to lose the feeling of reality, I repeat, reality, and to express the expectations of our people. [passage omitted]

I once again ask the Supreme Soviet to release me from my duties as the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Sakalauskas Resignation Rejected

LD0802150990 Moscow TASS in English 1446 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Vilnius February 8 TASS—By TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila:

The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet (parliament) has been thrown into turmoil by accusations against the head of the republican government by the leader of the Lithuanian Sajudis mass movement.

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Sajudis ruling council, on Wednesday accused the head of the republican government, Vytautas Sakalauskas, of indecision in handling transition to economic independence and other urgent problems.

He was backed by several other deputies who insisted that the session pass a vote of no confidence in the prime minister.

Although the majority of deputies opposed the discussion of this issue, Sakalauskas today submitted his resignation.

The Supreme Soviet did not agree to his request: only one quarter of those present voted for his resignation.

The resignation issue was first raised in November-December last year when leaders of public movements and organisations, including Sajudis, spoke about their lack of confidence in Sakalauskas. The republican parliament expressed it confidence in the head of government.

Algirdas Brazauskas, Lithuanian president and chief of the Independent Communist Party, urged the session today to postpone recriminations and pool efforts to handle pressing economic, social, political and other topical issues.

It is unlikely that the matter will end there, however. One of Sajudis leaders, Soviet people's deputy Romualdas Ozolas, said that a crisis of top political and executive power is obvious in Lithuania. In his view, the session should resume deliberations on this complicated issue.

The session is now discussing bills on principles of local self-government and on ownership.

Supreme Soviet Session Detailed

LD0902011190 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Here is (Linas Stanita) to tell you more about the session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

The session of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet continued today for the second day running. It was not very resultative, but the debates on five items of the agenda laid the foundation for adopting the final decisions tomorrow on such important laws as those on self-government, the Lithuanian Bank, and the press.

The issue concerning the elections of the chairman of Lithuanian Supreme Soviet was considered and postponed indefinitely, pending the formation of the new Supreme Soviet.

During today's morning sitting chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet Presidium Algirdas Brazauskas gave an account of the Central Committee plenum in Moscow, where he participated as the leader of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. Algirdas Brazauskas qualified the CPSU platform for the forthcoming party congress, which was adopted at the plenum, as a comparatively progressive and radical document. This is determined by the fact that the Communist Party of Russia is proposed to be founded and Article 6 of the Constitution is to be revised providing possibilities for a multi-party system.

Algirdas Brazauskas admitted that especially after Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania he had not expected such harsh debates on the Lithuanian party's secession. Mikhail Gorbachev himself, informing the plenum about the situation in Lithuania, laid special emphasis on the secession (moods) and the drive for independence dominating in the republic. Algirdas Brazauskas told the Supreme Soviet today: We were strongly condemned and met with no understanding. According to him much was determined by the speeches of the secretaries of the provisional central committee of the Soviet Union's Communist Party in Lithuania—Burkovicius, Kardamavicius and (Shvedas)—which made an impressive impression [as heard]. They painted a very tragic situation in Lithuania. It turned out at the plenum that those persons had sent telegrams to the majority of the Central Committee members asking to rescue the Marxist internationalists in Lithuania.

As we have reported, the plenum responded to this cry for help, commissioning the Politburo to provide all-round material and financial support to the CPSU Organization in Lithuania. The resolution passed by the plenum also stated that the independent Lithuanian Communist Party had broken off organizational and political links with the CPSU, but urged it to suspend is program and status.

Algirdas Brazauskas was the main personage today while debating the issue concerning the elections of the chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet. The point is

that the constitutional amendment adopted last year provides that the chairman holds supreme authority in the state, represents Lithuania in international relations and is to be elected by the Supreme Soviet itself by secret ballot. However, as we have reported, before the current session a motion was entered to the effect that the chairman be elected by referendum, possibly even timed with the elections to the Supreme Soviet. When this motion was submitted for discussion at today's sitting, the secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Liudvikas Sabutis, who opened the debates on the issue, voiced the opinion of the presidium that the issue be postponed since it was connected with the making of new laws for which the current Supreme Soviet has no time left, and besides, in the given situation direct elections of the chairman by the people would step up tension in the society.

Similar argumentation was provided by Algirdas Brazauskas who, according to public opinion polls, has the best chances to be elected to this post. As he put it, certain forces, imagining that he would make claims to the post, had unleashed a campaign against him. This might harm the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party in the eyes of the public as well as the communists running for election to the Supreme Soviet.

Referring to a certain hostile campaign was also chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, Vytautas Sakalauskas, who applied for resignation as prime minister for the second time during the past few months. At the beginning of December the member of parliament (Zigma Fraychuva) demanded the prime minister's resignation, accusing him of inactivity and obstructing the implementation of economic sovereignty. The motion, however, was voted down then. Today the Premier Vytautas Sakalauskas motivated his resignation by the fact that Sajudis was conducting a campaign of discredit and blackmail against him. In his speech he turned specifically against Vice Premier Kasimiera Prunskiene, who had, as he put it, neglected the implementation of economic sovereignty and was lost in debates instead. According to Vytautas Sakalauskas, the Estonians already had about 10 laws on implementing economic self-dependence, while Lithuania was as yet discussing the first legal acts. The voting results were (62 or 52) for the prime minister's resignation, 140 against and 20 abstained. Thanking the Supreme Soviet for the confidence, Vytautas Sakalauskas addressed the people's deputies of the Soviet Union: Stop the blackmail.

During the afternoon sitting, the deputies responded with a letter to the session's chairman discounting all the accusations of blackmail. Vice Premier Kasimiera Prunskiene, who later spoke on a different issue, practically did not react to the accusations voiced by the premier though it was obvious how much it had cost her.

Commission Head on Lithuanian Elections

90UN0816A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 10 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Yuozas Bulavas, chairman of the LiSSR Election Commission, by S. Bykhun: "We Can Expect a Difficult Test"]

[Text] Only six weeks remained before the elections for the deputies to the LiSSR [Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation. The crucial nature of this in the life of the republic can be judged from the "Appeal from the LiCP [Lithuanian Communist Party] Central Committee to All Voters, Party and Public Organizations and Movements, and Labor Collectives." The recently passed law On the Election of Deputies for the LiSSR Supreme Soviet imparts just as much importance to this political measure.

How are the preparations going for the elections and how is the new law being used in the practical work of the election commissions? This was what our correspondent asked Yuozas Bulavas, chairman of the republic election commission and corresponding member of the LiSSR Academy of Sciences.

[Bykhun] A month has passed since your commission was set up. What kind of work has been done in that time?

[Bulavas] I do not like to exaggerate, but I can say that the commission has already done a great deal. Briefly, we have devised and approved a calendar plan for the main aspects of holding the elections, estimates of spending have been prepared, the election okrugs and wards have been defined, and the composition of the okrug and sector election commissions has been confirmed. A methodical letter has been prepared for the election commissions in the electoral wards, which surveys matters pertaining to the organization of their work. Forms for voting papers and the protocols of election gatherings and meetings of the election commissions, and models for the ballot boxes and seals have been prepared. Seven meetings have been held, and also a meeting with the chairmen and members of the okrug election commissions and rayispolkoms [rayon executive committees] and gorispolkoms [city executive committees] devoted to matters relating to the holding of the elections.

[Bykhun] What kind of difficulties has your commission encountered during the initial period of its work?

[Bulavas] The time was too short to form the election okrugs and election commissions, prepare samples of voting documentation, draw up estimates of spending connected with the elections....

In this connection let me cite you just one example. The fact is that, with such a number of voters in the republic, the electoral okrugs were formed first. Previously, as a rule, they coincided with the administrative-territorial divisions of rayons and cities and there were no problems. Now they do not. This applied to rayons in

Kretingi and Ionavy, the cities of Palangi and Druskininkay, and others. Therefore the members of the commission had to travel out to the localities and organize things, which, of course, took time. But now we are keeping to our calendar schedule and in general are not experiencing any particular difficulties.

It is common knowledge that the new law on the election of deputies to the Supreme Soviet was preceded by a great deal of tense work at all levels. What, in your view, were the main features of this?

[Bulavas] The main feature of the new law is that it makes it possible for the citizens of Lithuania to express their wishes and will really freely during the election to the republic supreme organ of power. Of no less importance is the fact that the organization and holding of the elections are now done not by the party and not by the executive committees of the rayon and city soviets of people's deputies, but by the election commissions, where the main role is played by the Republic Election Commission, which, as is known, has a set number of members (15) and term (five years), that is, the term of a deputy.

[Bykhun] Can you tell us, please, what caused this innovation?

[Bulavas] Without going into a long discussion, let me note only that within the republic a quite new organ of popular power is being formed, and on a different democratic basis. The task is that it be filled with the most worthy representatives who are capable not only of exerting a decisive influence on the future and free development of our area but also of being totally responsible for the fate both of the individual and of the entire Lithuanian people. And this can be achieved without the intervention or influence of the old apparatus, in the form of the party rayispolkoms and gorispolkoms, in the nomination of candidates to the post of deputy and in the election of deputies, which previously, unfortunately, was not a rare thing.

[Bykhun] This means that the rayispolkoms and gorispolkoms cannot, so to speak, dictate their conditions in the nomination of candidates for the post of deputy, even less their election as deputies. But do we have the same guarantee with respect to the Republic Election Commission itself? For now it is, as they say, up to it—it organizes the election, will hold the elections, and will itself determine the results of those elections.

[Bulavas] First, we are not nominating the candidates. That right is enjoyed only by political and public organizations and citizens' movements at work and their places of residence. The okrug election commission also only registers the election candidates. That is done using mandatory documents: The minutes of the meeting that nominated the candidate, and a written statement from the candidate himself stating that he agrees to be placed on the ballot for the given electoral okrug. In addition, a candidate for the post of deputy may not sit on the election commission for the okrug for which he has been nominated.

Finally, there is something else to which I would like to draw your attention. The members of the commissions are chosen in such a way that they represent different organizations and movements. For example, the Republic Election Commission includes representatives of the LiCP, the "Greens," the council of the Sejm of the Sajudis Lithuanian Movement for Perestroyka, the central board of the Union of Poles of Lithuania, the council of farmers and so forth.

If we look at things in the larger context, then the members of all commissions should be totally objective in resolving any question pertaining to the holding of the elections, regardless of party or organization affiliation. The law requires this, and it must be observed.

[Bykhun] We can agree with you on this plane: The elections to the republic Supreme Soviet are taking place in a more democratic and open way. We must assume that no citizen of Lithuania is being "pressured" to vote. But we are receiving in our editorial offices bewildered questions from particular readers on certain procedural matters relating to the upcoming elections. In particular, a woman who lives in the No 6 apartment block on Konarskio Street in Vilnius city reported to us that a citizen with whom she was not acquainted recently approached her claiming to be from the election commission for the ward and asked her to answer just one question: Was she going to vote? "How can one take this," she asks, "if they are already placing 'crosses' against your name?" What can you say about this?

[Bulavas] I do not think that this was a representative of the ward election commission. It was more likely a person who has an obvious interest in boycotting the elections and in disparaging their importance for the inhabitants of Lithuania. The decision whether or not to vote is a personal one for each voter. I merely suggest that very few will remain indifferent to these elections.

[Bykhun] What are the most significant differences that you have distinguished between the new law and the previous one?

[Bulavas] There are very many. Just take Article 38, which states that a candidate for the post of deputy in the LiSSR Supreme Soviet can have up to seven agents help him conduct his election campaign and engage in canvassing to have him elected as a deputy. A candidate for the post of deputy may also have one observer in each electoral ward, who has the right to attend meetings of the election commissions and be present at the voting, vote counting in the electoral ward, and the determination of results for the electoral okrug and determining the overall results of the voting. In accordance with the present law, agents and observers for a candidate must be registered with the okrug election commission, where they are issued with the proper credentials.

Typically, one of a candidate's agents may at his request be released from his production or service duties for a period of two weeks while still being paid the average wage using funds allocated for the elections.

For example, Article 37 gives the candidate the right to make a public statement with a program for his future activity.

The procedure for nominating candidates for the post of republic Supreme Soviet deputy has also been changed in the new law. Whereas previously this right belonged to the organizations of the Communist Party and other public organizations and the labor collectives, now it also belongs to the rayon and city organs of the political organizations and public movements on the territory of the electoral okrugs, and also to meetings of citizens at their places of residence. The stipulation is made that when a person is nominated as a candidate at least 250 persons should be present at the meeting.

In my opinion it is also important that the new law states that a citizen of the LiSSR, except for the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, may be a candidate only for one Supreme Soviet.

In contrast to the previous law, the new law makes provision for greater liability. Thus, persons who publish or in any other was circulate false information about a candidate are now liable.

Another innovation is found in Article 7—"Glasnost in the Preparations for and Holding of Elections." This article states, in particular, that proxies from political and public organizations and movements, the labor collectives, and observers for voters' meetings located on the territory of the okrug have the right to be present at meetings of the election commission, including during the registration of candidates, the voting, and the vote counting.

In the new law, the procedure for voting and the holding of the elections has been changed. Whereas previously the voting used to take place from 0600 hours to 2200 hours and the candidate who polled more than half of the votes in an electoral okrug was declared the winner, the voting will now be from 0800 hours to 2000 hours, and the candidate who polls more than half of the votes of the voters participating will be declared the winner. This is a significant difference.

The voting procedure for all voters who for some reason are unable to be in the locality on polling day has been changed in the new law. Previously such citizens were issued with papers of authority that enabled them to vote in any electoral ward and for any candidate. Now, in line with Article 46, a citizen who is unable to be present on polling day can apply to the ward election commission at least 10 days before the elections and ask for a ballot to be sent to him. After he has completed the ballot he puts it in an envelope which he seals and mails to the commission. On election day the envelope is placed in the ballot box in the presence of the commission members.

[Bykhun] Excuse me for interrupting you, but what will happen, for example, with those citizens of Lithuania who are now working in other republics in our country and are unable to participate in the voting?

[Bulavas] The commission has also made provision for this circumstance. Thus, we already know that about 500 Lithuanian construction workers are working in Artika city in the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. They are all receiving blank ballots from the electoral okrugs in which their places of permanent residence are located, and when they have filled them out they will return them.

[Bykhun] At one of its sessions your commission reviewed the question of participation by servicemen in the elections. How was it resolved?

[Bulavas] All servicemen, and also their families, will take part in the elections in the normal way.

[Bykhun] The new law has already gone into force. And who if not you knows about its "strong" and "weak" aspects. You have already described its advantages. But what, in your opinion, are its defects?

[Bulavas] I think that it is still a little early to talk about that because it has not yet been fully tested. But comments are already being made by voters about particular articles. For example, citizens have been turning to us on the subject of Article 21, which provides the procedure for the formation of the okrug election commissions. They believe that a labor collective council can also recommend a person for this commission without a meeting of a majority of workers, as provided for by this article.

We have had to turn to the Supreme Soviet Presidium for an explanation of Article 41, which concerns the procedure for nominating candidates for the post of deputy. For example, it is not entirely clear from this article how many candidates may be nominated by rayon or city organs and political and public organizations and movements. It is now known that these organs may nominate as many candidates as there are electoral okrugs on the territory of the rayon or city.

[Bykhun] Many of our readers are interested in the question of the money being spent for the election campaign. Could you say a few words about that?

[Bulavas] Some R2.5 million have been allocated for the entire election campaign. Of this sum, R296,100 have gone for the work of the election commissions, R1,320,000 for the ward election commissions, R150,000 to pay candidates, and R75,000 to pay candidates' agents. In addition, each candidate has the right to finance his election campaign by opening a personal bank account into which individual citizens, labor collectives and political and public organizations and

movements may transfer their own monetary assets. The total sum of those assets may not exceed R1,000.

[Bykhun] If we are talking about monetary assets, I would like to clarify another matter with you. The more so since it is of interest to some of our readers. It is known that the new law provides for one member of an okrug or ward election commission to be released during the period of preparation for and the holding of elections from his production or service duties while retaining the average wage, to be paid from assets allocated for the elections. But why does only one member enjoy this advantage? Surely all members of the commission must spend considerable amounts of their free time dealing with "election" matters. Does this mean that they should also get some kind of material compensation also?

[Bulavas] This is so. But, judge for yourself, where would that money come from? Even if we were to pay only one members of each commission, it would cost about R700,000. Moreover, we should not forget that participation in the work of a commission is a public duty because a person is not appointed to a commission but elected.

[Bykhun] It is common knowledge that not all inhabitants of the republic can speak Lithuanian. Did the commission take this into consideration when it prepared the ballots?

[Bulavas] Of course. For example, in Snechkus, most people speak Russian. In Shalchininskiy and other rayons, where a Polish population lives, they will be in Polish. So no citizens who speak foreign languages will feel wounded.

[Bykhun] Your commission, of course, has more than enough work. But already the elections to the local soviets of people's deputies are not far off....

[Bulavas] We have already started to form the okrug election commissions and prepare the voting documentation. We are now thinking about going to Latvia or Estonia to learn how the elections were held there in okrugs with many mandates, of which we have more than 50. In short, we are working in this direction.

[Bykhun] How do you, as the chairman, assess the work of the commission members?

[Bulavas] Positively. I would like in particular to note the diligence and work of my deputy, V. Litvinas, and commission members V. Panumis and Yu. Raudelyunas. The latter sacrificed his own vacation in order to do this work.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude also to the workers in the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Soviet Work Department, who are providing our commission with comprehensive and essential assistance.

[Bykhun] Can you tell us how many candidates have already been nominated for the posts of deputy

[Bulavas] As of 8 January more than 80 candidates had been nominated.

[Bykhun] To conclude our interview I think it would not be superfluous to remind our readers once again of how many deputies will be elected to the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, 12th Convocation.

[Bulavas] A total of 141 deputies are to be elected to the republic Supreme Soviet.

Nominations Correspond to Lithuania Population

LD0102152790 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 1 Feb 90

["News About Lithuania" program, presented by Edvinas Butkus]

[Text] After final registration of the 522 nominess for deputies to the Lithuanian supreme Soviet had been completed, it become clear that their nationality composition fully corresponded to the nationality composition of the population of Lithuania.

With 141 seats in the new Supreme Soviet there are almost four candidates on average to each seat.

These, and other facts concerning the election, were announced by chairman of the Republican Election Commission Juozas Bulavas. He pointed out that according to him the candidate deputies essentially corresponded to the tasks set for the new Supreme Soviet.

It has been calculated that the Lithuanian Social Democrats party is represented by 21 candidate, the Lithuanian Democrats by 18 candidates; Christian Democrats—3; and the Lithuanian Greens—4.

Three hundred and ten candidates have been nominated by the Communist Party; according to preliminary information the supporters of the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU have divided at a ratio of 2:1.

Chairman of the Republican Election Commission Juozas Bulavas pointed out that a considerable number of violations of regulations in organizing the election meetings have been recorded. People who were not only not present at the election meetings, but who did not live in the constituency were included in the lists of nominees. Accoding to J. Bulovas the activists from the organization Yedinstvo have distinguished themselves in this. It is interesting to note that Valeriy Ivanov, the leader of this organization, and Professor Ivan Kucherov, the leader of the split bloc of the same organization Yedinstvo, are nominees in the same constituency in Vilnius.

As you remember, at the time when the process of nominating candidates for deputies had already begun, servicemen who were not permanent residents of Lithuania were deprived of the right to vote by the

amendment to the Law on Elections passe by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. According to the Republican election Commission chairman, this did not cause any considerable difficulties.

Lithuanian Communist Party Courts Voters

90UN0860B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 24 Jan 90 p 1

[Address to voters by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania: "Our Goals and Deeds"]

[Text] Dear residents of Lithuania!

The CPLi [Communist Party of Lithuania] is preparing for the elections without the constitutional guarantees of its leadership role which previously existed, having honestly and frankly evaluated its contradictory and dramatic past, and having become independent. This was a difficult but unavoidable decision which all people in Lithuania awaited. Even a most critical glance at the past should not obscure the realistic prospects for the future and interfere with a sober evaluation of the current political forces in Lithuania.

The independent CPLi hopes that the residents of Lithuania understand that the changes have been speeded up by the constructive activities of the CPLi and its initiatives in the recent period.

What are the main concerns of the CPLi, what will be the primary direction of its activities when it has a parliamentary opportunity to work for the benefit of Lithuania and its people? In its actual activities, the party will proceed from a program of actions of which we consider the following to be a priority.

Restoration of the Lithuanian State

A free, law-governed, democratic state of human socialism based on national values—such is the ideal of a majority of the residents of Lithuania and the main goal of the actions of the CPLi. The restoration of an independent Lithuanian State consists of certain stages. Even now we strive for sovereignty, equal rights, and mutually advantageous cooperation both with the center and other republics through negotiations, on the basis of agreements. At the current stage of restoring the Lithuanian State, it is necessary to:

—ensure the exercise of the right of the Lithuanian people to self-determination by restoring historical justice;

—assert democracy, a multi-party system, and delineate the functions of the legislative and executive authorities and the judiciary; depoliticize the law-enforcement organs;

—resolve the issue of military service of the young men of Lithuania by organizing national military units;

—establish and expand contacts with international organizations, ensure the diplomatic recognition of the Lithuanian State, exchange diplomatic missions;

—assert the integrity of the Lithuanian State by negotiations with other states.

Spiritual Rebirth of the Individual

It is the duty of national culture to restore and reinforce the morality and spirituality of the people by enriching the individual intellectually and aesthetically.

The CPLi is resolutely committed to:
—ensuring the continuity and integrity of the culture of Lithuania;
—setting forth in the law guarantees of the freedom of creativity, protecting culture, education, and science from ideological dictates;
—encouraging and expanding democracy and glasnost based on general human values;
—creating a national system of science and education which meets our cultural needs and economic interests, restoring the traditions of national schools;
—harmonizing relations between the church and the state, aspiring to mutual understanding and respect, and gradually returning the assets belonging to religious communities;
—supporting the aspirations of the ethnic groups of Lithuania to preserve national originality, language, customs, and traditions of culture;
—ensuring the actual implementation of the legislative acts on the state language of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, and developing the Lithuanian language in all possible ways;
—reorganizing the system of mass media.

Meeting Social Needs

The independent CPLi strives for guarantees of equality for all residents of Lithuania, for social justice. This is why we will persistently and urgently improve and implement:

—constitutional rights of citizens;
—adjustment of incomes using a justified progressive system of taxation, as well as measures for increasing wages, retirement benefits, scholarships, benefits, and other fixed payments taking into account the official subsistence level;
—guidelines for the provision of housing which are uniform for all residents and differentiated rent (depending on the floor space, quality of housing, and the environment);
—a housing construction program in the urban and rural areas;
—improvement of social conditions for the rural population;
—a system of health care which will codify the responsibility of the organs of power and administration, self-government, departments, enterprises and organizations, treatment and prevention facilities, officials

and the people themselves for a careful attitude toward their health, its reinforcement and restoration;
—a program of reinforcing the family, care of the genetic pool, a scientifically sound demographic policy;
—most extensive financial and spiritual aid to the handicapped, their social adaptation;
—programs of development of physical culture and sports, tourism, various ways of reinforcing health and a healthy way of life of the populace.

Environmental Protection

Only a society which is capable of maintaining a harmonious relationship with nature has an opportunity for historic continuity. This is why laws on the protection of the natural environment which guarantee the right of the society and every citizen of the republic to ecological well-being should be developed and complied with, primarily by:
—codifying the right of local self-government to solve the problems of environmental protection and use of nature taking the interests of local population and the republic as a whole into account;
—encouraging ecologically pure production;
—reducing atmospheric pollution and the discharge of waste water into open bodies of water in keeping with the requirements of the Helsinki convention;
—solving the problem of collection, processing, and storage of poisonous waste;
—implementing a unified system of pollution monitoring, scientific research in the field of environmental protection, and ecological reviews;
—taking part in international ecological programs;
—informing the public in a timely fashion.

Economic Restructuring

The well-being of the citizens of Lithuania is the goal of the economic policy of the independent CPLi. We will ensure this goal through:

—rallying the efforts of the residents of Lithuania with a view to creating a modern economic system in the republic;

—eliminating the administrative-command system of management and implementing a market mechanism which ensures that the interests of producers and consumers are reconciled;

—combining various forms of property, ensuring their equal rights and economically effective ways of organizing labor and production, partially denationalizing, demonopolizing, and decentralizing the economy and encouraging private initiative;

—creating independent monetary, finance and credit, and budgetary systems;

—expanding economic contacts on an equal footing with other Soviet republics and states;

—streamlining the system of price-setting and taxation in agriculture.

Esteemed voters!

Lithuania, which is moving toward independence, has a historic need for the wisdom and political realism of the candidates supported by the independent CPLi, their skill of maintaining a constructive dialogue with various political forces. By voting for the candidates whom we support and who know well the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the republic, you will vote in favor of a realistic and mature program of the further renaissance of Lithuania, for your future. We are in favor of a young and free, sober and healthy, just and affluent Lithuania!
[Signed] Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania

Lithuanian 'Sovietization' Papers To Be Released

LD0802164590 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Excerpts] A sitting of the Council of Representatives of Deputies in the Lithuanian Parliament was held earlier today. [passage omitted] A commission for document circulation at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee has decided to distribute the party documents dating back to the years 1940-1941. They are very indicative of the rapid Sovietization processes of that time.

Lithuanian Party Viewed in Wake of Congress

WA0802195890 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 11 Jan 90 p 2

[N. Zdanovich report: "Who Is Right? (The Question of the 'Transition Period')"]

[Text] The 20th LiCP [Lithuanian Communist Party] Congress, which completed its work on the eve of the new year, 1990, not only did not put the final period on the party discussions but on the contrary it delineated even more clearly the boundary that separates the communists of the republic into two camps.

The results of the congress and the subsequent reaction in the CPSU Central Committee are being discussed everywhere—at work, on the street, in private conversations, at meetings of party cells. And although the the time for self-determination by the communists of Lithuania has been postponed until the end of March, already today many of them have made their choice, and some have spoken out in support of the results of the 20th LiCP Congress, while others have decided to remain members of the party that they joined—the CPSU.

Today, two party committees exist at the Lithuanian "Sigma" Production Association. One of them is led by A. Karalyus, the secretary of the association party organization, while V. Meshcheryakov, senior design engineer at the scientific research institute of computer technology and information science, has been named as the interim chief. Behind the former stand a majority of

communists whose aspirations and hopes were justified by this last congress. In the second group there are also communists who are continuing the struggle for the unity of the CPSU and its renewal and are reluctant to voluntarily isolate themselves from the political processes taking place in the country. And this is how they assess the decisions of the 20th Congress. "By organizing an independent party," V. Meshcheryakov thinks, "the LiCP has deprived itself of the opportunity to influence the situation in the CPSU, and, that means, in the country—for it would be unreasonable to deny that role of the party as the only decisive force in society."

A. Karalyus assumes that about three-fourths of the members of the party organization support the stance taken by his party committee. V. Meshcheryakov agrees with this ratio, but emphasizes that both sides will soon be saying goodbye to some of today's "like-thinkers" who in the near future will be handing in their party cards. They will simply be unable to find a place for themselves in such a complicated situation. They will include the fellow-travelers whose paths finally diverge from the communist movement, and those who no longer believe in either the old or the new trends or the ability of the party to carry people along with it.

I met with V. Panskiy and R. Tenis, members of the party committee led by V. Meshcheryakov. What is it that, in their opinion, threatens the republic party organization today? Sajudis has achieved a split so as to settle accounts with the Communist Party. To this end Sajudis will either merge with it or destroy it: This is their opinion.

The threat to the party's existence also worries A. Karalyus and his supporters at the "Sigma" Association. But in contrast to Meshcheryakov, Panskiy and Tenis, and their comrades, he saw in the decisions of the 20th Congress the only chance for defending and regaining the former authority in the present very complex situation in the republic.

"The elections of USSR people's deputies," A. Karalyus reminded us, "demonstrated the unpopularity of the party among the people. Communists in the republic had to show their ability to engage in vigorous action and be bold and decisive in offering and embodying new ideas. We have always proclaimed a vanguard role for ourselves in society. Now the people should say whether or not we have that right."

Neither are there doubts among the members of the interim party committee at the "Sigma" Production Association that the party needs renewal. And these processes are taking place in the party: The formation of the Russian Communist Party Bureau [as published] is proof of this. But they are taking place only slowly and not always consistently. Alas, there is still no concept for perestroyka in the party. And so the interim party committee considers its task to be the struggle to change the present CPSU Rules.

"The struggle to change the Rules is one thing, but destroying them is another," V. Meshcheryakov emphasizes. No matter how bad the law might be, we must take it into account. There is a procedure for changing the law and we must try to achieve this without destroying it! But the 20th Congress broke the law. If they were ready for such changes then, if they acted according to the Rules, which bind everyone who joins the party, they would have been obliged to withdraw from the CPSU and form a new party." But how legitimate would it be to decide to create an independent party, even if it were within the framework of the CPSU, which V. Meshcheryakov supports? It is not now even within the framework of the CPSU Rules.

A. Karalyus disagrees with the viewpoint of the interim party committee, considering the creation of an independent republic communist party on the basis of the former republic CPSU organization to be quite justified. The more so since its ideological basis remains the same. "In considering these serious problems and reaching responsible decisions, and evaluating them, it is essential to proceed from today's realities," he says. "I am convinced that the people support us. And this means that we are right, for we are a party of the people.

How many times throughout human history has the name of the people been invoked for lawlessness, and how many feats have been accomplished. The people have immortalized in legends the names of their predecessors and have rejected those whom they failed to understand when alive. And the people themselves have called the rulers of their destinies the crowd, the holy thing.... But it is always the people who are the measure of the value of any particularly idea, precisely the people who have ultimately answered the question "who is right?" Time, of course, will tell and will put everything in its proper place. But we must live today and make our decisions now.

New Polish Magazine on Sale in Lithuania

LD0202174490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] The first issue of the Polish magazine MAGAZYN WILENSKI has appeared today in the kiosks in Lithuania's capital. Its publishers think that, in particular, the problems of interethnic relations will be examined in its pages. A selection of poetry by Polish classical writers is being published in the first issue.

Economic

Economist Discusses Solutions to Inflation

PM0702170890 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 4, 23-29 Jan 90 pp 32-35

[Economist Valentina Yanishevskaya article: "Time And Money"]

[Text] Inflation has become a threatening reality in our country. Its rate keeps growing steadily. The government and a number of our leading experts believe that inflation is caused primarily by an excessive growth of monetary incomes, on the one hand, and chronic consumer goods and services shortages, on the other. Hence the measures suggested to combat inflation: increasing the output and import of goods, broadening the services sphere and restricting the growth of incomes. The efficacy of these measures is dubious. Goods shortages and excessive solvent demand, which are regarded now as the cause, not as the outcome of inflation, constitute a vicious circle, with no way out of it in sight. Under the circumstances the current recommendations for removing the shortages and restricting the incomes of individual employees and whole enterprises can be likened to correct and flashy road signs, intended as a means of safely seeing a faulty car through a length of broken highway.

What We Know and What We Don't Know About Deficits

A deficit means having a lot of money, but nothing to spend it on. Most people are worldly-wise nowadays, and can find a way out of any predicament. The Soviet people, for instance, have grown accustomed to deficits. Some patiently stand in lines. Others set up special distribution and special service systems. Still others cultivate the sort of people who can be useful in getting goods in short supply and are prepared to pay through the nose for them. For instance, they think nothing of spending a thousand rubles or more for tights with a tropical motif or for a pair of shoes which change their color to match the dress one wears.

A question arises in this connection: what kind of deficit are we to fight? It exists only in the formal economy. The shadow economy knows of no shortages, because it operates on a fundamental market principle: A product costs as much as the prospective buyer is prepared to pay for it. In the formal economy, the action of this principle is suppressed by the monopolies which merit a special discussion.

Manufacturing plants are widely believed to be monopolists in our country. This is either a delusion or a distortion of the truth. We are told that anyone selling a product in short supply is a monopolist. By this logic, it would be monopolistic of you to sell strawberries in winter. As a matter of fact, "monopoly" means a deliberate, organized restriction, or even elimination of competition. Way back at the beginning of his century, Lenin described the basic methods of exercising monopoly control of the market, which include depriving competitors of raw materials, labor, marketing outlets and supply channels, and beating down the prices. These and other methods are widely used in our economy as well—not by enterprises, but by the central authorities like the State Planning Committee, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the State Price Committee, ministries and other government bodies. They dictate to manufacturers what to produce and in what quantities, whom to sell their products to and at what prices, distribute material and financial resources and finished products at their own discretion. Besides that, they dictate wage levels and bound supplies to consumers.

As for enterprises, they do not engender monopoly, but use the consequences of the monopoly domination of the center, which deforms the economy and money-commodity relations, one of these consequences being shortages in the formal economy.

These shortages, and their absence in the shadow economy, are interconnected phenomena, which pose a number of theoretical and practical questions, such as where do the commodities offered by the black market come from.

The black market draws its commodities chiefly from "underground manufacturers," and misappropriates the unaccounted for part of the state-run enterprises' output. The existence of underground production alone does not explain the origin and expansion of the black market and profiteering. Where does the underground industry get its raw materials, feedstock, equipment and labor from? The answer is obvious: From the formal economy.

The underground economy uses both illegal (theft, graft) and legal (the setting of certain output quotas and limits) methods to draw means of production and finished products from the formal economy. Centralization in whatever form, be it planning, supply, pricing or norm setting, provides ideal conditions for pumping the goods over to the shadow economy.

Enterprises often bribe the authorities so as to obtain more realistic or lower production targets, receive resources, and have their products overpriced. Bribery in cash is not the only form of graft. In order to curry favor with a ministry or some other government body, enterprise managers make special holiday arrangements for its officials, have their cars and apartments repaired free of charge and offer them summer residences for their own exclusive use. "Pushers," get the principle of centralized material and technical supply going, serve as an inalienable link connecting the shadow and formal economies.

The siphoning of goods out of the formal economy into the shadow one is fraught with colossal losses. Operators often deliberately destroy products so as to steal with impunity. According to the Fire Fighting Service Administration under the USSR Minisry of the Interior, arsons of warehouses, supply centers and shops, did our trade industry 47.8 million rubles' worth of damage in 1988. Enormous amounts of meat, vegetables, fruit and other farm products, thousands and even tens of thousands head of livestock are destroyed every year. Hides are left to rot in tanneries; and timber, in wood-working facilities.

In about two years, the USSR Ministry of the Interior exposed 450,000 economic crimes, nearly 14,000 of them major ones. According to the State Committee for

Statistics, damage and theft caused 4.1 billion rubles worth of losses. The list is infinite. The situation is caused by a deformed market driven underground.

For as long as debates over whether we should accept a market economy are going on, and the nationwide market is substituted with that within enterprises, all the efforts aimed at restricting and ousting the shadow economy are doomed to failure and will only encourage the shadow economy to be more inventive. For instance, the changeover from the normal practice of offering goods for sale through the trading network, to their disribution over enterprises has created every condition for a wholesale flow of goods to the black market. Previously, profiteers had to buy goods from the retail network in small batches, or even in single places; now they can do so wholesale. This is confirmed by statistics obtained by the Ministry of the Interior as a result of a three-day operation ring, carried out by patrolmen on the Moscow circular motorway: Check-ups of outgoing trucks revealed 250,000 rubles' worth of goods bought in large batches to be smuggled out of Moscow. Just one of the detained trucks turned out to carry about 6,000 packs of imported tea, 3,000 packs of caramels, 230 tins of coffee and 200 kilos of sugar. In Leningrad, the search of a profiteer's flat revealed 330 wedding rings which are known to be available to newlyweds only.

In the Khabarovsk Territory, 80 percent of the Japan-made video equipment, made available to peasants on condition they sell its worth of farm poducts to the state, went to people who hadn't handed in as much as an ounce of these products.

It would be wrong to say that nothing is being done about all this. On the contrary. But all the countermeasures are of no avail. What's more, the stepping up of punitive action against speculators only causes black market prices to jump up by way of compensation for extra risk. As a result, it is buyers, rather than sellers, who get worst hit for the most part. Somewhow we stubbornly ignore the experience other countries have accumulated in this sphere. In the U.S., for instance, the government sees to it that liquor prices do not exceed a certain limit, because a 20 percent price rise might encourage home distilling, with the result that the incomes from the marketing of liquor would go to bootleggers rather than to the state budget. For the same reason, and also for fear of provoking heavy drinking, liquor prices in cafes and restaurants are kept relatively low.

A Law of Stagnation: Billions Down the Drain

Do our enterprises have much surplus money? To believe the economist Nikolay Shemlyev, they have accumulated on their bank accounts 150 billion rubles in idle money. This figure is highly objectionable in itself. The thing is that when characterizing enterprises' solvent demand, one should not ignore the objective conditions for meeting it, i.e., the availability of the means of production on the market. While speaking of the idle money on the enterprises' bank deposits, we should match it against the stock of commodities and other material assets to the tune of 478 billion rubles as of the beginning of 1989. True, there is reason to believe that the actual worth of this stock is lower, what with the juggling with figures and faulty accounting. This is particularly true of the construction jobs, which have been left unfinished. Besides, a considerable proportion of this stock has been damaged or stolen.

Apparently, the actual worth of material assets in stock countrywide is about 350 billion rubles. In pursuing practical objectives, it is important, of course, to know the content, structure, holders, distribution patterns and prices of raw materials, feedstock and equipment. Be that as it may, however, such material resources are certainly excessive for a national income of 625 billion rubles and a gross national production of 866 billion rubles.

In our country we have a situation where some enterprises are not willing to sell their surplus material assets, while others are in no position to buy them. Money is of small if any consideration here. The holders of surplus material assets prefer to keep them because, our centralized material and technical supply system being what it is, they can be left without the necessary feedstock and raw materials any time. Now reserve stock can always be brought into play, whenever necessary, or swapped for what is needed at the moment. This naturally favors the growth of the shadow economy. Products like metal rolled stock have become kind of currency in the semi-legal or "grey" market of means of production which can buy almost anything.

The excessive reserves of material assets result from the current situation in our country where fulfilling the plan at any cost takes precedence of the saving of resources.

Consequently, the reason why some enterprises accumulate large sums of idle money on their bank deposits, while others build up excessive stocks of material assets often lies not in the lack of these assets, but in the fact that they are distributed in accordance with the rules of nonmarket command-administrative relations. While preventing means of production from finding their way to the official market, from being freely sold and bought, and hindering the satisfaction of the enterprises' solvent demand, these relations provide the most favorable conditions for the black market, for the shadow economy.

For its part, the shadow economy is coming to play an ever more important part in the producer goods market. At the same time, two shadow markets - that of consumer goods and that of means of production - are merging together and maintaining a two-way "barter trade." Not infrequently, enterprises exchange building materials, mechanisms and metal for cars, apartments, sanatorium tickets, and other "good things of life" other enterprises are authorized to get from centralized supply stores for their own exclusive use. As a result, stocks of

material assets become sources of personal enrichment for certain economic managers. This cannot but foster inflation.

"Surplus: Or "Hot" Money"?

Some say that people have a lot of surplus money in this country. Let's look into this problem. 320 billion rubles have accumulated on private savings deposits here. Besides, people have an estimated 50-70 billion rubles "salted away" at home. Other sources say that there are 100 billion rubles in circulation. Petr Korotkov claims that this money is accounted for by the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. down to the last kopek. This is a case of boundless faith in the omnipotence of the state machinery, indeed!

It is difficult to say precisely how much money is presently circulating because besides official economy this money also serves shadow economy. Naturally, keeping accounts is a complicated business in this case. According to Lev Braginskiy's calculations, 500 million rubles is circulating in the country in cash. Oleg Shvedov believes one trillion rubles is currently on saving deposits, in private holding, or cashes and in the Mafia circulation. 479 billion rubles out of this trillion is backed with goods and services, while the rest of the money is "hollow." This means that we have 2.1 times as much money as is needed for a healthy economy.

These statistics are staggering and make one reflect on the expediency of the proposed monetary reform designed to undermine the financial might of shadow economy and organized crime rather than to withdraw surplus money from circulation. Such a reform could only offer a temporary solution if root causes of our specific inflation are not eliminated.

In assessing the amount of surplus money, it is necessary to take into account the various factors at play here, one of them being the level of prices. The higher the prices, the more money you need. The artificial restraining of price rises detracts from the need for money, while in actually the reverse is true. This provokes latent inflation and its withdrawal into the black market sphere.

While talking about the large sums on savings deposits, we mustn't ignore the following circumstances. First of all, owing to a low level of pensions, to the inadequacy of social security, most people have to save for the "rainy day." This part of savings can hardly be related to the "hot" money which is an inflation factor.

Second, it would be wrong to include in "hot money" the savings due to the absence of consumer credit, which compels people to save up for expensive goods.

Nevertheless, when working out anti-inflation measures the emphasis should be not on reckoning up surplus money, the more so since the rate of inflation can be assessed only on the basis of consumption level. It is much more important to know income sources and population structure by the income level. It is precisely there that the answers to the questions of where inflation in the consumer market comes from lie in.

The first thing to point out in this context is that at least a third of our country's population has no savings altogether. These people are concerned not with consumer goods shortages but with making ends meet and surviving to the next payday. In this connection, if we regard solvent demand not only as a factor of consumption, but also as a factor of production, we have every reason to claim that what we need to rectify the situation in our economy and in our market, and to find our way out of crisis, is solvency which is now acutely deficient in the low; and even medium-pay brackets. Constituting the majority of consumers here, these categories fear, most of all, the slightest rise in prices, which is often objectively inevitable. These people are actively opposed to cooperators not so much because of the poor quality of their goods as because of higher prices they charge. The same buyers are opposed to the practice of enterprises charging extras to their prices. The attempt to settle the conflict between producers and consumers by freezing prices or wages appears unsubstantiated and doomed to failure.

One can understand the desire of some executives to blame all the troubles we have in our economy on cooperators and on the group egoism of enterprises. But if we look deeper into the problem, we shall see that the root cause of our poverty is to be sought neither in perestroika, nor in price rises. Stark poverty accompanies socialism practically always. For decades, the main condition of consumer goods production—a sufficient and dynamic solvent demand of the public—remained unfulfilled. Hence low consumer goods prices. But then, the incomes of a substantial proportion of the public are also low. Therefore, most people couldn't afford many goods at such prices. As for the low prices, they resulted not from technical progress, not from the abundance of goods, but from the ruthless exploitation of cheap work force.

The slightest livening-up in the labor market, the emancipation of labor, the changeover to economic, commodity-money relations and, as a result, an increase in the public's incomes leads to a rise in prices: of farm products, meat and milk above all (as was the case (in 1961), producer goods (in 1967). The price rise process has been going on, in an overt or covert form, continuously since the end of the 1950s.

At the same time, the government is firmly pursuing the wage freeze policy which is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. Because of low wages, workers are not motivated to do efficient work. On the other hand, the cheapness of labor provides no incentive for modernization. As a result, the shadow labor market is steadily gaining in scope and making every greater profits.

Low wages and it being impossible to earn much by honest work push some people into the shadow economy

or even into crime. Low wages do not only discourage workers from stepping up their efficiency, but also hamper the realization of the schemes for purchasing apartments from the state, buying shares, changing over to the lease contract sysem, making more services available to the public, medical ones included. So far, all these schemes are geared to the needs of the moneyed ones.

The fact that the incomes of many people are extremely low does not remove the problem of the shadow economy making unearned incomes. In addition to what has already been said about fictitious sources of incomes, it is necessary to point out the extremely important role credit plays here, or more accurately, financing when loans are issued against plans and frequently cover mismanagement or downright embezzlement.

The way out of the crisis lies in forming a civilized market which objectively calls for enterprises' self-dependence in deciding on what to produce and in what quantity, in choosing partners; for balanced prices; for replacing credit financing by crediting; for anti-monopoly legislation. Underground market practices come not from the laws of the market but from the administrative system's failure to take into account the demands of the market.

Far from ruling out, the market economy presupposes centralized control, but of the kind entirely different from that exercised today. First of all, it is necessary to define and optimize the functions of the center; second, the center should change over to different methods of dealing with enterprises, to replace peremptory instructions by recommendations; third, it is necessary to firmly guarantee the center's abidance by its decisions, that is to materialize the vital principle, the "golden rule" of any system—adequate feedback.

Plants Reopening To Ease Medicines Shortage

PM0902103990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations"]

[Text] The commission examined the emergency situation prevailing in the country's health service due to sharp reductions in the production of medicines.

According to USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry data, local soviet organs and sanitary services decided in 1989 and early 1990 to either close down or partially terminate the operations of a number of production units and enterprises, many of which were the only ones in the country manufacturing some of the most important raw materials and other materials necessary for the production of medicinal output. For example, the closure of a chlorosulfonic acid shop at the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy's Kirovograd copper smelting combine will result in reduced output of medicinal compounds like analgin, amidopyrine, norsulfazole, sulfaguine, and sulfalene. The shutdown of capacities at the "Nairit" Production Association in Yerevan city will bring to an end the production of cardiovascular medicaments (theophylline, caffeine, zuphylline), antipyretics and analgesics (amidopyrine, promedole), and vitamins (A, E, and B group vitamins). The termination of dimethylformamide production by "Azot" Production Association in Kemerovo city will prevent the production of 14 categories of medicines including antibiotics, X-ray contrast mediums, and cardiovascular and other most important medicines. The closure of the Kiev chemicals plant and the "Azot" Production Association in Dneprodzerzhinsk city will halt the manufacture of ampicillin, sulfalene, levomycetin, and synthomycin. Deliveries of antiphlogistic and gastrointestinal medicines to pharmacies and hospitals will cease.

The commission received an urgent telegram on 1 February from the collective of the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry's Saksskiy chemical plant, reporting the imminent closure of the country's sole potassium permanganate production units in view of the refusal of the Bakhchisaray construction industry combine to accept manganese slurries for processing, despite the conclusion by USSR Ministry of Health organs that they are not toxic.

According to estimates by the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry, medicine production in the country will be reduced by 30-40 percent due to raw material shortages.

It was noted that decisions to close down, suspend operations, or reduce capacities at industrial enterprises and production units have been made, as a rule, in connection with systematic violations of environmental protection legislation by enterprises. The USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry,the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, and the Agrokhim were instructed to analyze the reasons why the fulfillment of environmental protection measures had been obstructed by enterprises under their jurisdiction and to take the culprits strictly to task.

At the same time, we cannot jeopardize the health of millions of Soviet people through the lack of a whole series of vitally important medicines, and therefore the commission instructed the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, the Agrokhim, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers to take all necessary measures for immediate resumption of operations by enterprises and production units manufacturing raw materials and other materials for the medical industry, bearing in mind that their closure would create an emergency situation as regards meeting the needs of the country's population for medicines, and to inform the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations of measures

taken by 15 February this year. By that date, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, and the Agrokhim must prepare and submit to the commission measures coordinated with the councils of ministers of relevant union republics, the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection, and the USSR Ministry of Health, whose implementation is necessary for guaranteeing ecological normatives during operations by enterprises manufacturing raw materials for the production of medicines.

The commission requested the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, and local soviets of people's deputies to examine as soon as possible the emergency situation prevailing in the health service as a result of the termination of operations on territories under their jurisdiction by enterprises supplying raw materials to the medical industry, and to adopt decisions for normalizing the situation as regards the supply of medicines to the population.

For its part, the commission will ensure permanent monitoring of the fulfillment of environmental protection measures at the relevant chemical industry enterprises.

Agricultural

Commentary on Land Law Session Debates

904B0128A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 2 Feb 90 p 1

[Commentary by V. Virkunen: "Let the Peasant Decide"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the final session of the Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for the consideration of remarks and proposals by citizens on the draft Land Law chaired by Deputy A.A. Nikonov was held on 31 January. The people's deputies again discussed the draft basic legislation of the USSR and union republics on land, article by article, in an atmosphere of sharp but constructive debate.

How has the draft law changed compared to the version published? In brief, the variant submitted for the discussion stands out for being specific, definitive, and radical.

First of all, the term "ownership of land" has appeared in the draft law though the pertinent articles have not been edited yet. It is also significant that selling, purchasing, mortgaging, and exchanging land is allowed in cases envisaged by the legislation of the union and autonomous republics and put under the strict control of the soviets.

This provision was the one that gave rise to polemics. Deputy V.A. Tikhonov submitted his version of the wording of Article 3 of the draft law. He proposed to abolish the state ownership of land and carry out a radical land reform on this basis. In his opinion, there is just no other way to endow the emerging peasant farms with land. Any kolkhoz [collective farm] member or sovkhoz [state farm] worker should, if he so wishes, have a right to leave the socialized farm without hindrance and receive the share of land and work implements due to him. Without this provision, citizens of the USSR will not receive land, stressed V.A. Tikhonov.

The reactions to his proposals were mixed. At the same time, the proposals served as a good foundation for considerations on reflecting in the law the notion of "land ownership." Many spoke in favor of carrying out a land reform. The support for the proposal to give the peasant the right to choose where to work—on the kolkhoz, sovkhoz, or his peasant farm—was overwhelming; however, there were serious, substantiated objections to abolishing the state ownership of land. If we cancel it we will unavoidably go from one extreme to the other. In this case, only individual property will have monopoly rights. This is why it is necessary to avoid extremes and stick close to the middle of the road. In this regard, a compromise was proposed: A variety of forms—state, collective, cooperative, and private labor ownership of land. If we want the land to have a master we also need land ownership. There simply is no other choice.

Let us assume that the new law will codify the right of ownership of land by citizens. The following question immediately arises: Will the operators of the shadow economy buy up the land overnight? Will the sales and purchases open up a channel for the highly advantageous investment of the tainted, stolen funds? In this regard, Deputy A.A. Sobchak noted that the formula proposed by no means represents a gold mine for speculators in plots of land. The republic legislation should place a formidable obstacle in the way of abuses. It is necessary to provide for an opportunity to buy out the land only for those who work on it, only on certain terms, and only following a certain duration of leasing or use of a given plot of land. The soviets should have a good idea of who they are selling the land to.

It was stressed at the meeting that a variety of land ownership forms cannot be considered an appeal for the immediate dissolution of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. It is just that people need to have the freedom to choose whether to work on a socialized farm or organize their own peasant, individual farm, set up a cooperative, a partnership, or an association. It was noted at the meeting that, unfortunately, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes are staunchly reluctant to let their employees go with a specific share of their land and fixed assets. The future Land Law should give the peasants this right.

Currently, the people's deputies preparing the final version of the draft basic legislation of the USSR and union republics on Land for the session have much work. Just two weeks remain until the session opens. The amount of

work increased manifold after SELSKAYA ZHIZN published a special questionnaire on 25 January which established a direct contact between the Supreme Soviet and public opinion. Tens of thousands of questionnaires filled out by the readers have already come in. The data are being processed. The results of the poll will be taken into account in developing the final provisions of the draft.

A joint meeting of two parliamentary committees, for agrarian issues and foodstuffs, and for the issues of compliance with the law, legislation, and legal order; on 9 February will ultimately determine what the draft law should be. One thing is clear: The Land Law is being born in a complicated and tormenting manner, overcoming incredible difficulties and clashes. At the same time, a common consensus, a compromise is to be worked out under these circumstances.

As of now, the points of view are diametrically opposed. Suffice it to say that the Union Council of Kolkhozes at its plenum on 17 January voted against the provision of the draft law concerning the lifetime hereditary possession of the land. Its chairman, Deputy I.I. Kukhar, spoke out bluntly against carrying out the land reform.

Scientific

Cargo Spacecraft Ends Mission, Leaves Orbit

LD0902103190 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—By TASS correspondent from the mission control centre:

The Progress M-2 automatic cargo spacecraft, which delivered more than 2.5 tonnes of various cargo to the orbital complex Mir, has finished its mission. At 05.33, Moscow time, [0233 GMT] today, the spacecraft separated from the manned orbital complex, transferred to a descent path, entered the dense layers of the atmosphere and ceased to exist.

Radio engineering systems for the approach of spacecraft with the use of a relay satellite in geostationary orbit were tested during the cargo spacecraft's separation from the orbital station.

Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov continue their work in orbit. This week their work included medico-biological and astrophysical research. The cosmonauts also tried out a new shower installation that is available in the Kvant-2 module.

The experiment, started on the Gallar installation on February 6, is being continued in order to obtain a semi-conductor material, gallium arsenide, in microgravitation conditions. The full cycle of this technological process lasts 120 hours.

According to medical control data, the two cosmonauts are in good health and are feeling well.

Preparations are now under way at Baykonur cosmodrome to launch a Soyuz TM-9 manned spaceship. Lift-off is scheduled for 09.16 Moscow time, [0616 GMT] on February 11.

Military

General Moiseyev on Warsaw Pact-NATO Meetings

LD0902132990 Moscow TASS in English 1136 GMT 9 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow February 9 TASS—Positive processes in the world and particularly in Europe are forcing both politicians and military officers to reassess political priorities and the means to attain them, said General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff.

Today he met his visiting Belgian counterpart Joseph Charlier.

"Regular meetings between representatives of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have already established a good tradition," Moiseyev said.

Such meetings make it possible to gain a better understanding of the stand of the other side and to draw attention to matters that bring the sides closer together, rather than disunite them, he added.

General Charlier said that he is visiting the Soviet Union for the first time and is pleasantly surprised by the ardent and cordial welcome he has received.

He said he was given an opportunity to tour a number of military facilities in Moscow region. "This was even hard to imagine only a couple of years ago," Charlier emphasised.

Causes of Nuclear Sub Accidents Examined

PM0802162990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 p 4

["Viewpoint" article by USSR People's Deputy A. Yemelyanenkov, deputy chief editor of the weekly SOBESEDNIK, on factors leading to the loss of nuclear submarine "Komsomolets" a year ago; and response to the incident by the media and leading officials, published in response to a letter from crew members dissatisfied with the enquiry outcome under the general heading: "Underwater Currents"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Design shortcomings and equipment failures on submarines have begun making themselves felt increasingly frequently: Since the April tragedy in the Northern Fleet there have been three more accidents. But this is what is characteristic: The Navy leadership decided not to report the most recent accident, occurring in December, to the press. This relates to an accident on a nuclear-powered submarine which was making test launches of ballistic missiles. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but considerable damage was caused to the sea area and adjacent territories. [passage omitted]

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